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The  Working  Party on Securities Markets,  consisting of experts nominated by  the 
Member  States and  the  Commission,  was  set up  on  30 October 1967  by  the  Monetary 
Committee  to gather information concerning  the  ways  in which  equilibrium is 
established on  the  bond  markets  in each of the  member  countries. 
It began  by  making  an  inventory of the  procedures  and  instruments used  to ensure 
equilibrium.  Then,  from  October 1968  onwards,  it analysed  the policies pursued by 
the  Member  States with regard to their bond  markets  from  1966 till mid-1969.  For 
this purpose  the  Working  Party used statistical information prepared  by  a  sub-group. 
The  results of this work  were  summarized in a  report in two  parts,  the  first of 
which  was  completed by  the  end  of 1968  and  the  second early in 1970.  They  were  laid 
before  the  Monetary Committee  as  they  became  available.  While  the  report  was  being 
drafted and after its completion,  appreciable  changes  occurred in the  conditions unde~ 
which  equilibrium was  brought  about  in the  bond  markets.  It has not  been  always 
possible  to  take  account  of these:  what  is certain is that  the  very rapid development 
of these  markets  compels  the  authorities,  in general,  to make  continuous  changes in 
the  instruments  and  procedures  used  to  ensure  equilibrium and  leads to  even greater 
changes in the  conditions under which  these  instruments are  used.  These  changes  were 
on  a  particularly large scale  in  the  period  studied,  during  which  many  political and 
monetary events  had  a  marked  influence  on  the  development  of the  capital markets  and 
on  official policy in this field. 
It being impossible  to bring the  report up  to  date  to  cover  these  developments, 
it was  decided  to  fix  the  conclusions reached in the  two  parts of the  report at the 
date  on  which  each  was  submitted  to  the  Monetary Committee,  having  due  regard to the 
statistics then available. 
up-dated  to  the  end  of 1969. 
Much  of the  statistical annex has,  however,  been 
The  main value  of this work  is probably that it has  provided  an  opportunity  for 
the  representatives of the national authorities and  of the  Commission  to carry out 
detailed discussion of the  conditions under  which  equilibrium on  the  bond  markets is 
adjusted and  by this very  process  to  improve  understanding of the  machinery  and  the 
way  it is used. 
- 1  -An  improved  understanding of the  bond  markets  enables each  Member  State to gain 
more  from  the  experience  of the  partner countries and is a  first necessary  step 
towards  any  alignment at Community  level.  The  Monetary  Committee  felt,  however, 
that  the  value  of these  comparative  studies warranted their dissemination  outside  the 
Community  and  the  national agencies  for  which  they  were  originally intended.  It 
therefore  decided  to  publish  the  report. 
But  the  work  already  done  has  also  shown  the  usefulness  of closer cooperation in 
the  planning of schemes  to  reform the  structure of the  capital market  and in the 
implementation of the policies of the  Member  States.  The  Committee  therefore 
decided,  when  approving  the  report,  to keep  the  Working  Party in being  and  to  extend 
its mandate  to  cover all problems  connected  with  the  capital markets. 
The  Working  Party's tasks will include: 
(i)  The  drafting,  at  the  request  of the  Committee,  of  any  opinions  called  for in 
this field; 
(ii)  Periodical discussion of developments  on  Community  markets  and of their 
contacts with international markets; 
(iii)  The  examination of all aspects of  the  policies pursued  by  the  Member  States 
with  regard  to  the  capital markets  and of practical opportunities  for 
promoting  and  facilitating their gradual integration. 
- 2  -PART  I 
MAINTENANCE  OF  EQUILIBRIUM 
ON  THE  BOND  MARKETS  OF  THE  EEC  COUNTRIES: 
PROCEDURES  AND  INSTRUMENTS 
(October 1968) In all member  countries the  public authorities endeavour to maintain equilibrium 
on  the bond  markets,  using instruments  and  procedures  made  up  of a  variable  mix of 
official intervention and  restraint  on  the  part of issuers.  Some  of these 
instruments and  procedures  were  evolved after the  world  economic crisis,  most  of them 
after the  Second  World  War;  since  then  they have  been  modified everywhere  and  adapted 
to  the  institutional background of the particular country. 
The  situation on  the  bond  markets,  which  after the  war suffered  from  a  structural 
shortage  owing  to  a  fundamental  disequilibrium between  the  supply of and the  demand 
for  long-term capital,  has  changed  in such  a  way  that  today the difficulties can in 
most  cases be  mitigated by  adjustments  to  the  timing of supply  and  demand  and  to the 
terms  of issues. 
In addition,  the  authorities in certain Member  States have,  in the  light of their 
own  experience  and  that of other countries,  changed  and  improved  their methods  of 
regulating the markets.  While  initially the  approaches  adopted  had  varied 
appreciably,  with  some  countries taking a  decidedly liberal line while  others were 
more  interventionist,  the  arrangements  have  been  changed repeatedly in  Qome  countries 
and have  tended  to  come  closer together. 
The  scale  of market  intervention by  the  authorities cannot be  assessed 
exclusively in terms  of the  regulations which  lay  down  what  they  can  do  in this field; 
a  better means  of assessing it is to examine  the  forms  which  intervention on  the 
market  takes in practice,  for in some  cases  the  authorities have  not  used their 
powers  while  in other cases they have  used  'moral suasion',  their intervention in 
fact going  further  than  seemed possible  in the  light of their powers  as set down  on 
paper. 
The  French system is particularly difficult to describe.  In April  1968 this 
system was  radically changed along  more  liberal lines;  owing  to  the  events of May, 
however,  the  authorities ordered a  three-month ban  on  certain issues,  so that the  new 
procedures  were  tried out  for  a  relatively short period only.  It has  therefore 
appeared expedient  to describe not  only  the  principles and  the  working details of the 
current arrangements  but also  to recall certain aspects of the  system in effect before 
the  reform of April 1968. 
- 4  -CHAPTER  I.  INTERVENTION  BY  THE  AUTHORITIES  AT  THE  ISSUE  STAGE 
In all member  countries the  floating of a  public  loan is subject  to  certain 
controls ensuring at least that  the  authorities supervising the  market  are  informed 
and also,  in most  cases,  that  the  equilibrium of the  market  is maintained. 
There  are,  however,  major  differences in the  oojectives,  legal bases  and  the 
practical implementation of these  controls. 
A.  Comparison  of objectives and  methods 
Although it is very difficult to  give  a  summary  account  bringing out  resemblances 
and  differences between official policy objectives in the  member  countries  and  between 
the  methods  used  to safeguard market  equilibrium,  they  may  be  summed  up  as  follows, 
fuller details  for  each  country being given in the  pages that  follow. 
1.  Objectives 
The  objectives which  the  authorities of the  member  countries  pursue in practice, 
explicitly or implicitly,  are  the  following: 
(i)  Protection of the  saver:  all countries; 
(ii)  Elimination of temporary  overloading of the  market:  all countries; 
(iii)  Stabilization of rates of yield:  France,  Italy, Netherlands; 
(iv)  ~  ~  priority for satisfaction of public  sector needs:1  Belgium,  Italy, 
France  (particularly before  the  reform); 
(v)  Priority for  domestic  issuers over  foreign  issuers:  all countries except 
Germany  and  Luxembourg. 
1  Here,  the  public  sector is to be  understood in the  broad  sense  and includes central 
government,  local authorities,  credit institutions and public  and  semi-public 
enterprises. 
- 5 -2.  Methods 
To  attain these  objectives,  the  countries endeavour  to stagger issues 
(procedures  used  vary  in rigour).  Methods  may  be  classified as  follows: 
(i)  Establishment  of a  time-table  by  the  public authorities:  Belgium  (for 
public-sector loans),  Italy,  France  (before  the  reform); 
(ii)  Arrangements  to  coordinate  action between  the  public  authorities and  the 
banks:  Netherlands,  France  (after the  reform); 
(iii)  Arrangements  (a)  within  a  committee  of banks  to  coordinate  domestic  block 
issues  by  the  private  sector and  DM  issues by  foreign borrowers,  and  (b) 
within  a  committee  of public  borrowers  to  coordinate  public-sector issues; 
action  to  fix  the  terms  and  dates  of issues  by  banks:  Germany; 
(iv)  Autonomous  fixing of the  date  of issue  by  the  banks:  Luxembourg; 
(v)  Possibility of using rules designed primarily to  protect  the  saver but  which 
can  also be  used  to  avoid  serious  overloading of the  market:  Germany, 
Belgium,  Luxembourg; 
(vi)  Possibility of limiting private-sector issues by administrative  action: 
France,  Italy; 
(vii)  Possibility of limiting private-sector issues by administrative  action; 
all countries in a  period of crisis. 
In practice  the  methods  used  by the  individual countries differ more  widely in 
normal  times  than in times  of a  market  crisis.  Even  in the  countries  where  the 
policy is to regulate  the  market  by  relying  on  issuers'  restraint  and  market  forces, 
the  authorities have  power,  used  only in case  of serious strain,  to  limit 
public-sector issues  (Germany,  the  Netherlands),  and  even private-sector issues as 
well  (France). 
Although  three  countries have  made  arrangements  to  coordinate  the  timing of 
issues,  the  implementing  arrangements  are  in no  two  cases  the  same. 
In Germany,  issues are  floated in normal  periods without official intervention 
to  regulate  the  amount,  timing or  terms.  The  decision  on  these  points lies with  the 
banks,  which  take  the  market  situation as  a  guide.  Temporary strains are  also 
eliminated without official intervention thanks  to voluntary restraint  on  the  part 
of  the  borrowers. 
- 6  -Some  groups  of issuers have  a  special coordinating body  - the  Central Capital 
Market  Committee  (Zentraler Kapitalmarktausschuss  des  Bankgewerbes,  ZKA)  - for 
private-sector issues  floated  throu~h a  banking  consortium,  and  the  Council  on 
Economic  Trends  (Konjunkturrat)  for  pu~lic-sector issues.  It should,  however,  be 
emphasized  that  the  timing of public-sector issues is fixed  by  the  one  body 
independently of  the  timing arrangements  for private-sector issues established by  the 
other. 
In normal  times,  the  authorities  can  influence  the  timing of public-sector 
issues  only,  and  their role is confined  to  ensuring that  the  public  borrowers 
coordinate  action  among  themselves. 
In  the  case  of serious disturbances  on  the  market,  which  so  far have  occurred 
only once,  in 1965/66,  when  the  volume  of operations  dropped  by  roughly  60%,  the 
authorities  may  ration public-sector  demand  (provided  an appropriate Decree  has  been 
published  previously),  and  also  curb  in  some  measure  private-sector demand  if public 
issues are  affected. 
Private  placings,  however,  which  constitute  a  considerable  share  of the  market 
(25%),  are  not  subject  to  control by  the  public  authorities,  even in times  of crisis. 
These  mainly  take  the  form  of loans against borrowers'  notes1  (the  principal 
creditors being private  insurance  companies,  which  in 1967  granted  loans  totalling 
some  DM  2  400  million),  and  registered bonds,2  which  in 1967  accounted  for  some  10% 
of the  gross sales of bonds  and  even  less in the  normal  years prior to 1967  (it is 
mainly  the  mortgage  institutions which  raise additional  funds  through registered 
bonds). 
In France,  by  contrast,  since  the  refo~m of April 1968,  the  arrangements  to 
coordinate  action  between  the  public authorities and  the Banking Committee  have 
covered  the  whole  of public- and  private-sector issues. 
In  case  of serious strain,  the  Minister of Economics  and  Finance  may  use  his 
powers  to  delay or suspend all issues. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  Central Bank  may  bring its influence  to bear  on  the 
banks,  particularly as regards  the  date  and  possibly also  the  terms  of public  issues 
floated  by  the  private sector and,  for  certain issues,  also  by  the  public sector. 
1  Schuldscheine. 
2  Namensschuldverschreibungen. 
- 7  -When  the  market  is under strain,  the  Government  may  also,  by  means  of a 
comparatively  cumbersome  procedure,  limit the calls which  the  public  sector makes  on 
the  market.  There  is,  however,  no  way  of limiting private-sector demand,  except by 
moral pressure brought  to bear on  the  banks. 
Private placings,  which  in the  Netherlands account  for  a  much  larger part of the 
market  than  in any  other EEC  country  (four times  the  volume  of net domestic  issues 
floated publicly,  against at most  one  fourth  or one  fifth in the  other countries)  are 
not subject to  control by  the  public authorities,  and  this is a  major obstacle  to 
effective  public  control. 
In Belgium  and Italy,  where  the  authorities heavily influence or actually control 
the  timing of issues without  the  banks participating in their decisions,  the  volume 
of private-sector issues is relatively small  compared  with that of public-sector 
issues  (central government,  nationalized industries,  public  credit institutions). 
This is said to  be  not  so  much  the  result of any rationing of the  private sector in 
order to give  the  public  sector priority as  of two  special  factors:  firstly,  there 
are  few  private-sector enterprises large  enough  to use  the  market  directly; 
secondly,  enterprises which  are  able  to  do  so  prefer to call on  credit institutions, 
which grant  them  loans at subsidized rates of interest,  and  consequently at a  cost 
lower  than  that of raising  funds  on  the  bond  market.  As  loans at subsidized rates 
are  widely  available  in these  countries,  many  enterprises take  advantage  of this way 
of raising  funds. 1 
In Italy the  public  credit institutions are  also  able  - quite  apart  from  any 
subsidization of interest rates - to  raise  funds  on  the  market  and  relend  them  to 
enterprises at interest rates that are  lower  than  the  ones  the  latter would  have  to 
pay if they used  the  market  directly. 
There is in Belgium a  substantial latent demand  from  the  public  sector,  which 
makes  as  many  calls on  the  market  as it can  take.  This no  doubt  tends  to  discourage 
calls  from  potential private  issuers,  without  there being a  need  for  a  recommendation, 
let alone  an express decision,  ~Y the  authorities supervising the  market. 
1  In  France,  the  problem of the  m1n1mum  size  required  for  access  to  the  market  has 
been  partly resolved  oy  recourse  to grouped  loans.  Loans  are  alsowailable at 
interest rates  lower  than  those  ruling on  the  market,  but  they  are  granted less 
liberally than  in Belgium  and  Italy. 
- 8  -In Italy and  Belgium,  then,  the  structure of demand  for  capital explains  why  the 
time-table  for  issues is established by  the  authorities without official coordination 
with  the  banks.  The  time-table  is mainly  a  function  of planned public-sector issues. 
B.  Legal basis and  scope  of  the  powers  available  to  the  authorities supervising the 
markets  for  public  issues  floated  by  residents 
1.  Main  features 
Official intervention has  three  types of legal basis that differ widely: 
(i)  Some  rules explicitly provide  for intervention by  the  authorities to  maintain 
market  equilibrium by  rationing demand;  this applies  in Germany  and  the 
Netherlands  only  in exceptional situations of disequilibrium  and  only  to 
public-sector  demand,  in France  to all issues but  only  in case  of strain,  and 
in Italy to all issues at all times. 
(ii)  Some  rules are  mainly  designed  to protect the  saver,  but may  be  used in 
exceptional  cases or regularly to maintain market  equilibrium as well,  by 
rationing private-sector demand;  in Germany  these rules have  been  used  in one 
year only  (1966),  in Belgium they have  been  used  only at certain moments  and 
only  informally,  while  in Luxembourg  they are  available  but  have  never yet been 
used. 
In  these  countries,  the  market  for private-sector issues is regulated less 
by  the  actual use  of such  formal  powers  than  by  informal  recommendations  issued 
by  the  relevant authorities. 
(iii)  In the Netherlands  there is an original type  of legal basis  for Central Bank 
intervention in respect of public  issues:  this is a  gentlemen's agreement  with 
the  banks,  requiring  them  to keep  the Central Bank  informed of their issue 
plans  and  giving the  Central Bank  a  power  of recommendation  concerning  the  date 
of the  issues  and  the  terms  upon  which  they are  made. 
- 9  -2.  Analysis of intervention on  the  primary market  by  country 
Germany 
(a)  Private-sector issues  and issues by  local authorities 
Articles  795  and  808a of the  German  Civil Code  (BGB)  make  the  issue  of all bearer 
or order  bonds  other  than  those  of the  Federal Government,  the  Lander,  the  Federal 
Railways,  the  Federal Postal Administration  and  the Equalization of Burdens  Fund 
subject to  authorizations.  Even  issues by  local authorities are  subject to 
authorization,  as  are  foreign issues  floated  in Germany.  Similarly,  authorization 
is necessary  for  tap issues  (mortgage  bonds  and  "communal"  bonds  of the  mortgage 
institutions,  and  medium-term  securities issued  by  the  credit institutions to 
refinance  medium-term  investment  loans). 
The  authorization procedure  is mainly intended  to  protect the  saver,  but  as  an 
exception it can in case  of crisis also  be  used  to ensure,  in  the  interest of market 
equilibrium,  improved  timing of issues. 
A law  of'26 June  1954  defined the  powers  of the Ministry for Economic  Affairs 
under  this procedure,  bringing into effect again Article  795  of the  HGB,  which  had 
been  abrogated  by  the  capital movements  laws  of 1949  and  1952. 
It should,  however,  be  noted  that  the  powers  conferred  on  the  Ministry  for 
Economic  Affairs  were  used  only  in 1965-1966,  as  an  exception,  to ensure better 
spacing  out of issues.  No  express  decision  was  taken  to  suspend  issues,  the  granting 
of authorizations being  merely  delayed in agreement  with  the  issuers. 
Normally,  temporary  fluctuations  on  the  market  are  avoided  by  coordination  and 
voluntary restraint  on  th~ part of the  issuing houses,  without  public  authority 
intervention.  This  coordination takes  place  in  the  Central Capital Market  Committee, 
composed  of eleven representatives of the  banks,  of  whom  six are  representatives of 
the  credit institutions which  issue  bonds  of their own  (tap issues),  and  one  observer 
from  the  Bundesbank  who  informs  the  Committee  of  the  issue  plans  of the  public 
authorities. 
- 10  -(b)  Publio-seotor issues 
The  Aot  for Economic  Stability and  Growth  of 8  June 1967  gave  the  Federal 
Government  certain powers  of intervention. 
This Act  set up a  Council  on  Economic  Trends  (Konjunkturrat  fUr  die 5ffentliohe 
Hand),  presided over by the  Federal Minister for Economic  Affairs and  composed  of 
representatives of the  Federal Ministry of Finance,  the  LMnder  and local authorities. 
The  Bundesbank also  sends an observer. 
In normal  times  the  Council is nothing more  than a  body  ensuring concerted action 
and voluntary restraint among  public borrowers.  It examines  the credit requirements of 
the public  sector,  assesses the market  situation and  formulates  recommendations 
concerning priorities among  public borrowers and  the  size of their issues.  In doing so, 
the  Council  takes into account  the urgency of the  financing requirements of the  private 
sector as  shown  in the applications for authorization filed with  the Ministry for 
Economic  Affairs and  in the information received  from  the  Central  Capital  Market 
Committee.  It makes  no  more  than a  general examination of the  terms of the issue,  their 
fixing being normally left to  the banks. 
In this way  the  Council has given official status to the  round-table talks which 
have  been organized by the Federal Ministry for Economic  Affairs  since 1965  with  the 
same  participants and  the  same  objectives. 
In the event  of an exceptional  situation of market disequilibrium arising the  Act 
confers increased powers of intervention on  the  Federal  Government.  It may  issue 
decrees making the  Council's recommendations  binding and thus: 
(i)  Limit  public-sector indebtedness in the  form  of loans or other credit  for a 
specific period; 
(ii)  Fix the maximum  amount  and  the  terms of loans; 
(iii) Make  the issue time-table binding for three months. 
These  decisions would,  however,  have  to be  approved by the Bundesrat  (the Upper 
House  of the  Federal Parliament). 
Furthe~ore, when  loans are loans floated by the  Federal  Government,  the  Federal 
Railways,  the  Federal  Postal Administration and  the  Linder,  the Bundesbank is also 
associated with the operation.  The  issues are  floated either through  the Bank  or in 
-11-agreement  with it (Article  20(2)  or  the Federal Bank  Law  - Bundesbankgesetz).  As  the 
Bundesbank is represented  on  the  Council  on  Economic  Trends and on  the Central  Capital 
Market  Committee,  and as on  account of its activities it is in permanent  touch with the 
banks  and  the  stock exchanges and therefore has an overall view of the situation on  the 
capital market,  it is in a  position to give  opinions concerning the date,  the  amount  and 
the  terms of public loans.  In these opinions, it takes account of the recommendations 
made  by the  Council  on Economic  Trends. 
(c)  Formalities prior to flotation 
To  obtain authorization under Articles 795  and  808a of the  Get"JDan  Civil  Code,  the 
issuer has to  file an application with  the Federal Ministry for  Economic  Affairs via the 
appropriate Ministry of the  Land  where  he resides  (generally the  Land  Ministry of 
Economics  but  sometimes  also the  Land  Ministry of Finance),  which  renders an opinion  on 
the credit rating of the  company  or the indebtedness of the issuing municipality. 
Authorization is in general granted within three weeks;  five  or six weeks  may,  however, 
be required if enterprises are  involved whose  credit  standing takes longer to 
investigate.  Costs are very low  (0.025% of the amount  of the issue,  with  an upper limit 
of Dl4  2  000). 
The  Federal Ministry for Economic  Affairs issues a  written authorization valid for 
one  year,  and this may  be  renewed  free  of charge if necessary. 
Belgium 
(a)  Private-sector issues 
The  Royal  Decree  No.  185 of 9 July 1935  setting up  the  Banking Commission 
(Commission  bancaire),  amended  by  Royal  Decree  No.  67  of 30  November  1939  (Article Be), 
vested this body  with  the right to supervise private-sector issues. 
These  supervisory arrangements  are  designed not only to protect the  saver but also 
to out  down  or spread  over a  longer period issues liable to disturb equilibrium on  the 
capital market.  To  this end,  the Banking  Commission  sends recommendations to the 
issuing company  and  the  issuing banks  which  have  filed an application.  These 
recommendations  take into account the information available to the  Commission  on  issue 
plans in the public sector and  on  the  market  situation.  If its opinion is not complied 
with,  it may  delay the operation by three months  by means  of a  decision accompanied  by 
an explanation. 
- 12 ·-It also makes  recommendations  on interest rates in an effort to  ensu_~ that  the 
yields on  issues of private-sector bonds  do  not differ unduly  from  the yields  on 
issues of public-sector bonds  or from  yields  on  other securities. 
There  are  no  coordinating problems between the  Banking Commission,  which 
supervises the issuing projects of the  private sector,  and  the Ministry of Finance, 
which  draws  up the time-table  for public-sector issues,  as the  volume  of public issues 
by  the  private  sector is relatively small  when  compared  with  the public issues floated 
by the  public  sector  (for the years 1966-1968  they represent  some  15%  of the net value 
of all public issues).  Contacts are  maintained  among  officials with  a  view to 
exchanging information on  planned issues. 
(b)  Public-sector issues 
The  law of 16  March  1954  and  the  statutes of the various quasi-public bodies, 
which all include a  clause preventing them  from  floating loans unless  they have 
received prior authorization from  the Minister of Finance,  give  the Minister 
considerable  influence  over the fixing of the time-table. 
Loans  rai·eed by the quasi-public  bodies must  also be  authorized by  the  competent 
Minister. 
Every year the Minister of Finance  draws  up  an overall list of the needs of the 
central  government  and  the  various public borrowers  and establishes at the beginning 
of the  year the  issue time-table,  taking into account  the national budget  and  the 
financial  equilibrium of the various quasi-public bodies,  the capacity of the market, 
the trend of the economy  and of the balance of payments,  and  the  redemption  dates for 
earlier loans.  He  also takes account  of the issue plans of the private  sector,  of 
which  he  is informed by the Banking Commission.  It rarely happens that the time-table 
is changed during the  year but there is nevertheless  some  room  for flexibility despite 
the  structural deficit of the  central  government  and  the  obligations in connection 
with redeption. 
In regulating the market,  the Minister may  be  assisted by two  consultative 
bodies: 
(i} The  Conseil  des institutions publiques  de  credit  (Council  of Public Credit 
Institutions,  statute of 1937  amended  by  Royal  Decree  No.  18 of 25  May  1967)  may 
be  consulted on matters such  as the  terms of issues by the quasi-public credit 
institutions; 
- 13-{ii) The  Conseil  superieur des  Finances  {Higher  Finance  Council,  statute amended  by 
Royal  Decree No.  17  of 23  May  1967)  may  be  instructed to assist the Minister in 
the  preparation and  implementation  of the  finance  policy measures applicable to 
the  various capital markets;  it has,  however,  not  been set up  yet. 
In short,  the Minister of Finance  not  only regulates the market in the  short  term 
but also  structural  developments in the rates of interest. 
{c)  Formalities prior  to  flotation 
Any  person intending to "display for  sale,  offer for  sale or sell publicly company 
shares of any kind  {actions,  titres ou  parts beneficiaires de  societas)  or bonds"  must 
inform the Banking Commission at least fifteen days before  the proposed date of issue 
of the details of the operation envisaged and  attach all the information and  statements 
of accounts required in such  oases. 
The  Banking Commission  may  ask for additional  information and  address 
recommendations to the  company  in an informal  way  by  getting in touch with its 
management. 
If these  recommendations are not  complied with,  the Banking Commission  may,  by  a 
reasoned decision sent  by registered letter,  delay the  issue  for a  maximum  of three 
months  from  the date  of notification of the decision to the party concerned. 
The  quasi-public institutions submit their applications to the Minister of Finance 
via  the  competent Minister,  who  renders an opinion. 
{a)  The  powers  of the  Minister of Economic  Affairs and  Finance 
The  law of 23  December  1946  {Article 82)  introduced a  procedure  for prior 
authorization by  the Minister of Economic  Affairs and  Finance  in case of "any increase 
in capital,  no  matter what  form  it takes,  any issue,  display,  offer for  sale or 
introduction on  the  French  market  of loans,  bonds,  shares  and  securities of French 
corporations or French  private-sector companies". 
For issues exceeding FF  250  000,  this law gives  the  Minister  the  power  to regulate 
all terms  (date  of issue,  amount,  rate of interest,  issue  price,  redemption  price, 
- 14-maturity,  redemption arrangements and  any additional benefits)  and to establish a 
time-table  for  the issues.  This  time-table is an effective instrument  for the 
allocation of resources in accordance  with the  guidelines of the  economic  plan. 
Various ministerial decisions  {16  January 1958,  16  June  1958,  7 March  1959, 
22  August  1963,  7 January 1966),  however,  exempted  certain issue  operations  from  the 
prior authorization requirement  while retaining the  obligation to inform  the Minister 
and his power  to delay these  io:'l'.H::t  or  rnorlify  their terms.  Despite this concession, 
any bond  issue exceeding FF  15 million remained  subject to prior authorization  and  any 
issue  exceeding FF  30  million had to be  included in the  time-table. 
By  a  ministerial decision of 18  April  1969,  the Minister of Economic  Affairs and 
Finance waived  some  of the rights he  had  under  the  law of 1946  by abolishing the 
obligation to  seek authorization for any issue of bonds  and retaining only the 
obligation to notify issues of FF  15 million and  more. 
He  reserved,  however,  the right to depart  again  from  this more  libe~al system 
without  formality  and without notice.  Since this reform,  all the  procedure  of 1946  does 
is to furnish the legal 'hasis  for the Ministel''s discretionary power  to delay or suspend 
issues in case of heavy strain on  the  market  (right of veto). 
(b)  The  role of the banks  and of the  Banking Commission 
The  role of the  banks and  the details of the coordinating arrangement  introduced 
between  them  and  the Minister of Economic  Affairs and  Finance  were  set out  in a  joint 
declaration of intent by the Minister and  the main  banks in March  1968. 
The  absolute  powers  for  fixing the  time-table and all ·terms of an  issue enjoyed 
by the Minister before the reform were  replaced by coordination between the Miniater 
and  the  banks  concerning the timing of the issues and  the  general  level  of coupon 
interest rates.  The  dates,  amounts  and  terms of issues are  thus  fixed  jointly,  but  in 
case  of conflict the  final  decision lies with the Minister of Finance.1  This applies 
not  only to private-sector issues but  also to issues by  the  publie and  semi-public 
1  During the capital market  crisis caused by  the  events of May  1968,  the temporary 
ban  on issues was  agreed between the  Minister and  the banks. 
- 15 -sectors;  theiT needs are still given priority ranking although in 1968  the necessary 
adjustments  affected primarily the  public and  semi-public  sectors.  Since the reform  of 
placing techniqueo,  the  floating of public-sector loans depends  in greater measure  than 
before  on  smooth  cooperation by  the  banks,  as the latter may  now  refuse to underwrite  a 
public-sector issue which  they believe to be  too big or made  on  terms  incompatible with 
the market  situation.1 
The  banks align their views and  coordinate their measures within a  Banking 
Committee  consisting of representatives of the  three nationalized banks,  two  non-
nationalized deposit  banks  and  one  investment  bank  {banque d'affaires). 
(c)  Forrr.alities prior to flotation 
Since  the reform of April 1968,  companies  are  merely required  to notify  the 
Ministry of Economic  Affairs and  Finance  fifteen  ~ays in advance  of any planned issue 
of an  amount  of FF  15 mil1ion  or more. 
There  are  no  other written formalities,  but  a  period of about  a  fortnight is 
needed  for  the coordinating contacts between the bankers participating in the issue 
and  the Ministry. 
Under  the  special  rules  governing loans floated by  the  Government  and its 
agencies,  the local  authorities and  public enterprises or establishments,  all public-
and  semi-public-sector issues are  subject to authorization  by decree  or ministerial 
order. 
The  combined  powers of the Ministers responsible  for  the Treasury,  and  for Industry, 
Commerce  and  Crafts,  of the  Central  Bank  and  of the Inter-Ministerial  Credit  and 
Savings  Committee  make  it possible  to  fix all  terms of a  bond  iasue  and  to  channel  the 
resources into schemes  that enjoy pric>rity under the  Government's  e.conomic  policy. 
1  At  the beginning of 1968,  the volume  of issues by  public enterprises dropped  for the 
first time  in ten years,  and implementation of the  reform  was  acc~mpanied by  an 
increase in the yield on issue in line with market  conditions  (by  about 1/4%  for 
public- and  semi-public-sector issues and  about 1/3%  for issues carrying no 
government  guarantee)  while the placing commissions  of the banks fell. 
- 16  -(a)  Lesal basis  for official intervention in the authorization procedure 
The  powers  of the various authorities vary somewhat  with the type  of issuer and 
the  methods  of issue. 
Banking law No.  375  of 13  March  1936  (Articles  2,  44  and  45)  makes  all  the 
following types of issue subject to authorization by  the Bank  of Italy: 
(i)  Issue through credit establishments  subject to supervision by the Bank  of Italy 
(except  for government  and  government-guaranteed bonds); 
(ii)  Securities admitted or to be  admitted to quotation on  an Italian stock 
exchange; 
(iii) All  issues by credit establishments  and institutions,  except mortgage bonds 
(cartelle fondiarie)  issued  by those institutions entitled to lend on  mortgage 
and  those issued by  credit institutions which  finance  public works  (cartelle 
opere  pubbliche)  and  by those institutions entitled to make  agricultural loans, 
if they have been placed on  a  similar basis to institutions issuing mortgage 
bonds. 
Law  No.  428  of 3 May  1955 makes  company  issues exceeding Lit.  500 million  subject 
to prior authorization  from  the Ministries responsible for the  Treasury,  for Industry, 
and  for  Commerce  and  Crafts;  the Inter-Ministerial Credit  and Savings  Committee  must 
be  consulted before the  authorization is given. 
Lastly,  the  statutes and bye-laws of certain bodies and  authorities regulate the 
terms of issues floated  by them: 
(i)  Local authorities  (Article  300  of the  communal  and  proVincial  law,  amended  by 
law No.  10 of 5 January 1950):  authorization by the Ministries of the Treasury 
and  the Interior;  the Central  Committee  for  Local  Finance  and  the  Council  for 
Provincial Administration  (Giunta)  must be  consulted before authorization is 
given; 
(ii)  IRI:  authorization by  the Bank  of Italy; 
(iii) ERI:  authorization  from  the Ministers responsible  for the Treasury,  Industry, 
and  Commerce  and  Crafts,  the Ministry of State Participations,  and  the Bank  of 
Italy; 
(iv)  ENEL:  authorization by the Inter-Ministerial  Credit  and  Savings  Committee  and  the 
Bank  of Italy; 
-n-(v)  Autonomous  administrative agencies:  authorization by  a  decree  of the Ministers 
of the Treasury and  of State Participations,  following an opinion rendered  by  the 
Inter-Ministerial  Credit and  Savings  Committee; 
(vi)  Motorway  companies:  authorization by  the Ministries of the Treasury,  of Industry 
and  of Commerce  and  Crafts,  the  Bank  of Italy and  the Inter-Ministerial Credit 
and  Savings  Committee; 
(vii)  Finance  companies  set up  by  special laws:  authorization by the Inter-Ministerial 
Credit  and  Savings  Committee. 
(b)  The  roles of the various authorities 
Each  authority has  a  special task: 
The  Inter-Ministerial Credit and  Savings  Committee,  presided over by the Minister 
of the Treasury and  consisting of representatives of any of the  above-mentioned 
ministries that are likely to be  involved  and  of the  Bank  of Italy,  must  in some  cases 
give its authorization but usually merely renders an opinion;  it seeks to achieve 
stable interest rates  by putting out  general  directives  on  the  terms  and  details of 
issues and by  ensuring,  where  it· participates in the authorization procedure  through 
endorsement  or rendering an opinion,  that  the  yields  of similar securities do  not  show 
unjustified disparities. 
The  Treasury reviews the market to establish whether or not the issues can be 
absorbed,  given the  needs  of official departments,  and  plays a  key role in the vetting 
of applications. 
The  Ministries of Industry,  of Commerce  and  Crafts and of State  Participations 
endeavour to channel  resources into uses that are in line with  the desired development 
of investment in the various sectors. 
The  Bank  of Italy has the  special  task of protecting the  saver;  it examines  the 
issues  from  a  legal  and  technical  point of view and also looks into the  financial 
situation of the issuers.  By  virtue  of a  mandate  from  the Treasury and  the Inter-
Ministerial  Credit and  Savings  Committee,  it also fixes  the  exact dates  and  terms for 
the  flotation of issues.  The  authorization given for issues does not  specify the dates 
when  they are to be  floated and leaves  some  latitude as to the  terms.  In the  final 
analysis it is therefore  the Bank  of Italy which  fixes,  under  powers  delegated to it, 
the time-table and the details of the  issues.  It maintains constant  contact with 
borrowers and lenders  (particularly the banks)  through  informal  quarterly meetings. 
- 18  -(c)  Authorization procedure 
The  law does  not  specify the procedure  to be  followed in authorizing issues.  The 
following "administrative practice" has,  however,  emerged. 
Applications which  fall entirely within the competence  of the ministries are 
submitted to the Ministry of Industry or the Ministry of Commerce  and  Crafts,  which 
pass  them  on  to the Treasury,  with  a  note  signifying their approval.  The  Treasury 
examines  the application in consultation with the  Bank  of Italy,  which is required to 
obtain the  opinion  of the Inter-Ministerial Credit and  Savings  Committee. 
The  Treasury then issues the  authorization requested,  referring to the  opinion  of 
the  Committee  and  the agreement  of the Ministries of Industry and  of Commerce  and 
Crafts.  If one  of the ministries refuses to give its authorization,  the  procedure is 
blocked. 
Applications  for  which  the  Bank  of Italy is also responsible are dealt with in the 
same  way,  but  when  the Bank  passes the matter on  to  the  Committee it states explicitly 
whether or not it intends to endorse  them.  If it withholds its approval,  ministerial 
authorization may  still be  given,  provided the issuing company  waives  any right to 
effect the  operation through  the  banks and/or have  the securities quoted  on  the  stock 
exchange. 
The  procedure  takes two  to  four  weeks  and  the  cost  (representing stamp tax) is 
negligible.  The  applicant  then receives an authorization under which  he  may  in principle 
float a  loan within a  period varying from  a  few  weeks  to several  months.  The  Bank  of 
Italy then informs the  issuer of the  date  and  the  exact terms  for the  flotation. 
Luxembourg 
The  Grand-Ducal  Decree of 19 June 1965 setting up a  Commissariat  to supervise 
banking laid down  the respective  contributions  t.o  be made  by  the  supervising 
Com~issioner an•i  by  the Minister at the Treasury to the  maintenance  of market 
equilibrium  (Article 16)  and to the  protection of the  saver  (Article 17),  the intention 
bei~g to  put  teeth into the  company  law of 10 August 1915. 
- 19-Like  the Belgian Banking Commission,  which  served as  a  model,  the  supervising 
Commissioner must  be  informed of the  terms of the operation 15  days  before  the date  of 
flotation.  He  may  address  recommendationsto  the issuer if a  proposed public issue is 
likely to disturb equilibrium  on  the market. 
If the  issuer faiis to comply  with  the recommendations  of which  he  has been 
notified,  the  Commissioner may  propose  to  the Minister at the Treasury that he  should 
give  a  decision accompanied by  an explanation,  which  may  be  made  public.  Under  such  a 
decision,  the issue can be  delayed for a  maximum  of three months. 
The  same  procedure  may  be  followed in the interests of the protection of the  saver, 
but  even in this case  there is only a  power  of delay. 
In practice,  the  Commissioner has  so  far done  no  more  than collect information and 
has never used his powers,  leaving it entirely to the banks  to fix the date and  the 
terms of an issue. 
For  public-sector issues,  the Treasury fixes the  date  of issue independently of 
any  other authority,  while  the  Commissioner  ensures that  during the period of issue 
there are no  privat~-sector issues to distut"b it. 
Netherlands 
(a)  Powers  of the  Central Bank 
In normal  times,  the  main  power  to regulate the  market lies with  the  Central  Bank 
by virtue of a  gentlemen's agreement  concluded with  ~he other banks in 1954.  Under  this 
agreement,  which is based on an exchange  of letters between. the  Central  Bank  and  the 
bankers'  association,  the members  of the association are required to  inform  the  Central 
Bank  before  floating any public loan of more  than Fl.  10 million.  The  Central Bank  then 
draws  up  an issue time-table and may  recommend  that certain issues be  held over in order 
to avoid overloading of the market and an undesirable rise in interest rates;  it holds 
informal discussions with the various banks. 
Although  there is no  sanction for non-compliance  with the gentlemen's agreement, 
it has,  to all intents and  purposes,  the  same  force  as a  law,  since legal provisions 
could be  adopted if it proved  i~sa~ficient. 
- 20  -The  Central Bank  implements  the gentlemen's  agreement  autonomously,  reserving the 
right  toa 
(i)  Modify  its programme  should the central government  want  to  use  the markets; 
(ii)  Take  account  of the continuing needs  of the  local authorities  and  enable  the Bank 
for Netherlands  Municipalities  (Bank  voor Nederlandsche  Gemeenten)  to float  one 
or two  public  loans every quarter. 
(b)  Powers  of the Government 
The  Government  contributes to market  equilibrium by being careful to adjust its 
borrowing policy to the  capacity of the  market,  its principle being to give priority to 
the borrowing requirements  of trade  and  industry and  the  municipalities. 
In addition,  the  law of 1963  on  municipal  and  provincial expenditure  empowers  the 
Minister of Finance,  in agreement  with  the Ministers  of Home  Affairs  and  Transport  and 
with the subsequent  approval  of the Parliament,  to place  a  limit on  loans floated by the 
local  authorities or to prescribe certain forms  for  them  in specific circumstances. 
(i) Article 4 of the  law authorizes  the  GoYernment,  in case  of  overheating or a 
threat  of overheating of the  economy,  to place,  for a  period of no  more  than 
one  year,  a  ceiling on  the debts  contracted for more  than one  year by the 
municipalities and  public corporations (in the form  of public  loans  or in any 
other form)  with a  view to indirectly curbing investment. 
(ii) Article 5 empowers  the Government,  when  there are strains on  the capital market 
that  jeopardize the supply of capital to the  municipalities and  public  corporati~ 
or prevent  the  supply of capital reaching the  ceiling fixed under Article 4,  to 
rule that the municipalities  and  public corporations m~  contract loans for more 
than  one  year with only one  or more  specific institutions,  chiefly the  Bank  for 
Netherlands Municipalities.  Such  central financing is designed to mitigate as 
far as  possible  the  harmful effects which  a  serious disturbance of the capital 
market  would  have  on  the financing of the  local authorities and  the public 
institutions. 
If the  eoonomy  overheats at a  time  when  the capital market is also under strain-
which  often happens  ~ a  choice must  be  made  between  these two  instruments,  that  are 
mutually exclusive.  In practice,  loans  have  been centralized since  1965. 
- 21  -(c)  Control  p~ocedure 
In  addition to the  re~~lar contacts between the  Central Bank  and  the four or five 
banks usually leading the  issue consortia,  the banks  have  informal contacts with  each 
other before each  issue.  On  this  occasion,  the  Central Bank  m~  make  semi-official 
recommendations  on  the  terms  and  the  timing of an  issue.  The  banks  fix the exact date 
within the margin of two  or three weeks  given to them.  It seldom happens that  the 
Central Bank  asks private-sector companies  to reduce  the  amount  of the proposed  issue, 
and  if the latter have  to wait for more  than  two  months  they prefer to use the private 
1  market,  to which  they have  always  had  completely free  access  and  which  is, depending 
on  the year,  three or four times larger than the market  for public  issues.  The  market 
regulation measures  of the Central Bank  therefore cover only about  one  fifth of the 
to~al market  in long-term loans. 
c.  Control  of tap issues  and  issues  placed privately 
In all the  member  countries,  these  issues are subject to simpler formalities  than 
issues  in  large tranches. 
1.  Tap  issues 
These  issues are  so1newhat  difficult to define.  Issued continuously  o~ in regular 
series,  they are  roughly classifiable as bonds  or certificates of deposits,  depending 
on  their characteristics,  which vary from  country to country.  Despite these peculiarities 
they may  be  considered as part of the  medium- and  long-term fixed-interestwbearing 
securities market  because  t~ey are  an alternative means  of finance for the  issuer or of 
investment for the  saver and  because  the  trend in these issues is often linked to the 
trend  on  that market. 
1  The  yield on  this private market  is somewhat  higher than  the yield for public  issues, 
but  the  placing commissions  on  the private market  are  lower.  It should be  noted that 
the underwriting  co~mission for  a  public issue  (1  1/z<)  is exceptionally low  compared 
with the  commissions  charged in the  other REC  countries. 
- 22  -These securities are  considered in this study even where  they are not called bonds, 
provided they have all of the  following features•  maturity  mo~e than one  year, 
availability to the  public,  "mobilizabili  ty"  (even if on  a  special market  o~ only with 
the  issuer),  yield close to that of bonds  with  the  same  life.  The  yield on  ~edium-term 
securities is,  of course,  generally lower than that  on  long-term securities. 
Germany 
In Germany,  tap  issues  pl~ a  more  important role than in the  other EEC  countries 
(from  1960  to 1968,  they accounted  fo~ two  thirds of the  amount  of domestic public 
issues). 
Mortgage  bonds,  issued to finance,  in particular,  construction loans,  and  municipal 
bonds,  issued to finance  loans  to public bonds  o~ authorities  (especially the  local 
authorities)  constitute by far the  most  important kind of tap issue.  These  are  normal 
bearer bonds,  quoted  on  the  stock exchange  and  running over a  long periodJ  very many 
of them  have  a  life of  20  to  3~ years,  but they can aiso  ~un for  50  years or more. 
They  are  issued by  the  same  bodiess  public  and  private mortgage banks  and  central giro 
institutions  (Giro0entralen). 
The  flotation of mortgage  bonds  and  municipal  bonds  is subject to the procedure  of 
Article 795  of the  German  Civil Code.  There  are no  consultations in the Central Capital 
Market  Committee  although the mortgage  banks sit on  this Committee.  But  as  residential 
construction is comparatively sensitive to variations  in the  rate of interest,  a  rise in 
interest rates is also reflected in the  terms  of new  mortgage bonds,  automatically 
curbing new  issues when  the market  is under strain. 
Nor  are  issues of mortgage bonds  and  municipal  bonds  the  subject  of consultations 
within the  Council  on  Economic  Trends,  even where  their purpose is to finance  the 
authorities;  they are,  however,  influenced indirectly by the  decisions  on  the borrowing 
requirements of the  public sector. 
The  fact  that most  tap issues are not  regulated  (except by Article 795  of the 
German  Civil  Code),  although  they  pl~ a  special role  in Germany,  is therefore not 
considered as  a  serious drawback,  and  the  appropriate authorities see no  need  to take 
measures  to exercise direct control. 
A second  type  of tap issue is that  of  medit~m-term securities issued,  in particular, 
by the Girozentralen,especially to  finance  industry.  Although  these issues are 
- 23-theoretically public,  they are  in fact mainly placed with  institutional investors. 
Such  medium-term securities are subject to  t~e same  procedures as  the  mortgage  bonds 
and  municipal bonds. 
A third type is the  medium-term  notes (Kassenobligationen)  issued directly or 
indirectly by  the Federal Government,  the Linder,  the Federal Postal Administration 
and  the Federal Railways.  These  too  are  mainly placed with institutional investors. 
Their issue is not  subject to  the  Article 795  procedure,  but it is taken into account 
in the  coordinating talks held within the  Council  on  Economic  Trends.  Since the 
second half of 1967,  these securities have  been offered by tender. 
Belgium 
Tap  issues by private-oecto!' coD•panies  (banks,  savings banks,  mortgage  companies, 
hire-purchase companies)  play a  comparatively important  role  and account,  varying with 
the year, for 30  to  55%  of the net  domestic  issues of public loans. 
These  are securities with a  life of from  1  to  20  yearsJ  mostly they are medium-
term securities (bona  de  caisse)  that are  ~ot  q~oted on  the  stock exchange  but are 
traded on  a  special  mark~t and  oan  often be encashed with the  issuer. 
Public tap issues are subject to supervision by the Banking Commission,  which 
authorizes the floating of a  certain amount  during the following twelve months  but 
must  be  informed before the floating of each  tranche.  If the  issuer changes  the 
terms  during the year,  a  new  authorization by the Banking Commission  is required. 
The  most  important  tap issues floated by the public sector are  those of the 
public credit institutions and the  Cr,dit Communal  de  Belgique.  They are  limited 
by annual ceilings fixed by law,  their statutes or the Minister of Finance.  Furthermore, 
in moat  cases each  tranche has to be  authorized by  the  Minister of Finance. 
The  only tap issues of  lo~term (more  than five years)  bonds  are grouped  loans 
of the  local authorities.  These  loans are subject to supervision by the Minister of 
Economic  Affairs and  Finance  and  the Minister of the  Interior. 
Furthermore,  there are also comparatively important  issues of medium-term 
securities  (2 to 5 years)  that are  available to the  public,  notably Treasury bills 
- 24  -and bills issued by the  Caisse Nationale  de  Cr,dit Agricola,  which  are  considered as 
forms  of saving that  can be  mobilized at short  term.
1 
Before the  reform of April 1968,  all these issues escaped the  "discipline" of the 
queue,  and  they are not subject to the  coordination arrangement  introduced under the 
reform. 
Tap  issues,  which  account for about  one  sixth of net  domestic  issues on  the  open 
market,  are  limited by various ceilings. 
The  "cartelle fondiarie"  issued by the institutions authorized to grant mortgage 
credit are mortgage  securities issued to borrowers of funds for building.  In most 
cases  these borrowers  therefore sell them  iu~ediately on  the  secondary market  to obtain 
the  aeoeesary fundsJ  they may  also use  them  to repay their loans.  The  issue of these 
securities is not  subject to authorization but is limited by  ceilir~s of  20  to 30  times 
the  capital of the  issuing institutions, which generally make  full use of them.  There 
is indirect control  over the  issues  in that the  institutions are required to obtain 
auth~rization if they wish to raise their capital in an  effort to increase their scope 
for issuing cartelle fondiarie. 
There  are  also "cartalla opere  pubbliche" for the financing of public work• ·  and 
"cartelle agrarie• for the financing of agriculture,  these are securities issued by 
special departments of certain credit institutions. 
In  addition there are securities which  are  issued in ".oper.  series'' by  the large 
public corporations  IMI  (Istituto Mobiliare  Italiano),  CCOP  (Consorzio di  Credito per 
le Opere  Pubbliche)  and  ICIPU  (Istituto di Credito per le  Imprese  di Pubblica Utilitl), 
after the  Bank  of Italy has  authorized specific ceilings.  Security issues within this 
limit  are  not  controlled, but the Bank  of Italy does  not  issue  a  new  authorization if 
the  previous one  has  not  been fully used or at  least fully committed.  A new  authorization 
is required if the  interest rate is changed  while  the  authorized amour1t  is being used. 
1  It should be noted that  the  yield on  these medium-term  securities is lower than that 
on  long-term loans  (in September  1968  5.8%  as  against 7.4%).  No  doubt  the French 
authorities are  more  inclined to classify these securities as  time deposits rather 
than as bonds.  For the  purposes  of this study it has nevertheless appeared preferable 
to  add  them  to the  issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest-bearing securities 
with a  view to facilitating as far as possible a  comparison  with  the situation in the 
other Member  States,  in most  of which  no  distincti.on is made  between medium-term  and 
long-term securities although the  yield of the former is generally lower. 
2~ -luxembourg 
There  are no  tap issues in this country. 
Netherlands 
The  main  securities issued on  tap are  mortgage  bonds  floated by  the mortgage  banks 
and  the  ship mortgage banks.  As  these banks  are not  members  of the bankers' association 
which  concluded the  gentlemen's  agreement  with  the  Central Bank,  this agreement  does  not 
apply to bonds  issued by  them.  However,  although mortgage  securities are  issued on  a 
considerable scale,  they account for a  smaller proportion of total issues than in Germany 
and  Italy. 
There  are  also  medium-term  sa~ings bonds  (from  3  to 6 years)  which  are  issued by the 
banks  and  quoted  on  the  stock exchange;  their yield is much  the  same  as  that of ordinary 
bonds but they are of comparatively small  impo~tance.  These  issues are  theoretically 
subject to control by the  Central Bank,  but  authorization is normally  alw~s granted. 
The  Bank  for  Netherl~~ds Municipalities issues  savings bonds  (generally with a  term 
of  10 years),  on  wh1ch  the Government  can place  a  limit only indirectly.1 
In  addition,  there are Treasury certificates which  are  issued by the Government  and 
may  be  subscribed to by  the banks  onlyJ  they aTe  an  instrument of monetary rather than 
of credit policy. 
2.  Issues placed privately 
These  issues are  also  somewhat  difficult to define because they rank  half-w~ 
between public issues of bonds  and  borrowings.  "Issues placed privately" should be 
considered as  covering those  intermediate forms  whose  legal  characteristics differ from 
those of bonds  but  which  perform the  same  economic  function  as bonds. 
(i)  Most  of them  are  loans  which  are  contracted in the form  of bonds  from  a  limited 
number  of borrowers but in respect  of which  the formalities  required for public 
issues have not been complied withJ  this is why  they must  be  r~~ked as issues 
placed privately. 
1  If an  upper limit were  placed on  the total indebtedness of the  local authorities 
{this could be  done  under Article  4  of the  law of 1963),  the  issues by the Bank 
for Netherlands  Municipalities could also be affected,  but  there would  be no 
ceiling specifically for this institution,  any more  than for each  commune. 
- 26  -(ii)  Included are  also issues against borrowers'  notes,  which  in the  legal sense 
a~e not bonds but  loans,  and  are of great  importance in Germany  and  the 
Netherlands. 
(iii) Registered bonds  rank  among  the non-public  issues if the registered  fo~m is 
chosen not  because it is obligatory but  simply because the bonds  involved are 
to be  reserved to certain subscribers.1 
Treasury bills which  are  issued by the  Government  and may  be  subscribed by certain 
institutions only must  be left out  of account  here.  These securities are often used  as 
an  instrument  of monetary policy or simply to raise funds  for  the  Government,  there 
are  special rules  on  issuing and trading them,  so that  they cannot be  ranked with 
securities placed privately. 
Issues in respect of which  the formalities  required for public  loans have been 
complied with but which  have  been fully placed before being announced  also rank as 
public issues.  The  securities are often quoted on  the  stock exchange  and  are therefore 
likely to be  sold to the  public.  The  issues must  therefore be considered as public 
although placed  pri~ately. 
In all member  count~ies except France,  issues placed privately (or non•public 
issues)  are wholly exempt  from  c~ntrol by the public authorities, but their importance 
varies very widely from  country to country. 
Germany 
The  private placing of registered bonds  and  loans against borrowers'  notes 
(Schuldscheindarlehen)  is not  subject to the  authorization procedure of Article 795 
of the German  Civil Code  and is therefore  completely free. 
The  private placing of these securities may  be restricted only in an  exceptional 
case of serious disequilibrium and  only in respect of public borrowers,  provided an 
upper limit is put  on  total indebtedness under the procedure of the  law of 1967. 
1  In Germany,  for  instance,  there is a  legal difference between registered bonds  on 
the  one  hand  and bearer bonds  and  bonds  to order on  the other,  and the  terms governing 
them  are often aligned on  the specific needs  of subscribers. 
-v-Loans  against borrowers•  notes  (Schuldscheindarlehen)  are the  most  important  form 
of non-public  issue.  These  acknowledgments  of debt  are not fungible,  they may  not  be 
traded on  the  stock exchange  and  there is no  secondary market  for  them.  They  can, 
however,  be mobilized  since they are  assignable  (provided there are no  stipulations 
to the contrary), but  no~mally they aay not be  assigned more  than  once. 
It has been estimated that  the  volume  of loans  against borrowers'  notes floated 
between 1962  and  1967  averaged  DM  2  000  million per year.  These  securities are mainly 
issued by industry,  but  increasingly also by the public authorities,  and  placed with 
insurance  companies  and  mortgage  lending institutions (for acknowledgments  of debt by 
the Federal Government,  the  Linder  and  the municipalities). 
Registered bonds,  which  are generally issued by the  mortgage  lending institutions, 
accounted for only about  lo%  of the total volume  of security issues  in 1967J  the 
proportion had been  decidedly lower  in the preceding,  normal years  and  rose to an 
exceptional  2~ in 1966  because of strain on  the  market  and  of the  measures  taken by 
the  authorities to curb  the  issue of bearer bonds. 
Belgium 
The  non-public  issue of bonds  is free  and  is not  subject to supervision by the 
Banking Commission.  The  volume  of these issues varies from  year to year and  m~ 
account for up  to 2~  of net  domestic public issues.  The  form  most  frequently used  is 
the private placing,  similar in character to  the public issue but  not  subject to the 
type  of supervision that would  enable  them  to be  sold publicly.  In certain cases, 
nevertheleas,  the underwriting technique  is used. 
The  proportion of non-public  issues  represented  about  4~ of the total volume  of 
gross  issues  in 1966  and  6~ in 1967.  They  are placed with  insurance  companies,  provident 
societies and  pension funds.  Eowever,  since  the  rules of these institutions require 
them  to subscribe in practice only to securities that  are  listed on  the  stock exchange 
or guaranteed by the  Government,  a  guarantee decree  must  be  issued to allow the placing 
of these non-public  issues,  which  as  a  result are mainly floated by  the public or the 
semi-public sector. 
- 28  -Italy and  Luxembourg 
Non-public  issues are subject  to  no control  and  no  restriction,  but  the 
technique is not  very  common,  except  for  international loans  placed abroad. 
Netherlands 
Private  placing of  loans against  borrowers'  notes  (onderhandse  leningen)  is a 
very  important  practice,  accounting  for  three  to four  times  the  value  of  public 
issues,  depending  on  the year.  It is supervised neither by  the  Central Bank  nor  by 
the  Government. 
Only  at times  of overheating in the  economy,  when  the  Government  may  set a 
ceiling to the  overall indebtedness of the  local authorities under  the  procedure  of 
Article  4  of the  law  of 1963,  may  this  form  of borrowing  be  restricted,  though  of 
course  only  in respect  of local authority borrowers. 
As  these  private loans  (like the  issue  of mortgage  bonds)  escape  supervision by 
the Central Bank,  the  latter has control  over  no  more  than a  small  part of  the 
market  in fixed-interest  securities.  Thus  the  Netherlands authorities exercise 
supervision on  a  limited scale·· only not  because  the  legal basis for  supervision is 
too narrow  (in fact,  the  gentlemen's agreement  and  the  law  of  1963  confer fairly 
extensive  powers)  but  because  the  scope  of controls is restricted. 
In  1966  the  onderhandse  leningen and  mortgage  loans issued  on  the  market 
accounted  for  a  net  total of Fl.  4  800 million  (out  of Fl.  7  000 million for  the 
whole  of  the capital market).  This  sum  included Fl.  3  200  million deriving  from  funds 
(pension  funds,  insurance companies  and  government  funds)  and Fl.  1  400  million  from 
savings  banks.  The  net placings of local authorities  were  Fl.  400  million,  those  of 
the central governments Fl.  1  100  million and  those  of  the  private  sector Fl.  3  300 
million. 
D.  Control  of  issues in relations with  countries abroad 
In respect  both  of their scope  and  severity,  the controls exercised over issues 
involving  financial relations with  countries abroad  vary  appreciably  from  case  to 
1  case. 
The  following description of the  situation dates  from  October  1968  and  takes  no 
account  of  arrangements  made  since  then  in  more  than  one  member  country.  As  often 
as not,  these arrangements  have  tended to tighten controls  over  issues involving 
financial relations with  abroad. 
- 29  -A distinction must  be  made  between: 
(i)  Foreign  issues  on  the  national market; 
(ii)  Sale  on  the national  market  of securities issued abroad  (particularly 
Euro-issues); 
(iii)  Issues floated  abroad  by  residents. 
In  the  majority  of the  member  countries - Belgium,  France,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands  - foreign  issues are  generally subject  to  a  specific control in addition 
to  the  usual controls exercised over  domestic  issues.  In Germany,  virtually all 
foreign  issues are  floated  abroad  and  are therefore,  unlike  most  domestic  issues,  not 
subject  to control  by  the Federal Minister for  Economic  Affairs;  however,  since 
November  1968  the  timing both  of these  issues and  of domestic  "block"  issues by 
the  private sector has  been  subject to consultations in the  Central Capital Market 
Committee.  If the  exceptional case of  a  crisis should  arise,  foreign issues could  be 
subjected to a  specific control  involving a  rather complicated  procedure.  In 
Luxembourg  the  system  for  domestic  and  foreign  issues  remains  the  same  under all 
circumstances. 
Germany 
(a)  Only if foreign  bonds  are  issued in Germany  are  they  subject to authorization 
by  the  Minister  for  Economic  Affairs under  Articles 795  and  808a  of  the German  Civil 
Code.  In  practice, virtually all foreign  bonds  are  issued  outside  Germany  and  thus 
escape  this authorization  procedure;  no  notice is taken  of  the  fact  that  they  are 
arranged  with  the  aid  of consortia made  up  wholly  or partly  of German  banks. 
If the  exceptional case  of  bonds  issued  in  Germany  is left out  of account, 
neither  foreign  issues  nor  the  sale  of  securities issued abroad  by  residents are 
subject  to control in Germany.  Nor  are  there restrictions  on  advertising and 
prospecting. 
(b)  In  times  of crisis,  however,  the  sale  of  foreign  securities  may  be  restricted 
under Article  22  of  the  law  of 23  April  1961;  this provision does  not,  however, 
authorize  the  authorities to intervene directly.  In case  of  serious disturbance  in 
the  economy  (balance  of  payments,  capital market)  the  Federal Government  must  issue 
a  decree  making  the  public  offering in Germany  of securities issued abroad  or the 
purchase  of  foreign  securities by  a  resident  subject  to authorization  by  the 
Minister  for  Economic  Affairs.  Article  73  of  the  EEC  Treaty  would,  however,  apply 
to relations  between  member  countries.  No  restriction has  so  far  been  introduced 
or contemplated  under  this law  on  economic  relations with countries abroad. 
- 30 -(c)  Following a  boom  in Euro-issues  denominated  in  DM,  the  Bundesbank and  the 
Federal Ministry  for Economic  Affairs concluded  a  gentlemen's agreement  with  the 
banks in the  spring of  1968.  Under  this agreement  they are  to be  kept  informed  on 
the  number  and  the  amount  of  projected  DM  issues,  terms,  timing,  etc.  A restriction 
of  foreign  issues in  DM  has,  however,  not  been  contemplated. 
At  its meeting  on  4  November  1968  the  Central Capital Market  Committee  decided 
that in future  foreign  issues in  DM  would  be  discussed within it, for  the  purpose  of 
ensuring balanced  timing  for  them.  As  before,  no  provision was  made  to coordinate 
action in the  Committee  with  that  of  the  public authorities,  for  the  treatment  of 
these  issues. 
Bundesbank  returns  show  that  from  1964  to  1967  German  banks  participated in 
foreign issues  (denominated  in  DM  or  other currencies)  involving  DM  4  500 million,1 
of  which,  it was  estimated,  only about  one  third was  placed in Germany.  In  1968, 
there  was  a  brisk increase  in  the  flotation  of foreign  loans  in Germany  (DM  5  200 
million). 
1 
The  proportion placed  in Germany  went  up  sharply  (to about  three  quarter~, 
the yield of Euro-issues having risen above  the  yield  of domestic  German  loans. 
(d)  There  are  no  restrictions-on securities issued abroad  by  German  residents. 
Belgium 
(a)  Like  domestic  issues,  public  issues by  foreign  private-sector companies  are 
subject  to control by  the  Banking Commission.  Issue  plans are  examined  according to 
the  same  procedure,  within the  same  time-limits  and  according to the  same  criteria. 
(b)  Under  Article  108,  Volume  I, Title 5  of the  Commercial  Code  as  amended  by  Royal 
Decree  No.  61  of  10  November  1967  (Article  13),  all foreign  issues must  also be 
authorized  by  the  Minister of Finance.  Consequently,  the Minister  of Finance  may 
suspend  or  prohibit  any  issue liable  to upset  market  equilibrium.  In actual fact, 
the  volume  of  foreign  issues is negligible,  the  market  being fully  taken  up  by 
Belgian issuers.  However,  projected operations  by  borrowers  residing in another 
EEC  country  or  by  international institutions may  qualify  for  more  liberal treatment. 
These  are the  figures  for  the shares in Euro-issues  (placed  by  international 
consortia)  and  in the  "conventional"  foreign  issues  (placed  by  wholly  German 
consortia).  They  also  include  issues placed  privately and,  up  to  1967,  the  shares 
by  foreign  banks  in consortia headed  by  a  German  bank. 
- 31  -Under  the  agreement  between the Minister of Finance  and  the  Banking Commission, 
the  documents  are  submitted in duplicate  to the  Banking  Commission,  which  passes 
them  on  to  the Ministry after examination and  comment. 
(c)  Belgian residents are  free  to buy  foreign securities on  foreign markets. 1 
Consequently,  subscriptions to Euro-issues - which  are mostly  floated outside 
Belgium - by  Belgian residents are  n_ot  subject to control in Belgium. 
Belgian  banks are completely  free  to participate in placing consortia and 
place2  these securities with  their customers.  Advertising and  soliciting for fUnda  are 
however,  prohibited and  the  banks  may  inform residents of  the  issues at  their request 
only. 
(d)  Belgian private-sector companies  are  free  to issue securities abroad  but are 
required  to  inform  the  Banking  Commission accordingly.  Public-sector issues floated 
abroad are  subject  to authorization. 
(a)  Foreign issues are  subject  to prior authorization by  the Minister of Economic 
Affairs  and  Finance  by  virtue of  law  No.  66-1008  of 28  December  1966  on  financial 
relations with countries abroad  and  Article 5  of the  Decree  of 27  January  1967 
laying down  the  relevant  implementing details. 
The  procedure  followed  is that  of prior authorization as  provided  for  under 
Article  82  of  the  law  of 23  December  1946;  it is to be  applied to domestic  issues 
in a  situation of  serious strain only,  provided the coordination arrangements with 
the  banks  have  proved  insufficient to help  safeguard market  equilibrium. 
Loans  guaranteed  by  the  French State,  however,  are  exempt  from  the authorization 
requirement. 
(b)  There is also a  need  to obtain authorization for advertising and soliciting for 
funds  in  respect  of all foreign  securities the  sale of  which  would  not  be  permitted 
in France.  The  French  banks,  however,  which  participate in large  measure  in the 
Transfers of capital must  nevertheless be  effected  on  the  free  market  and  not  on 
the  official market;  on  this subject  see  the  details given  in the description of 
the  situation in Luxembourg,  since  these  two  countries have  a  common  foreign 
exchange  system  under the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union. 
2  The  placing possibilities were,  however,  restricted in  1969. 
- 32  -organization of international issues  may  buy  international bonds  for  account  of their 
customers  in France  provided  they  do  no  soliciting for  funds;  in practice  they  place 
in France  about  one  fifth of their share  in Euro-issues. 
French  residents are  free  to buy  abroad  any  foreign  or international securities, 
irrespective of whether  they are  quoted  on  the  stock exchange  or not. 
In 1967,  an  estimated  $40 million  of Euro-issues  were  subscribed in France,  with 
the  share  of the French  banks  in total Euro-issues  being about  $200 million or  10%. 
(c)  Under  Article  6  of the  Decree  of  27  January  1967  and  under  the  law  of 
28  December  1966,  the  issue  by  French  residents of securities abroad  is,  like the 
flotation  of all loans  abroad,  also subject  to prior authorization by  the  Ministry  of 
Economic  Affairs and  Finance. 
Loans  contracted  by  the  registered banks  and  the  credit institutions having 
legal status are,  however,  exempt  from  authorization,  as are  some  loans  which 
constitute direct  investment  or which  are  linked  to commercial  transactions  or cover 
a  small  amount  only  (under  FF  2  million). 
Since  1967,  the  practice has  been  to grant authorization more  liberally to 
French  firms  wishing  to  obtain access  to  foreign  markets.  In  1967,  French  Euro-issues 
ran at FF  770 million  (about  5%  of French  domestic  issues). 
Authorization to call  on  the  Euro-issue  mark~t has been  granted to enterprises 
which  earn  foreign  exchange  or  have  to  finance  investment  abroad,  the  intention 
being  to ease  the  pressure  on  the  domestic  issue  market. 
(a)  Under  the  foreign  exchange  regulations  DLL  No.  1955  of  12  December  1917  on 
issues in Italy by  foreign  companies  and  international institutions deemed  to  be 
foreign legal persons,  foreign  issues are  subject to prior authorization by  the 
Ministers of  the  Treasury  and  of Foreign Trade,  folloNing an  opinion rendered  by  the 
Bank  of Italy. 
Once  this authorization has been  obtained,  the  foreign  issuer has  to comply  with 
the  same  formalities as a  domestic  issuer. 
- 33  -(b)  Transactions  by  Italian residents  in the  form  of subscription to and  the 
purchase  of  foreign  bonds  not  issued or  quoted  in Italy are  likewise subject  to 
foreign  exchange  restrictions  (Articles 9,  10  and  11  of the  Ministerial Decree  of 
26  October  1967). 
Residents are  allowed  to  buy  and sell,  through  the  Bank  of Italy or the 
authorized credit institutions,  securities quoted  on  foreign  stock  exchanges.  They 
are,  however,  required to place  these  securities in safe  custody  with  an  authorized 
Italian bank.  There  are  no  restrictions  on  or control  over  advertising of securities 
issued  abroad,  but  soliciting for  funds  is subject  to supervision. 
Credit institutions which  participate  in  the  placing  or  the  underwriting  of  a 
foreign  issue  must  apply  for  prior authorization by  the  Bank  of Italy  (Article 45  of 
the  Banking  Act). 1 
The  Italian banks'  share  in Euro-issues  reached  $142  million in  1966  and  $221 
million in 1967  (about  12%  of total Euro-issues).  Italian subscriptions absorbed 
$99  million in  1966  and  $155  million in  1967,  the  rest  having  been  placed  with 
non-residents. 
Italian capital is attracted  to  the  Euro-issue  market  mainly  because yields  on 
this market  are  distinctly higher  than  on  the  domestic  market. 
(c)  The  flotation  by  Italian nationals  of  issues abroad is also subject to exchange 
control  (DL  No.  476  of 6  June  1956,  Article  13)  and  requires authorization  by  the 
Ministers  of  the  Treasury  and  of  Foreign Trade. 
In addition,  the  Inter-Ministerial Committee  of  Credit  and  Savings  decided  on 
8  August  1963  that  for  the  time  being  and  pending  more  c9mplete  legislation,  the 
Minister of  the  Treasury  was  to  obtain  the  Committee's  opinion  before  granting 
authorization:  issues made  abroad  were  the  only  type  not  submitted  to  the  Committee. 
On  the  Euro-issue  market,  Italian issuers  borrowed  in  1967  $65  million,  or  about 
3%  of the  market,  as against  5%  in  1966. 
Luxembourg 
(a)  In  Luxembourg,  foreign  issues are  subject  to  the  same  control  by  the  Commissioner 
supervising banking  and  the  Ministry  of  the  Treasury as  issues  by  residents.  This 
In  1969  other measures  were  taken  to restrict participation by  Italian credit 
institutions in international issues. 
- 34  -control affects only  a  small part  of Euro-issues  since  most  are  not  public  and  are 
not  legally domiciled in Luxembourg,  even if they are  quoted  there.  In contrast  with 
arrangements  in the  other member  countries,  there is no  other specific control  over 
foreign  issues. 
Subscription to securities issued abroad  is free  from  control and  restrictions. 
Advertising  of these  securities is governed  by  the  same  rules as advertising for 
Luxembourg  securities.  Soliciting for  funds  is prohibited  for  both  foreign  issues 
and  domestic  issues  (law  of  1  January  1850 as amended  by  law  of  12  February  1855, 
18  June  1870,  14  March  1896).  Loans  floated  abroad  by  Luxembourg  residents are also 
exempt  from  restrictions. 
(b)  There  is a  single  exchange  control Institute for  the  Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic 
Union,  which  applies identical  laws  and  regulations adopted  by  the  two  countries 
individually. 
As  a  result  of  various  liberalization measures  taken  in the  past,  transactions 
are  now  completely untrammelled.  While  current  transactions  have  to be  effected  on 
the  official  mark~t,  however,  capital transactions must  be  effected  on  the  free 
market,  unless  exceptions are  authorized  by  the  Institute,  particularly in  an  EEC 
context.  Consequently,  subscriptions  from  abroad  to national or  international loans, 
as  well as  capital exports  made  to  transfer the  proceeds of a  loan abroad  or  make 
redemption  payments,  must  be  effected  on  the  free  market. 
It should  be  noted  that Euro-issues  arranged  from  Luxembourg  reached  the 
following  amounts  only  (in millions of the  respective  currency unit): 
issues by  companies  under  Luxembourg  law 
denominated  in $ 
denominated  in  DM 
public  issues in Luxembourg  by  companies 
incorporated outside  Luxembourg 
denominated  in units of account 
denominated  in $ 










Even  the  "public"  issues  were,  however,  for  the  most  part  placed  privately 
before  being announced  to  the  public. 
- 35  -Netherlands 
Exchange  regulations  ~Decree of  10  October  1945)  prohibit all operations that 
are  not  expressly authorized. 
(a)  An  exchange  permit  must  therfore  be  obtained  from  the Central Bank  for all 
issues by  non-residents in the  Netherlands,  with  these  issues being in addition 
subject  to the  same  controls under  the  gentlemen's agreement  as  domestic  issues. 
The  Central  Bank  consults the  Ministry  of  Finance  before  issuing any  authorization 
for  a  foreign loan. 
In  the  past  seven years,  no  company  has  been  authorized to float  a  loan in 
guilders  on  the  Netherlands market;  the  only  foreign  borrower  in  1967  was  the 
Netherlands Antilles.  In  1968  some  international institutions were  given  the 
opportunity  to float  loans.  No  further  applications  from  foreign issuers were 
received,  probably  because  the  negative attitude adopted  by  the authorities was 
sufficiently known. 
It should  be  noted  that certain restrictions on  access to the  market  are  even 
imposed  on  companies  incorpora~ed under  Dutch  law  which  are  subsidiaries  of  foreign 
companies.  Under  the  gentlemen's  agreement  concluded  with  the  exchange  control 
authorities,  the  foreign  parent  company  is required,  when  acquiring its holding in 
the  subsidiary,  to give  an  undertaking that its subsidiary  will not  finance  more  than 
50%  of its investments  on  the  Netherlands  market. 1 
(b)  Subscription to and  the  purchase  of  foreign  securities,  by  contrast,  are  no 
longer subject  to  foreign  exchange  restrictions. 
The  banks  have  been  given blanket authorization to participate in placing 
consortia  for Euro-issues not  denominated  in guilders  and  to offer these  securities 
in the  Netherlands.  In  the  Netherlands,  the  public  shows  little interest in 
Euro-issues although  their yield is higher than  that  of domestic  loans. 
There  is much  greater interest  in convertible  loans  denominated  in dollars and 
issued  by  Netherlands  firms.  On  average,  about  20%  of  the  amount  of  these  loans 
have  been  placed in the  Netherlands.  There  are  certain arrangements  to coordinate 
with  the  banks  the  timing of  the  issues with  a  view  to fitting  them  as  smoothly as 
possible into  the  time-table  for  issues in the  Netherlands. 
1  This  rule  was  dropped  in November  1969. 
- 36  -There are  no  restrictions on  or controls  over advertising or soliciting for 
funds  for securities issued abroad. 
(c)  A foreign  exchange  permit  by  the Central Bank  is also required  for  ~oreign 
issues by  Netherlands  residents,  no  matter in what  currency  they are  denominated. 
Generally,  this authorization is granted  only if the  funds  raised are  intended to 
finance  investment  abroad or if the  importation of capital thus effected can  be 
offset  by  supplementary  exports of capital.  This very restrictive policy,  the  aim 
of which  was  to avoid  jeopardizing measures to control domestic  demand,  was  applied 
with varying rigour according to the  business situation. 
- }7  -CHAPTER  II.  INSTRUMENTS  TO  REGULATE  THE  SECONDARY  MARKET 
A.  Intervention  by  the  public authorities  to  regulate or suppcrt  bond  prices 
Germany 
There is no  special  body  to  support prices:  the  curtailment of fluctuations 
is a  matter  for  the  issuers  themselves.  For  each  issue  by  the Federal Government 
or its special  funds  (Federal Postal Administration,  Federal Railways,Equalization 
of Burdens  Fund)  the  borrower  undertakes  to  intervene  to  control  prices as 
required  in  the particular market  situation. 
For  loans  floated  by  the Federal Government,  the  special  funds  and  some  Lander, 
the  Bundesbank supervises  the  prices in its capacity as leader of the  consortium 
and  takes action to  regulate  the  market  price of  these securities on  behalf and  for 
account  of  the  issuers,  using  funds  supplied by  them. 
In  normal  circumstances it offsets excess  demand  and  excess  supply so  as  to 
eliminate random price fluctuations. 
In  times  of strain on  the  ~apital  n~rket,  the Federal  Government  has 
temporarily extended  this obligation and  made  more  funds  available  to  the  Bundesbank, 
enabling it to  intervene on  the  market  for  government  securities and  ensure  that 
the market  is not  disturbed  by sharp drops  in prices. 
Belgium 
Since  1945  the  Fonds  des  Rentes  has  intervened  on  the  market  to  steady the 
prices of medium- and  long-term securities issued or  guaranteed  by  the Government 
(particularly securities issued  by  the  R~gie desTelephones  et  T~l~graphes, the 
Belgian Railways,  and  certain quasi-public credit institutions) or issued  by  the 
Cr~dit Communal,  the  provinces  and  communes.  By  influencing long-term interest 
rates,  the  Fonds  des  Rentes  may  also  indirectly prepare  the  ground  for  the  placing 
of new  loans  by  the  Treasury.  It does  not,  however,  participate in the placing of 
public  loans  and  does  not  discriminate  between  loans  when  endeavouring  to  steady 
market  prices. 
The  Fonds  des  Rentes  finances  its intervention operations  from  a  capital of 
Bfrs.  2  Boo  million  made  available  by  the Government,  from  short-term loans raised 
on  the  money  market  (4-month certificates and,  where  necessary,  call money)  and 
from advances  from  the  Central  Bank.  By  the  end  of  1966,  it had  borrowed  a  total 
of Bfrs.  4  500  million  through certificates,  Bfrs.  1  500  million in the  form  of 
call  money  and  Bfrs.  320  million in  the  form of advances. 
- 38  -In  1966,  thenarrowness of the  market  compelled  the  Fonds  des  Rentes  to 
maintain and  even add  a  little to  its portfolio of public securities;  in  1967, 
the  pace of operations on  the  market  meant  a  bigger  public  securities portfolio, 
but  these  movements  were  not  the result of a  deliberate open-market  policy. 
In France,  there are  no  fixed  arrangements  to  support  bond  prices. 
The  Central  Bank  exerts  no  significant influence on  the long-term capital 
market;  the  Banque  de  France grants its direct  customers  loans against securities, 
but  the  sums  involved  are  very small  and  this does  not  constitute support  for  bond 
prices. 
The  Caisse  des  Dep8ts  et Consignations  exerts considerable influence on  the 
secondary market  for  bonds,  since it accounts  for  5%  of all bond  purchases,  but it 
acts like a  normal  investor.  It has  on  occasion  been  asked  to  step in and  steady 
or  support  prices,  but  this has  been  an  exception  to  the rule. 
The  Fonds  de  ~outien des  rentes,  which  used  to  employ limited funds  to  support 
the  price of loan issues by  the Government,  has  in recent  years operated on  only 
a  modest  scale. 
There is no  special price  support  agency.  Price support is effected by 
operations  under  the  Central  Bank's open-market  policy.  This  policy is also  used 
to  check  the  rise in interest rates.  It was  applied on  a  substantial scale in 
April  1968  to  ease  the  pressure on  the  market.  The  trend of prices is being 
watched  closely in an  effort  to  reconcile  the  volume  of new  loans  with  the  need 
to  maintain stable prices. 
Luxembourg 
There  is no  special  body  to  support prices.  Should  there  be  a  need  for  such 
support,  however,  the Minister of  the  Treasury  may  instruct  the  Caisse  d'Epargne 
de l'Etat to  step in. 
- 39  -Netherlands 
There is no  special  body  to  support  prices.  On  occasion  the Government 
intervenes,  buying securities covering loans  floated  by itself, in order  to 
eliminate certain disequilibria;  under  the  budget,  a  modest  sum  (about Fl.  20 
million)  is earmarked  for  this purpose. 
B.  Measures  of monetary  policy affecting the  market  for  fixed-interest  securities 
Germany 
Since  1967,  the  Bundesbank has  stepped  up  intervention under its open-market 
policy,  previously confined  to  the  money  market,  by  buying  (under Article 21  of 
the Federal  Bank  Law)  bonds of the Federal Government,  the Federal Postal 
Administration and  the Federal Railways.  By  the  end of 1967,  its purchases had 
reached ~ 1  300  million;  between  then and  the  end of September  1968,  they 
dropped  to  ~ 900 million. 
These  measures  constitute a  new  element  in  the  policy of liquidity expansion, 
which  previously was  concerned only with  reducing  the  minimum  reserve requirements. 
At  the  same  time,  they have  helped  first  to stabilize long-term interest rates 
and  subsequently  to  reduce  them. 
Credit institutions in Germany  hold  a  comparatively substantial volume  of 
bonds  (about  40%  of the fixed-interest  securities in circulation).  If the 
Bundesbank  changes  their liquidity,  they  tend  to  vary their investment  in 
fixed-interest  securities rather  than alter their lending policy.  The  measures 
taken  by  the  Bundesbank to  influence  the liquidity of these institutions can 
therefore affect the  primary and  secondary bond  markets. 
Belgium 
By  influencing short-term interest rates  (Bank rate,  policy governing  the 
allocation of certificates of the Treasury and  the Fonds  des Rentes)  the  monetary 
authorities  may  indirectly affect  the interest rates  for  fixed-interest securities. 
As  the  Fonds  des Rentes is authorized  to  pursue an open-market  policy by 
issuing certificates placed with banks,  by intervention on  the markets  for call 
money,  short-term government  paper  and  public-sector bonds,  it can  bring direct 
influence  to  bear on  the  whole  range of interest rates. 
- 40  -It should  be  noted  that  the  change  made  in May  1965  in the rules governing 
bond  holdings  by  the  banks  has  encouraged  the latter to  participate in the  bond 
market  and  particularly the Euro-issue  market:  the  banks  have  been authorized 
to  hold  in their  portfolios an  unlimited  volume  of Belgian or  foreign pr.ivate-
sector bonds;  previously only Belgian public-sector securities could  be  held in 
this way. 
The  open-market operations of  the  Banque  de  France are  confined  to  the  money 
market  and  affect short-term securities only.  The  links  between  the money  market 
and  the  capital market are  very loose,  mainly because  the  deposit  banks  make 
comparatively little long-term investment  and  particularly because  they bold 
virtually no  bonds  (1.5% of their assets). 
The  Central  ~ank's open-market  policy affects not  only the  money  market  but 
also  the  bond  market.  Direct influence is consequently being  exerted on  prices. 
More  generally,  Central  Bank  measures  to  influence the liquidity of the  credit 
institutions have  an indirect effect on  the  bond  market;  this effect is all the 
stronger as almost  a  third of the  bonds are acquired by credit institutions,  which 
may  within certain limits bold  them  as part of their compulsory minimum  reservea. 
The  credit institutions also  finance  purchases of securities, partly by 
using the credit lines which  the  Banca d'ltalia grants  them against securities, 
after ensuring  their maintenance of a  satisfactory level of liquidity.  These 
four-month  advances  are  usually renewed,  but  by influencing the  total amount  of 
these advances  the  Banca d'Italia can  influence  the  volume  of bonds  held by  the 
credit institutions.  In  1967,  fixed-term advances  were  introduced  which  have  to 
be  used  within  two  to  three  weeks. 
In  1967,  the  credit institutions (banks  and  savings  banks)  and  their central 
institutions  subsc~ibed to  fixed-interest securities worth Lit.  000  000  million 
(41%  of the  volume  issued)  and  in  1966  to  such securities worth  310 000 million 
or  46%  of the  volume  issued. 
Under  its charter  the  Central  Bank  may  hold securities issued or  guaranteed 
by  the Government.  In  1962,  1963  and  1965 it bought  a  comparatively small  volume 
of bonds  but in  1966  and  1967 it made  purchases  on  a  substantial scale  (7%  of 
net  domestic  issues). 
- L+1  -The  Central  Bank  makes  subscriptions with  a  view  to  keeping supply of and  demand 
for  securities in equilibrium and  to  contributing to  the  maintenance of liquidity 
as  long as  the  borrower  has  not  yet  invested  the  proceeds  of  the  loan.  Subsequently 
the  Banca d'Italia assigns  the securities  to  the  credit institutions,  passing on 
to  them half of the  placing  commission  (about  1/2%). 
In  1966  and  1967,  the  Central  Bank  bought  more  than it sold:  in  1966,  purchases 
amounting  to  Lit.  500  000  million  (of which  Lit.  450  000  million on  issue) 
contrasted with sales of Lit.  300  000  million,  while  in  1967  the  figure  for  purchases 
was  Lit.  600  000  million  (of which  Lit.  500  000  million on  issue)  and  that  for 
sales Lit.  450  000 million. 
Luxembourg 
The  Caisse  d'Epargne  de  l'Etat has  not  yet  had  an opportunity  to  intervene on 
the  market  for  issues of public  loans. 
Netherlands 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  link between  the  money  market  and  the  capital market 
is less close  than  in Germany  and  Italy.  Interest rates are  maintained at  the 
desired level  mainly  by limiting  the  foreign  supply of and  demand  for  capital. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  Treasury  can  supplement  action  taken  under  the open-
market  policy by influencing  the  secondary market  through  advance  redemption of 
certain loans.  Given  the  upward  tendency of interest rates,  this has  in fact  not 
been  done  for  a  long  time.  In  the  past,  a  substantial proportion of foreign  debt 
has,  however,  been repaid ahead  of schedule  for  balance of payments  reasons. 
C.  Privately sponsored  mechanisms  to  support  bond  prices 
1.  In  most  member  countries  frequent  use is made  of a  clause  under  which  a  bank 
that participates in  the  placing of a  loan must  withhold  the securities  from  the 
secondary market  for  a  specified period.  The  period varies  with  the issue and  the 
country. 
- 42  -In Germany,  a  clause is often  imposed  in respect  both of "block"  issues 
(in  the agreement  setting up  the  consortium)  and of tap issues  (at  the  moment  they 
are floated)  under  which  the  placing  commission is to  be  refunded  in full or  in 
part if the  bonds  sold return within less  than one  or  two  years  to  the  bank 
supporting their price.  Sometimes  repayment  of  the  commission  is due  only if the 
bonds  have  to  be  repurchased at or  below  issue price. 
In  Belgium,  the  banks often undertake,  during  a  specified period  (generally 
one  month  from  the  time of issue),  not  to  sell the securities on  the market 
below a  price that has  been  fixed  in advance.  Underwriting  by  the  banks is tending 
to  become  the general  practice. 
In France,  there  was  no  underwriting before  the  reform of April  1968,  except 
for  foreign  issues. 
Under  the  underwriting  technique  introduced  in April  1968,  the institutions 
belonging  to  the  guarantee  and  placing consortia are  forbidden,  during  a  period 
of generally one  month,  to  sell the  securities on  the  secondary market  below  the 
issue price;  if this rule is infringed,  the  commission  baa  to  be  refunded. 
There  are  no  price support  arrangements or agreements other  than  the  period 
of restraint  to  be  observed  by  the  consortium and  the  time-limit  (three months at 
the  most)  during  which  the  leaders of the  consortium may  effect  trading operations 
for  account of the  consortium. 
In  Itoly,  the  issues are  normally underwritten by  placing and  guarantee 
consortia,  among  which  the  Mediobanca  plays  a  major  role.  For  government  bonds  the 
consortium is led  by  the  Banca d'Italia.  The  bank  consortium often undertakes  to 
support  the  price  for  a  period of one  year  from  admission  to  stock exchange  dealing 
(e.g.,  ENEL  loans),  ensuring  that  the actual  yield  does  not rise by  more  than  0.25% 
unless  this is warranted  by  the  general  trend of  the  market.  However,  if it does 
intervene,  the  consortium is only obliged  to  purchase  up  to  5%  of  the  nominal  value 
of the  loan. 
In Luxembourg,  the  underwriting  contracts  do  not  contain clauses binding  the 
underwriters  not  to  sell below  the  issue  price  during  a  specified period.  It is, 
however,  common  practice  for  the  underwriters  to  exercise voluntary restraint by 
refraining,  during  the  period  following  the  date of issue,  from  selling the 
securities at prices  that are  lower  than  the  issue  price. 
In  the  Netherlands,  these  clauses in  the  placing contracts are less  common  than 
in the other  member  countries,  but  the  banks  participating in  the  issue  consortium 
refrain  from  selling their quotas  on  the  secondary market  so  as  to  safeguard  their 
professional standing. 
- 43  -It also  happens  that  issuers intervene by  purchasing  through their banks if 
there are unduly sharp price  fluctuations;  they support  the  price of the  bonds 
already in circulation,  especially before  the  flotation of a  new  issue. 
The  general  practice is to  employ  the  underwriting  technique  for  private-sector 
issues,  while  government  and  local authority loans are  placed  by  the  banks on  a 
commission  basis only.  To  adapt  loans  exactly to  the  capacity of the  market  and 
avoid  fluctuations  on  the  secondary  market  after issue,  the  Government  sometimes 
floats  loans  without  a  ceiling or loans  whose  rate of interest,  maturity and 
redemption  schedule are  fixed  in advance  while  the  issue price is left open 
(tender system).  The  system appears  to  lead  to greater price stability immediately 
after  the  issue has  been  made,  as  a  result of this better adaptation  to  market 
conditions. 
In  the  placing contracts  for Euro-issues,  clauses are  sometimes  to  be  found 
under  which  the  banks  that are  part of  the  underwriting and  selling group  undertake 
not  to sell below  the issue price  (unless an appropriate  arrangement  is made 
concerning  the  placing  commission)  for  the  period of 30  to  45  days  that  is needed 
for  placing  the  loan  with  the  public.  This  prohibition is generally lifted before 
the  period is up.  If securities reappear  on  the  market  before  the  end  of this 
period,  the placing  commission  must  be  refunded  to  the  issuer. 
2.  A less frequent  practice is the  conclusion,  between  the issuer and  a  financial 
institution, of contracts under  which  the institution supervises  the market  and 
steps  in  to  support  prices  by drawing on  funds  supplied  by  the  issuer. 
In  Germany,  issuers sometimes  undertake  in  their contracts  to  supply,  at  the 
request of the  bank leading the  consortium,  funds  to  support  the  prices.  Price 
support is often a  practical proposition only if the  pressure on  prices is not 
linked  to  the  market  trend.  Some  large issuers are  very liberal in supporting 
prices.  Where  the  issuer  does  not  supp~-~nds, the  consortium banks  eliminate 
price  peaks  on  the  stock  exchange. 
In  the other countries,  these  contracts are  a  rare  exception  to  the rule. 
There  are also  such  contracts  for Euro-issues,  but  banks  have  intervened under 
them on  a  ver~ limited scale only. 
3.  In  the  Community,  on  the Euro-issue market,  issuers quite often have  the 
opportunity of redeeming loans  by repurchase  on  the  stock  exchange  rather  than  by 
making  the  repayments  provided  for.  The  issuer is  then led  to  support  prices,  to 
a  certain extent;  however,  he  only repurchases  when  the  repurchasing price is 
lower  than  the  arranged  repayment  price. 
- 44  -In  Germany,  tap issues in particular  (mortgage  bonds  and  communal  bonds)  may 
under  the  terms governing  them  be  redeemed  by repurchase on  the  stock exchange. 
When  mortgage  lending institutions buy their own  securities on  the  stock exchange, 
however,  they  do  this practically always  to  support prices and sell the  securities 
again  when  the occasion arises.  Furthermore,  some  issuers  have  undertaken  to  make 
their  purchases  through  a  sinking  fund  which  steps  in when  prices fall  below  a 
certain level. 
In  Belgium,  private issuers of bonds  seldom redeem  by repurchase on  the stock 
exchange,  although  there is no  law against  this.  Borrowings  against  bonds  by 
companies  are as  a  rule redeemed  in  constant annuities  (comprising  capital and 
interest)  according  to  a  fixed  schedule.  The  bonds  to  be  redeemed are  drawn  by lot. 
Companies  may  reserve  the right  to  repay all or  part of  the  loan in advance. 
In France,  redemption  by repurchasing on  the  stock exchange  is not  forbidden 
but,  in order  to  protect security holders,  the  public authorities as a  rule object 
to  clauses  under  which  more  than  50%  of a  loan  may  be  redeemed  by repurchase. 
In Italy,  redemption  by repurchase on  the  stock  exchange  is possible  provided 
certain disclosure :equirements are  met  (reference  to  this condition  must  be  made 
on  the security certificate). 
The  way  in which  mortgage  loans are granted and  are  to  be  paid  back helps  to 
support  the  price of mortgage  bonds.  As  has  been  said above,  borrowers  on  mortgage 
may  in fact  repay their mortgages  in  the  form of securities (cartelle fondiarie) 
which  they acquire on  the  secondary market.  The  support of the  market  in these 
securities rests in decisive  measure  on  the possibility open  to  the  credit 
institutions to  include  the "cartelle fondiarie"  among  \.neir  required  compulsory 
reserves. 
The  ''cartelle opere  pubbliche"  issued  to  finance  public  works  can also be  used 
for  repayment  but  may  not  be  included among  the  compulsory reserves of  the  credit 
institutions. 
- 1 +5  -In  Luxembourg,  loans  floated  by  Luxembourg  borrowers are,  depending on  the  case, 
redeemed  by repurchase on  the  stock exchange or by  drawings. 
In  the  Netherlands,  repurchase on  the stock exchange  is permitted  but  may  in 
most  cases  not  take  the  place of redemption,  which  is generally ~fected by  drawings. 
For Euro-issues,  redemption  by repurchase  on  the  stock exchange is allowed 
within  the limits of  the  redemption  schedule  and  is,  in fact,  the general practice. 
- 46  -PAR'!'  II 
MEMBER  STATES'  POLl  CI  ES  ON 
THEIR  BOND  MARKE'rS  FROM 
1966  TO  THE  MIDDLE  OF  1969 
(February 1970) The  purpose of this part of the  report is to indicate  the use  that Member  States 
made  of instruments to regulate the  bond  market during the period from  1966  to 
mid-1969.  This  "dynamic"  study highlights certain aspects which are not  brought  out in 
the "static" description of procedures  and instruments for the maintenance  of market 
equilibrium given in Part I. 
In actual fact,  little or no  use vas made  of existing instruments in some  member 
countries,  whereas  the authorities in others succeeded in following an active policy 
despite  the  apparent  inadequacy of their  fo~al powers. 
It also  seemed  advisable  to  follow  the description of differences and  similarities 
between  the various measures  and  procedures available  with  a  comparison of the policies 
pursued at a  given  time,  with a  view in particular to assessing the effects these 
policies had  on  each other.  This  interaction can either increase or lessen the 
effectiveness of national policies,  depending on  whether  aims happen to converge  or not. 
-~-CHAPTER  I.  GENERAL  APPROACH  TO  BOND  MARKm'  POLI t:Y 
All  Member  States have  instruments at  their disposal  which  enable  them  to 
influence conditions on  the bond  market  by acting to adjust  supply,  demand  or interest 
rates.  In practice,  however,  depending on  the country and  the  circumstances,  the 
authorities have  tended either to allow  the market  to find its ovn level or to determine 
the  conditions of market equilibrium  by using the instruments at their disposal  to a 
greater or lesser extent. 
1.  The  course  selected by the authorities has generally been dictated by 
considerations of economic  policy extraneous to the  bond  market  as  such.  Official 
action has been influenced among  other things by attitudes to price movements  in 
general and to the  trend of interest rates as means  of controlling economic  activity 
either in a  given situation or in the  context of growth  policies. 
The  balance of payments  situation and  the  desire to encourage  capital  imports or 
exports have  also,  in certain circumstances,  had a  particular influence  on  official 
policies regarding interest rates. 
In Germany  the authorities feel  on  the  whole  that fluctuations in the rate of 
interest are an effective means  of regulating the trend of economic  activity.  Because 
of this,  and with a  view to combining growth  with stability,  the authorities have 
accepted increased intereat rates on  the capital market during periods when  the 
business situation seemed  to warrant  such increases - as was  the  case in 1966  and  1969. 
They also considered that,  in the last analysis,  the  greatest possible measure  of price 
stability was  the most  effective way  of safeguarding the interests of holders of 
registered securities and,  consequently,  the interests of the  bond  market.  During 
1967/1968  the  Government  pursued an  ~asy money  policy,  with interest rates relatively 
low,  this being regarded as a  desirable  stimulus to economic activity. 
Throughout  the period under review the authorities were  aware  of the  need  to curb 
capital imports and encourage capital exports,  though  the urgency of this need varied 
from  time to time.  They did not,  however,  consider it necessary to check the increase 
in interest rates because  the "Kuponsteuer"  (withholding tax on  bonds held by non-
residents,  from  German  issuers),  announced in March  1964  and  in force  since  March  1965, 
was  enough  to channel  foreign capital towards foreign  DM  issues,  in other words  towards 
re-exportation. 
- 49  -Thus,  fluctuations in the interest rate and market  volume  were  usually accepted -
indeed welcomed  - and little was  done  to regulate the  bond  market by direct action on 
capital  supply or demand,  except when  a  curb on interest rates  seemed  to be  advisable 
because of the trend of economic  activity. 
Until recently market regulation policy in Belgium,  France,  Italy and  the 
Netherlands was  less closely linked with  economic  considerations.  This was  because, 
on  the wnole,  the authorities in these  countries made  little use of interest-rate 
policy for  cyclical or specific purposes  for many  years.  They  felt  that if supply or 
demand  on  the  bond  market  were  to be  effectively influenced - allowing for  the  general 
decline in prices and  the  behaviour of borrowers and  lenders - interest rates would 
have  to be  fixed at very high levels,  and this they regarded as incompatible with 
growth  targets and  social requirements.  In these  countries regulation of supply and 
demand  on  the  bond  market - and through  these regulation of the  business trend - relies 
much  less heavily on interest-rate fluctuations,  and  growth  policy is backed by interest 
rates which  have  been kept as low as the  business trend allowed.  It will  be  seen, 
however,  in this regard that  there  we~e diffe~ences - sometimes  considerable 
differences - in  th~ extent to which  this policy was  pursued  from  country to country and 
from  period to period.  At  the beginning of the  period under review the  authorities 
pursued  a  policy designed at  le~st to reduce  the  peaks in the  trend of interest rates 
and  often to stabilize rates as much  as possible with  a  view to meeting the  economy's 
financing needs,  notably those  of priority investment in the  public sector,  at the 
lowest  possible cost.  Even  in countries where  prices rose more  rapidly than in Germany, 
the authorities did not  consider that a  high interest rate was  needed to regulate the 
business trend,  but  the  aim  of keeping rates low  (a  short~term target in  some  and  a 
structural  one  in others) had to be  abandoned  for all practical purposes - in 1968  in 
France  and the Netherlands,  early in 1969 in Belgium,  and in mid-1969  in Italy.  The 
authorities are  now  showing a  growing  tendency to allow the market  to find its own 
level. 
Member  States•  policies have  therefore tended to move  closer together because  of 
changing attitudes on  interest-rate policy or because it proved  impossible  to pursue  an 
effective isolationist policy or accept  steady capital outflows,  which  is what  an 
isolated policy of low interest rates implies. 
- 50  -2.  It is also evident that official bond  market  policy is related to the importance 
of the  bond market  in financing channels. 
The  bond market is of major importance  in Italy and Belgium,  but it plays a  more 
modest  role in the other countries,  where  alternative  financing channels are more 
numerous  and  the  financial  system as a  whole  more  flexible.  The  flexibility of the 
financial  system is particularly marked  in Germany  and  the Netherlands,  where  issuers, 
and  the private  sector in particular,  can resort in large measure  to issues placed 
privately  (  markets in "Schuldscheindarlehen" and  "onderhandse leningen").  Relatively 
speaking,  therefore,  policy on bond  market regulation in these countries is rather 
liberal,  since it does not  extend to alternative  channels. 
It must  be  noted,  however,  that in countries  such as  Oe~many and Italy where  the 
banks have  an important role in the capital market,  either as lenders or as borrowers, 
monetary policy can exert  a  considerable, if indirect,  influence  on  the  working of the 
market  and  on  rates of interest. 
3.  The  point at which  the authorities intervene also varies considerably from  country 
to  country. 
In Germany  official intervention is less common  than in  the other countries,  and 
the brunt of adjustments made  for  cyclical reasons has been borne  so  far by the public 
sector. 
In the  other countries the burden is shared by  the public and  private sectors in 
the light of priorities.  When  public-sector loans predominate,  however,  market 
fluctuations  and regulatory action are bound  to affect the  public  sector. 
In Belgium,  France  and  the Netherlands market  regulation policy concentrates 
mainly on  demand  for capital.  In Italy,  although action to regulate  demand  is not 
neglected,  equilibrium  has  been  largely maintained by making the banking system 
contribute to a  greater or lesser extent  to the  supply of capital. 
4.  Arrangements  for  coordinated action by  the authorities and the banks participating 
in consortia in scheduling issues also vary from  country to country. 
-51 -As  far as the  form  of this ooordinated action is concerned,  German,  Dutch  and 
French practice has tended to converge  in recent years,  though there  are still 
considerable differences in the  amount  of pressure applied by  the  authorities.  In 
these three countries the issue time-table is fixed  on  the basis of official or  semi-
official discussions - multilateral or bilateral - between the  authorities  ~nd the 
banks. 
In contrast to this,  although unofficial contacts have  been  established between 
the authorities and the  banks in the  other countries,  there is no  official framework 
for consultations and  the issue time-table is still drawn  up more  or less independently 
by  the authorities in Belgium  and Italy and the banks in Luxaabourg. 
-52-CHAP'l'ER  II  •  POLICIES  ON  DOMESTIC  DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL 
Over  the years 1966  to 1969  the authorities in all Member  States exerted influence 
on all or part.of the domestic demand  for capital on  the  bond  market.  They  did, 
however,  concentrate  on  different types of issuer,  and  the policies followed varied in 
severity. 
Germany 
It vas only when  the market vas under heavy pressure  or when  interest levels were 
extremely high that any attempt was  made  to influence  market  trends by limiting the 
number  of issues.  One  such period ran from  autumn  1965  to the  end of 1966.  During 
this time the authorities brought  pressure to bear on  certain domestic issuers who  were 
not very sensitive to changes in interest rates to encourage  them  to bring their issues 
more  into line with market conditions. 
Towards  the  end of 1968  and during 1969  there  vas no  need,  despite market  strains 
and  the level of interest rates,  to interfere with  domestic  demand  beoause public-sector 
issuers voluntarily limited their calla on  the market  and  even agreed,  within the 
Council  on  Economic  rrends  (Konjunkturrat),  to postpone  a  ntmber o! issues in 1969. 
German  policy might  be  summed  up as follower 
(a)  A freese  on  direct issues by administrations and  public enterprises  (Federal 
Government,  Linder,  local authorities,  the  Federal  Postal Administration and  the 
Federal  Railways)  in 1966; 
(b)  A curb on  issues of mortgage  and  communal  bonds1  from  the end  of July 1965  and  in 
1966,  no  ban at all being placed  on  loans by private-sector companies,  though  these 
were  of minor  significance only. 
In actual fact this ·policy was  not very strictly applied.  Some  public 
administrations were  able to run into debt with institutions which  continued to float 
issues  (communal  bonds),  while other issuers had recourse to calls on  the market vhioh 
were  not  subject to control  (issues of registered rather than bearer bonds,  issues of 
Schuldscheindarlehen). 
This flexibility in the  policy to limit capital demand  is explained by the liberal 
view taken by the authorities,  who  believe that a  rise in interest rates has  some 
favourable  effects on  economic  activity and tends to make  it possible for the  market  to 
find its own  way  back to equilibrium. 
1  Securities issued by the public and  private mortgage  credit institutions and  by  the 
central giro institutions  (Girozentralen). 
-53-(a)  Policy towards  public administrations and  public enterprises 
Even  before  the  Council  on  Economic  Trends  (Konjunkturrat)  was  established under 
the June  1967  law on  economic  stability and  growth,  participants in round-table 
discussions had been  trying to adjust public-sector issues to  the  capacity of the 
market. 
As  far back as the  summer  of 1965  public issuers  (Federal Government,  Linder, 
local authorities,  the  Federal  Postal Administration and  the  Federal  Railways)  had 
agreed  to exercise restraint in their calls on  the  bond  market.  In May  1966  they agreed 
to call a  halt to issues - and  the agreement  was  continued until the end of the year -
so as to prevent the  coupon rate  from  exceeding 7%,  while  the yield on  the  secondary 
market  went  abov~ 8.~ and  even reached  9%  in certain oases.  As  a  result,  interest 
rates on  the  market  in  government  stocks fell,  to be  followed  by rates on  the other 
sections of the  market. 
In 1967  participants in the  round-table discussions and  subsequently the  Council 
on Economic  Trends  saw  to it that public issuers did not make  too much  use of the loan 
market  in order to make  interest rates fall  more  quickly and  thus stimulate a  revival 
of investment.  The  Federal  Government's  economic  programmes  were  financed by short-
and  medium-term  fUnds,  while the  Linder  and  the municipalities financed their additional 
investment  on  the long-term market. 
The  Federal  Government  began to contract loans against borrowers•  notes 
(Sohuldsoheindarlehen)  towards the  end  of 1967  and made  large-scale use of these in 
1968  to consolidate its short-term debts  (DM  4 700  million compared  to a  long-term 
indebtedness of only  DM  650 million).  It continued to avail itself of this method  of 
financing in 1969  (DM  1  500  million in the first quarter). 
It should  be noted that the  Council  on  Economic  Trends  advocated this type of 
financing,  which  is less expensive  for  the issuer,  though  the  Council  does not  normally 
review Sohuldsoheindarlehen,  public authorities being completely free  to float loans of 
this type and  to fix their amount  and  timing. 
Because  there was  no  pressure  on  the bond  market,  the easing off of rates which 
began in 1967  continued in 1968.  All issuers who  wished to place loans on  the  bond 
market  were  able to do  so,  and  the  Council  on  Economic  Trends had no  p~oblems to deal 
with,  especially since public borrowers preferred to make  use of Schuldsoheindarlehen. 
- 54  -Rates  began to climb again in the  spring of 1969,  partly because  of an influx of 
foreign issues and in sympathy with interest rates on  the  international market,  partly 
because of restrictions on  domestic liquidity and  an increase in Bank  rate. 
The  German  authorities considered higher interest rates inevitable because the 
economy  at the time was  showing  a  growing tendency to overheat.  During the first half 
of 1969,  however,  the volume  of new  issues floated by  domestic public issuers was  lower 
than the volume of redemptions and  repurchases.  Public issuers therefore made  a 
considerable contribution to the reduction in net  domestic issues,  which  totalled 
DM  5 400 million in January-April 1969  compared  with  DM  7  200  million in 
January-April 1968. 
Although the authorities regarded higher interest rates as one  way  to counteract 
overheating,  their policy within the  Council  on Economic  Trends was  to encourage public 
issuers to retrain from  making calls on  the market  so as to avoid aggravating existing 
market  strain. 
(b)  Policy on  issues by  financial institutions and  private enterprises 
It was  only in 1965/1966  that the  Federal Minister of Economic  Affairs made  use 
of the  powers  given him  by Articles 795  and 808a of the  Civil  Code  (BOB)  to postpone 
issues subject to authorization.  The  Minister preferred  on  the  whole  to use moral 
suasion to  obtain a  voluntary limitation of issues. 
Since industry made  hardly any calls on  the bond  market,  the main  object of this 
policy was  to prevent  an excessive volume  of bank bonds  (mortgage  bonds  and  communal 
bonds)  being issued by institutes specializing in credit against real estate.  Because 
of this policy,  issues of bearer bonds  (subject to the  authorization procedure) fell in 
1966  but  issues of registered bonds  and other privately placed issues  (Schuldscheindar-
lehen)  showed  an increase. 
The  Minister maintained this policy until the  end  of 1966,  though  the  trend towards 
lower interest rates set in in the  summer.  Authorizations only became  freely available 
when  the  Bundesbank,  for cyclical policy reasons,  returned to an expansionist credit 
policy and the credit institutions,  having built up their liquidity,  resumed  investment 
in bonds. 
- 55-Despite this,  the  Council  on  Economic  Trends kept  a  close watch  in 1967  to ensure 
that the bond market was  not  subjected to  excessive strain due  to the  flotation of 
public issues.  In 1968  the easing off observed in the  previous year  continued. 
The  very low level of industrial loans is explained by the  fact  that this sector 
of the  economy  had abundant resources of its own  (considerable liquidity and a  high 
rate of self-financing).  And  when it did need to borrow,  industry preferred to make 
use of the abundant  credit available in the  banking system. 
In contrast to this,  issues of communal  bonds  became  extremely important, 
representing about half of net domestic issues.  While  issues of mortgage  bonds  only 
showed  a  modest  increase,  issues by other specialized credit institutions rose 
sharply. 
Although  the bond  market was  again under strain in 1969,  the Minister did not make 
restrictive use of the authorization  procedure  because  domestic issuers did not make 
excessive use of the market.  He  was  content  to inform  the  Central  Capital Market 
Committee  (Zentraler K&pitalmarktaussohuss des Bangewerbes,  ZKA)  of the market limits 
for  foreign issues and warn  against  an excessive  flow,  hoping to encourage restraint 
and to persuade participating banks to  stagger their issues. 
But  tap issues,  and  issues of communal  and mortgage bonds in particular,  were  not 
discussed by  the  Central  Capital Market  Committee  and  were  scarcely affected by the 
market  situation.  During the first four months  of 1969,  issues of communal  and 
mortgage  bonds  were  very little lower than in the  corresponding period of 1968  and were 
higher than in the last four months  of 1968.  Other bank bonds,  particularly medium-term 
bonds  issued by the central giro institutions,  rose  sharply. 
Lastly,  private enterprises did not increase their calls on  the market;  in fact 
they even injected fUnds  into it, by redeeaing earlier loans to an amount  exceeding 
that of new  issues. 
~ 
A very active  market  regulation policy was  followed throughout  the  period under 
review.  The  authorities first had  to deal  with  strain caused by disequilibrium in the 
supply/demand situation beginning in 1966,  which  was  not properly dealt. with until 1967. 
They  then had to face  a  rapid series of crises due  to monetary and political factors 
- 56  -in May/June  1968,  November  1968  and the second quarter of 1969.  Lastly,  policy 
procedures and instruments were  considerably mod.ified in April 1968.1  Thus,  throughout 
the  perio~ under review,  the Minister of Economic  Affairs and  Finance,  initially on his 
own  and in clcse cooperation with the Banking  Commission  following the reform of 
April 1968,  did all in his  power,  through action on  domestic  demand  and  interest rates, 
to stabilize a  market which  vas being seriously disturbed. 
The  1"irst  step in this policy was  to allow interest rates to adjust themselves, 
letting French rates rise gradually to the level of rates on  the international market 
and then to exceed them.  The  next  step vas to ban issues temporarily on  a  number  of 
occasions  and  from  1967  onwards to  out  back planned  issues in the public sector, 
particularly issues by central  government  - which  thus,  as is Germany,  had to make  a 
larger proportion of the adjustments necessary to maintain market  equilibrium than other 
borrowers. 
French  policy on  bond market regulation has  gone  through  two  main  phases  since 
1966.  In the first phase,  ending in 1967,  variations in interest rates were  largely 
governed by the  trend of domestic  supply and demand,  and  the authorities had to restore 
"normal"  disequilibria by  conventional means.  In the  second,  beginning in 1968,  interest 
rates were  more  influenced by political and monetary  events,  and  were  also more 
sensitive to external influences.  The  instruments available to the  Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and  Finance  for intervening on  the bond market  were,  moreover,  radically changed 
by the April 1968  reforms. 
Lastly,  since 1968  the policy of adjusting domestic  demand  in the interests of 
restoring market  equilibrium has pressed more  heavily on  public-sector issuers. 
(a)  Policy  from  1966  to 196? 
French interest rates were  under pressure in the early months  of 1966  because of 
the increase in gross  issues  (+16%)  and net issues  (+2~), particularly central 
government  and local authority issues  compared with  the  previous year. 
1  These  changes are  described  in Part I  of this report. 
- 57  -The  Ministry of Economic  Affairs and  Finance,  which at that  time  was  responsible 
for  fixing the  timing and  terms of loans,  considered that it was  impossible  to  suspend 
calls on  the  market  because of the rigidity of the  issue  programme.  It therefore 
decided to raise the  coupon  rate of new  issues by  0.5~. 
This  brought  coupon  rates to  6.25~ for  first-category loans and  to  6.5~ for 
other issues,  and  yields  on  issue to  6.8~ and  7.1~ respectively.  This  adjustment, 
which affected the  secondary market,  was  not  enough  to catch up on  stock exchange  yields, 
which  continued to  show  a  moderate  increase until January 1967  because  of the  overloaded 
time-table. 
Higher rates on  the  international market  and foreign markets also contributed to 
increased interest rates in France  by encouraging institutional investors,  wh~ 
anticipated that this trend would  spread,  to  postpone  committing their available 
resources.  It should be  noted that rates in France  were  higher than in Germany  (some 
yields were  in excess of 8.5%)  but  that  there was  a  sharp reduction in issues in Germany 
in 1966  whereas  the  number  of issues in  France  that year were  higher than at any time 
during the  period 1960-69. 
So  while  the  German  authorities attempted to prevent  the  record interest rates 
on  their market increasing any  further by  curbing demand  (and  demand  from  the  public 
administrations,  in particular),  the French authorities took  the opposite line,  which 
had the effect of facilitating the alignment of French rates on  international rates. 
Market  strain eased off in 1967,  thanks to a  reduction in the  volume  of net 
issues and in particular loans floated by central  government  and  specialized credit 
institutions.  On  the  other hand,  the  selection of borrowers was  to the advantage of 
public and  private enterprises,  whose  issues expanded. 
(b)  Policy since 1968 
Following sterling devaluation in November  1967,  the  strain which  had made  its 
appearance  on  the international market  spread to the  French market,  causing  a  slight 
rise in yields.  Since  there are  no  close links between  the  international market  and  the 
French market,  it would  seem  that psychological  influences and  in particular anticipatory 
action by institutional investors were  responsible  for this. 
In 1968  the authorities had  to deal with  periods of more  serious strain provoked 
by  a  variety of causes. 
- 58  -The  tension which became  evident at the  end  of 1967  persisted until March  1968, 
when  it began  to ease with  the  reform of  t~e bond  market,  the  slowdown  in the frequency 
of issues and  the  0.25~ increase in coupon rates. 
There  is therefore  a  considerable contrast between  the policy followed before and 
the policy followed  after the  reform of April 1968.  Before the reform,  rates and 
timings  were  fixed by the authorities by and  large,  but since the reform  they have  been 
fixed  in consultation with  a  committee  of bankers  and  have  made  more  allowance for 
market  trends. 
The  social unrest in ~  led the Ministry of Economic  Affairs  and  Finance  and  the 
Banking Commission  to agree to a  ban  on  issues. 
When  issues began  again  in July,  market  equilibrium was  assured by reducing the 
issue programme  of the  semi-public sector (these were  replaced by medium-term credits 
and  medium-term bills placed with the banking system)  and  by a  further increase  in 
coupon  rates,  which  rose to  6.75~ for public-sector bonds  and  7~ for industrial bonds 
so that yields at issue could become  aligned with yields on  the secondary market  without 
the  need  for excessive  issue premiums. 
Despite these relief measures,  the bond  market  was  again under strain  from 
November  because of the monetary crisis,  and  it was  agreed to  suspe~d issues once  again. 
From  the  same  month  onwards  a  moro  deliberate policy Of  allowing rates to adjust  them-
selves  was  followed for'reasons  of business activity and  market  equilibrium. 
But  because requirements were  inflexible,  issues which  had been postponed on 
several occasions had  in the  end  to be  floated in rapid succession from  December  1968 
throughout  the first quarter of 1969.  This set off a  further considerable  increase in 
rates amounting to  n.5~ for government  stock and  0.7~ for industrial bonds. 
Despite the  increase in coupon  rates and  the high  yields on  issue recorded in 
April  (8.~~ for semi-public bonds,  8.5~ for industrial bonds), it became  difficult 
to place new  loans because of market  congestion andaectoral circumstances  which 
hindered recovery. 
Private-sector issues were  suspended voluntarily in April,  and  public-sector issues 
had  to be held  in abeyance  fo~ three  weeks  in June. 
-59  -When  issues resumed  in July,  a  turther sharp increase of  1~ in coupon  rates was 
approved in the hope  of doing away  with  issues at a  discount and  aligning the coupon 
rate on  the  running yield at issue,  which  is in turn identical with  the yield on  the 
secondary market. 
Netherlands 
Bond  market  regulation policy was  relatively flexible  in the Netherlands  and  made 
use  of the various  instruments available.  It was  backed  as required by an adjustment 
of domestic  demand  to market  capacity either by staggering certain issues,  or by 
limiting their volume  or by altering their yield. 
(a)  General policy 
The  Central Bank  made  use of its powers  to delay certain loans  under the  1954 
gentlemen's agreement  with the banks  on  one  occasion  in 1966  and  on  several occasions 
in 1967,  1968  and  1969.  Private issuers were  asked to stagger their loans more  often 
than public issuers,  whose  flotations were  adjusted to market  circumstances  in other 
ways.  The  Central Bank  has no  power,  in theory,  to influence interest rates for these 
loans  since the gentlemen's  agreement  is silent on  this point, but  in practice it does 
discuss  terms  with  the banks. 
A number  of loans  were  not fully subscribed in 1966  because the yield at issue 
fixed by the  issuers was  too  low.  In some  instances failure could also be attributed 
to the  absence  of an  adequate guarantee or to market  developments between the  announce-
ment  of the  issue and  the opening of subscription lists.  Thus,  one  central government 
loan was  not fully subscribed early in the year,  so  terms for later issues were  improved. 
Despite this,  however,  a  Oasunie loan was  considerably undersubscribed in April.  This, 
combined  with an  increase in Bank  rate,  subjected yields to heavy pressure,  causing them 
to rise over 7~ (as  against  6.25~ early in the year).  Terms  then became  stable,  and 
applications to float  issues filed in the  second half of the year were  approved. 
The  market  remained  calm  in the first quarter of 1967,  and  the rate fell back to 
6.15~ for a  central government  loan floated in April.  There  were  no  private-sector 
issues because potential borrowers  who  had  made  their wishes known  in 1966  and  were 
asked to wait until the spring of 1967  were  no  longer interested - either because they 
-~-had  satisfied their financing requirements in the  interval by means  of loans placed 
privately, or because the  interest-rate situation made  them  prefer to mark  time. 
Early in the  second quarter a  number  of applications for small  privat&Meector 
issues were  filed and  approved.  Later on,  however,  a  loan floated by the Bank for 
Netherlands Municipalities was  given priority, but  the  amount  of this loan had to be 
reduced because  of the tension in the  Middle East. 
Uncertainty with regard to the  pound  sterling led to a  further period of stagnation 
on  the market.  In January 1968  priority was  given to a  Gasunie  loan,  then to  a  central 
government  loan  (the  amount  of this being fixed after subscriptions closed). 
Two  privat8Meector loans  were  allowed on  to the  market  in March  1968  after the 
public issues mentioned  above.  The  first of these failed,  however,  because of monetary 
instability at the  time  and  because it coincided with the flotation of two  large loans 
on  the private market.  Despite the  differences between  the public market  and  the 
private market,  then,  they do  mutually influence each other. 
The  Bank  for Netherlands  Municipalities had  to wait until May,  and  the central 
government  until mid-June,  to  g~in access  to the market.  In the case of the central 
government  loan it became  obvious between  the date of issue  (14 June)  and  the date  on 
which  payment  in full was  due  (4  July)  that the  amount  was  too high  and  vas having the 
effect of depressing prices on  the  bond market.  For this reason two  loans floated 
just before the central government  loan was  due  for payment  in full were  unsuccessful, 
the yield being considered not  ve.ry  attractive.  Because of this set-back,  the c  ..... +..,.•l 
Bank  decided to suspend  issues. 
Flotations  recommenced  in the  second half of August  with a  Bank  for Netherlands 
Municipalities  loan.  This was  so successful that the  immediate  launching of another 
launched  loan proved possible.  The  central government  in its turn identical a  third 
loan by tender in October,  with  a  coupon  rate of  6.5~ and  a  minimum  issue price of 
99~,  the actual amount  of the  loan being indeterminate but to be fixed within stated 
upper and  lower limits. 
During the first half of 1969,  on  the other hand,  the authorities delayed 
a  loan on  one  occasion only,  market  equilibrium being largely assured by adjusting 
interest rates. 
- 61-After France,  the Netherlands is the country in which  interest rates rose  most 
rapidly during the first quarter of 1969.  Dutch rates came  close to rates on  the 
international market  for the first time  and  later exceeded them.  This rapid  increase 
was  mainly due  to four factors•  the restrictive credit policy,  the repercussions of 
higher rates on  the  international market,  a  certain hesitancy on  the part of investors, 
and  a  change  in the  pattern of supply (investors having shown  a  growing interest in 
foreign  shares  and  convertible bonds). 
These  changes  in interest rates do  in fact reflect a  gradual change  in official 
policy.  Although Dutch  interest rates had been among  the  lowest  in Europe for many 
years,  the authorities did nothing to stabilize them,  believing that  increased rates 
would  help to restore equilibrium on  the  market  and  might  give support  to short-term 
economic  policy.  The  interest-rate policy followed  by the Dutch authorities was  there-
fore very close to that pursued in Germany.  Market  equilibrium policy is,  however, 
much  more  active in the Netherlands,  where  market  equilibrium takes precedence  over 
short-term policy aims.  These  interventions by the  Central Bank  are  supplemented by 
the  Government's policy of adjusting demand  from  public issuers. 
(b)  Policy towards  local authori-ties 
The  local authorities - the  largest  issuers,  accounting for some  5~  of net  issues 
in 1967  and  1968  - were  obliged by the Government,  under Article 5  of the  1963  law  on 
municipal  and  provincial expenditure,  to reduce their long-term borrowing from  the Bank 
for Netherlands Municipalities by imposing "central financing"  throughout  the period 
1966  to 1968.  (The  ministerial decision of 10  December  1965  was  renewed  each year.) 
This  was  preferred to the alternative used on  previous occasions of placing a  ceiling 
on  municipalities'  indebtedness,  because the Bank  for Netherlands  Municipalities is 
better able to adjust its calls to market  conditions. 
This  method  is doubtless not very convenient for the municipalities,  who  have  no 
way  of knowing  in advance what  borrowed resources will be at their disposal during the 
year.  It does,  however,  have  the  advantage of making it possible to improve  the 
allocation of resources,  bearing the needs of the various local authorities in mind. 
(Small  municipalities were  previously at  a  disadvantage when  it came  to making direct 
calls on  the market.)  When  allocating resources the  Government  takes into account 
- 62-the priorities drawn  up  by the provincial authorities  (Colleges van Gedeputeerde Staten). 
There  are special  arrangements  for  large  towns•  an  investment  ceiling is fixed,  but  no 
mention  is made  of how  investmen~are to be financed. 
There  is also  a  curb  on  the short-term indebtedness  (less than  12  months)  of local 
authorities.  Under  administrative regulations this cannot  exceed one  quarter of current 
receipts in the previous year.  Once  this percentage has been  accounted for,  local 
authorities must  use  5~  of their long-term borrowings  to consolidate their short-term 
debts. 
Generally speaking,  however,  this rigid framework  seems  to be used to allocate 
resources between  the  authorities rather than to limit their indebtedness.  In practice, 
throughout  the period under review,  the Bank for Netherlands Municipalities raised as 
much  money  as it could by floating bond  issues,  issuing savings bonds  and  resorting to 
onderhandse  leningen.  It might  even be said that this borrower enjoyed privileged access 
to the  market because  a  number  of private-sector issues were  staggered to ensure that its 
loans  would  succeed. 
The  main  purpo~e of central financing is to ensure that capital markets are not 
disturbed by local authorities outbidding each other. 
(c)  Policy on  central government  issues 
As  far as  the central government  - generally the  second  largest  issuer - is concerned, 
the  Dutch  approach is to pursue  a  budget  policy which  does  not put  too much  pressure  on 
the  market.  This restraint on  the part of the central government  does  not  mean,  however, 
that its loans  come  last in the queue.  On  many  occasions,  p:r·i vate-sector loans  were 
delayed to facilitate the floating of central government  loans.  At  times,  however, 
particularly during the first half of 1968,  central government  and  local authority 
requirements  had  to take  second place because  of the  business situation. 
The  central government  also uses other sources  of finance,  notably the short-term 
market,  and  only finds  some  of its requirements  on  the bond  market.  In fact,  government 
net  issues on  the bond  market  fluctuate  much  more  than central government  indebtedness 
as  a  whole. 
- 63-The  central government  has varied its techniques  with  a  view to  m&kir~ its issues 
better adjusted to the capacity of the bond market.  In 1968  it floated  loans without 
fixi~g the  amount  before subscriptions opened,  and it also used  the tendering technique-
whereby  the amount  and  the real yield can fluctuate within a  certain range  in the 
light of market  response.  The  first technique  ensured market  equilibrium by adjusting 
the  volume  of central government  loans,  and  the  second did the same  by adjusting rates 
as well  as volume. 
There  is no  doubt  that the use  of these regulating techniques  reduced  the  need  to 
stagger a  number  of issues.  But  it is difficult in the last analysis to work  out  what 
effect they have had  on  the volume  and  terms  of central government  loans  or to say what 
the volume  and  terms  of these  loans would  have  been if they had not been  introduced. 
With  a  growing bond  market,  measured by the relationship between  issues and  national 
product,  the  Italian authorities kept  a  watchful eye  on  market  trends  so  as  to ensure 
that  the  demand  for funds  was  matched by supply,  thus stabilizing the  cost of the  long-
term funds  needed to promote  production and  investment. 
It should be  noted,  however,  that the main  effects of Italian policy - a  virtual 
monopoly  for public-sector issues  and relatively stable interest rates until mid-1969 
were  caused by the  automatic  weeding  out  of issuers by tax arrangements  and  measures 
affecting the  supply of capital, rather than by any  conscious selection policy applied 
to issuers. 
Contrary to practice in all the  other EEC  countries,  the  main  instrument of bond 
market  regulation policy is not  intervention at  the  issue stage. 
(a)  Selection of issuers 
This  plays  a  very important role,  but selection is largely an  automatic affair 
through taxation.  Because of the  "imposta di  riochezza mobile",  a  tax on  bond  interest 
paid by the  issuer and  now  running at 38%,  capital raised on  the bond  market  is 
- 64-prohibitively expensive for borrowers  liable to this tax.  The  issuers who  are  exempt 
are public borrowers  proper  (central  government,  local authorities,  institutions issuing 
for the  account  of the Treasury),  public credit institutions and public enterprises, 
which  only p~  a  subscription tax which  is almost negligible.  This gives public 
borrowers  a  de l!£!2 monopoly  of access to the market. 
1  After this automatic selection which  weeds  out private-sector issuers,  some 
selection must  still be made  between proposed public-sector issues.  Generally speaking, 
staggering issues is enough  to ensure market  equilibrium.  This can be arranged at the 
moment  when  authorization is given by all the authorities having a  band in this procedure 
and  again when  the Bank  of Italy authorizes the  effective launching of the  issue. 
For these reasons,  a  waiting period,  sometimes  of several months'  duration,  may 
occur between  the filing of the application and  the  actual floating of the loan.  In 
April  1967,  however,  because of fears  about  a  review of the  tax treatment of bonds, 
public borrowers suspended  issues  completely to relieve the  market  situation.  Net 
issues were  much  more  unevenly distributed throughout  1967  than  in 1966,  and  they 
dropped  more  in 1967.  than total issues.  They  recovered in 1968  and  were  once  more 
evenly distributed throughout  the year. 
Furthermore,  in 1969  the  monetary authorities restricted issues by institutions 
specializing in credit against real  estate,  in order to curb  a  building boom. 
It can be seen,  then,  that concern for market  equilibrium or the trend of economic 
activity can  lead the authorities to curb  or del~ issues by certain borrowers. 
Although  Italy has no  arrangements  on  the  lines of those existing in Germany, 
France or the Netherlands to ensure  that  issues  are  staggered,  coordination between 
the various authorities concerned is ensured by a  flexible  system of contacts,  including 
contacts between the  Inter-Ministerial Credit  and  Savings Committee  and  the Bank  of 
Italy.  The  principal  lende~a and  borrowers also meet  informally at the  Bank  of Italy 
each quarter. 
1  Specialized credit institutions,  however,  use  a  large proportion of their issues 
for private-sector financing. 
- 65-(b)  Demand  policy 
Throughout  the  period under review the  Italian authorities,  in particular the 
Inter-~~nisterial Credit  and  Savings  Committee  and  the Bank  of Italy,  acted to regulate 
domestic  demand,  making sure that  loan terms  were  consistent with the stabilization of 
interest rates which  was  their main  objective. 
It must  be noted,  however,  that  intervention with respect to  demand  was  less 
significant in this connection than measures affecting supply,  because yields at issue 
had been aligned on  rates  on  the  secondary market  and  action to stabilize the  market 
was  directed chiefly at these rates,  contrary to normal practice in other EEC  countries. 
Steps  taken to stabilize the  market  were  concentrated in the  main  on  interest 
rates for government  stock and  issues by special credit  institutions.  The  lowest  and 
most  stable rates are  those for 9-year Treasury bonds  and  some  other central government 
loans  such  as  those for school-building.  These particularly low  rates can be attributed 
to special tax concessions  (exemption from  estate duty)  - vhich explains  why  these 
securities are attractive to  individual bond  holders - and  to a  policy of price support 
which  was  particularly active in the  last three years,  prices being kept  at par. 
The  interest rate regarded· as  the best indicator of the cost of  long-term money, 
namely the  rate for bonds  issued by institutions specializing in credit against movable 
property,  only increased slightly in 1967,  moving  from  6.60%  to  6.77~. It was  kept  at 
this level in  1968  despite the strains which  made  their appearance  on  the  internation~, 
market  and  foreign markets.  The  contrast was  even more  marked  during the first half of 
1969•  when  the  increase in rates became  even  more  marked  everywhere else, this rate 
remained virtually stable  (6.83~ in June  1969),  with  a  very slight increase occurring 
in July.  The  upward  movement  became  more  accentuated in later months,  however,  bringing 
the yield to  7.46~ in October and  7.90%  in December. 
Belgium 
Because  loans floated by the public authorities predominate  (they represent  two 
thirds of all issues,1  the highest  proportion in the  Community),  market  regulation 
policy is largely based  on  forecasts  for  the borrowing requirements  of the central 
government  and  other public agencies. 
1 
For  the  three years from  1967  to 1969  issues by the  public authorities  (excluding 
public credit institutions)  amounted  to  66~ of total net domestic  issuesJ  if gross 
"block"  issues only are considered,  the proportion is 95~. 
- 66-Since central government  requirements  are  always  considerable,  the main  features 
of regulatory action are that the volume  of central government  loans  is fixed at  a 
level compatible with fluctuations  in capital supply and  that  a  time-table for issues 
is drawn  up  early in the year with  due  regard for the  wishes  of the various public 
borrowers. 
(a)  Public-sector issues 
In  1966  the net financing requirements  of central government  came  to 
Bfrs.  17  100  million.  Because  there was  strain on  the Belgian market,  only 
Bfrs.  9  100  million of this could be raised on  the  domestic  market  in fjxed-interest 
securities,  the balance being covered by short- and  medium-term funds  (Bfrs.  4  100 
million)  and  recourse to foreign markets  (Bfrs.  3 900 million). 
In 1967,  on  the  other hand,  all the central government's net financing  requiremen~ 
amounting to Bfrs.  22  50~ million,  was  raised on  the Belgian market  in fixed-interest 
eecurities. 
The  central government's net  requirement  in 1968  came  to Bfrs.  33  700  million. 
Only Bfrs.  25  400  million of this total could be found  on  the bond  market,  the balance 
being covered by short-term borrowing. 
Finally,  information available for the first quarter seems  to indicate that the 
central government's net  requirement  for  1969  too will not be fully satisfied by the 
Belgian bond  market. 
When  the budget  is being drafted the Treasury is aware  of the net financing 
requirements of the various public borrowers for the year ahead.  It fixes  the  annual 
volume  of these  loans  and  at the  same  time  draws  up  a  time-table spacing them  over the 
year.  The  time-table  makes  allowances for the  pattern of redemptions  and  repayments, 
the  estimated rhythm  of tax receipts,  and  market fluctuations during the year.  With 
the  development  of roll-over loans,  however,  it is becoming more  difficult to forecast 
requirements for renewing bonded debt.  The  demand  for reimbursement  from bond holders 
can  range from  2J  to  8~  of the issue,  depending on  the  individual  loan. 
In  1966  and  1967  public  issues  in large series ("block" issues) were  floated 
more  or less in line with the time-table  drawn  up  early in the year. 
In 1968,  on  the  other hand,  because  of the strained market  situation at the end 
of the year and  the  growth of net  financing requirements during the year,  it did not 
prove possible to raise all the money  as  planned  on  the fixed-interest securities market. 
-~-Over  the  years  under  review,  then,  the  Belgian Treasury adjusted its demand, 
cutting it back in  the  light of  forecasts  when  the  market  was  under strain and 
stepping it up  beyond  the  estimated level to  fund  its floating  debt  whenever capital 
was  available.  So  in Belgium,  unlike  the  Netherlands,  flexibility is ass.ured  by 
manipulating  the  volume  of loans rather than  by  staggering issues. 
(b)  Private-sector issues 
D~~ing the  period under  review,  the  Banking Commission  was  never  forced  to  make 
use  of its statutory powers  to stagger private-sector issues or  to  adjust  their 
amount  to  market  circumstances.  Nor  did it have  to exert  strong pressure  even  when 
the  market  was  under strain.  Its recommendations  to  companies  to avoid  overlapping 
in  the  issue  time-table  were  accepted  and  followed  without  any  difficulty. 
Competition  between public-sector and  private-sector issues  was  all the  more  easily 
avoided  since  private-sector issues were  "on  tap"  for  the  most  part.  Those  of  them 
that  were  "block"  issues  were  not  very large,  and  the  issuing companies,  aware  of 
the  Banking Commission's  views,  took  care  to avoid  any  clash between  their issues 
and  public-sector issues by inserting  them  in the  free  spaces left in  the  issue 
time-table  drawn  up  by  the Treasury.  But  the  main  point is that private-sector 
issues  were  very small,  companies  preferring to  make  use  of loans  from  the  banks  or 
specialized credit institutions  (Societe  nationale  de  credit a l'industrie  and Caisse 
nationale  de  credit professionnel),  which  are  on  the  whole  less expensive  than 
capital raised  by  public  issue,  particularly if allowance  is made  for  the  interest 
rebates  which  often accompany  these  loans if the  investment  to  be  financed  fulfils 
certain conditions. 
(c)  Interest-rate policy 
Interest-rate policy is dictated in  the  main  by  cyclical considerations  and 
largely depends  on  manipulation of Bank  rate.  Changes  in Bank  rate affect rates on 
the  money  market  but  do  not  necessarily influence  the  bond  market.  It is mainly 
when  the  authorities are  pursuing  a  policy designed to bring interest rates  down  that 
rates on  the  bond  market  prove  to  be  less  flexible  than  rates on  the  money  market. 
The  main  explanation  for  this is the  large structural  demand  from  the  public sector 
- 68  -on  the  issue  market.  In 1967,  for  example,  yields on  the  bond  market  fell only 
slightly though  Bank  rate  was  reduced  on  five  occasions. 
The  need  to boost  economic  activity meant  that  the  policy introduced in 1967  of 
maintaining interest rates at  a  "reasonable"  level  was  pursued  for  much  of 1968  and 
yields  on  the  bond  market  dipped slightly. 
Interest-rate policy was  reversed in the  later months  of 1968  because  there  was 
clear evidence  of a  powerful  recovery in economic  activity.  A reshaping of 
interest-rate policy was  also needed  because  of the  trend of interest rates abroad, 
which  had  led to  considerable  outflows of capital.  For  these  reasons  the Treasury 
decided to raise  the  issue rate of its loans.  Apart  from  the Treasury,  whose 
decisions  on  interest rates have  a  direct bearing  on  the  market,  the Council of Public 
Credit Institutions plays  an  important role  as  the  body  responsible  for  coordinating 
the  interest rates of loans,  especially tap issues,  floated by public  credit 
institutions. 
It is clear,  however,  that Belgian interest rates  were  more  and  more  influenced 
by  the  trend of interest rates abroad,  and  interest rates  on  the  Euro-currency  and 
Euro-bond  markets  in particular,  thus  limiting the  possibility of the  authorities' 
taking an  independent  line. 
Luxembourg 
Since  domestic  public  issues are  few,  action  to  regulate  domestic  demand  is 
necessarily limited. 
At  no  time  during  the  period under  review  did the  Commissioner  supervising 
banking,  who  has  powers  similar to  those  enjoyed by  the Belgian Banking Commission, 
have  to  use  them  to  delay private-sector loans. 
Luxembourg  interest rates,  which  had been  lower  than international rates  for  a 
long  time,  climbed back almost  to  international levels.  The  reason  for  this increase 
was  the  state  of the  public  finances,  which  obliged  the  public  sector to  make 
increased calls on  the  bond  market  from  1967  onwards  (it had  previously relied on 
institutional investors and  the banks). 
rates can be  regarded  as  permanent. 
The  alignment  of rates  on  international 
- 69  -CHAPTER  III.  POLICIES  ON  DOMESTIC  SUPPLY  OF  CAPITAL 
In every  Community  country except Italy,  measures  to  regulate  the  domestic 
capital supply  to maintain  market  equilibrium are  much  less  frequent  than 
intervention affecting  demand.  Action  to  regulate  supply is largely structural 
(measures  to  channel  placements  by  institutional investors or individuals,  for 
example)  and is necessarily a  rarer occurrence  than  the  day-to-day manipulation of 
demand.  This  does  not  mean  that its contribution to  market  equilibrium is any less 
significant  than  intervention with respect to  demand.  Action is also  taken,  however, 
to  facilitate  the  placing of certain loans  or to  support their prices;  this can take 
the  form  of an  open-market  policy or specific action to  influence certain investors. 
Germany 
(a)  The  expansion of investment  by  individuals in securities in general and bonds 
in particular is normally  viewed  favourably.  During the  period under  review  the 
authorities were  aware  that  fluctuations  in bond  prices  temporarily reduced  the 
propensity of  indiv~duals to  invest in these  securities,  and notably in longer-term 
loans.  This  was  particularly ·true  during 1966  and  1967,  when  bond buying  by 
individuals  fell,  both in terms  of absolute  value  and  as  a  percentage  of the  supply 
of capital on  the  fixed-interest  securities market,  although saving remained  stable. 
On  a  number  of occasions,  where  the  aims  of capital market  policy  (stable prices to 
attract savers)  clashed with  the  aims  of short-term economic  policy  (higher interest 
rates to  dampen  economic  activity),  preference  had  to  be  given  to  the  latter.  Rates 
and prices are  bound  to  fluctuate  somewhat  in the  future .too,  though  the  authorities 
would  like  to  change  their policy on  maintaining equilibrium to  make  more  use  of 
fiscal  policy and less of the  instruments  of monetary policy,  such  as  higher 
interest rates. 
Moreover,  a  number  of steps  were  taken  to  meet  the  public's preference  for  loans 
of shorter duration  and  readier marketability.  The  Federal Government  first cut  the 
life of its loans  to  10 or 12  years.  Then early in 1969 it introduced  the 
Bundesschatzbrief.  This is a  medium-term  (six-year)  security with  a  progressive 
rate  of interest;  it can  be  redeemed  at  any  time  after an initial one-year waiting 
period,  which  constitutes  a  guarantee  against  losses of capital.  Savings banks  and 
industrial credit cooperatives  were  encouraged  to offer similar securities. 
- 70  -Finally,  mortgage  credit institutions tried to  adapt their issues to  the  public's 
preferences  by  introducing ten-year  paper  redeemaole  at par after  five  years  and 
mortgage  bonds  of shorter duration. 
(b)  Through its open-market  policy the  Bundesbank  took  a  direct hand in influencing 
domestic  capital supply to offset temporary  market strain.  Hut  what  proved  decisive 
for  the  volume  of domestic  capital supply  was  the  repercussions of credit policy 
measures  taken to influence  economic  activity,  measures  which  had  a  direct incidence 
on  the  buying  and selling of fixed-interest securities by  banks  and  savings banks. 
The  Bundesbank  pursued  a  restrictive credit policy in 1965  and  more  particularly 
during  the  first half of 1966.  One  of the  side-effects of this was  a  considerable 
drop  in net  purchases of fixed-interest securities by  banks,  savings  banks  and  other 
credit institutions.  These  fell  from  DM  3  400  million in 1965 to  DM  1  500 million 
in 1966. 
From  the  end  of 1966  until 1968,  monetary  policy  was  directed towards  expansion, 
which meant  that  the  credit institutions acquired  DM  11  700 million in 1967  and 
DM  14  600  million in 1968.  One  of the  indirect  consequences  of monetary policy, 
then,  was  to increase  or  reduce  the  supply  of capital  from  credit institutions on 
the  bond  market. 
In 1967,  although  a  number  of credit institutions were  slow  to  resume  purchases 
of fixed-interest  securities,  the  Bundesbank broadened its open-market  policy by 
buying  from  its own  resources securities issued by  the  Federal Government  and its 
special institutions  (Federal Railways,  Postal Administration),  whereas it had 
previously confined itself to  buying securities of this kind  on  behalf of issuers. 
To  a  certain extent,  then,  the  Bundesbank  replaced  the  ordinary credit institutions 
as  a  buyer  on  the  secondary market,  thus  contributing directly to  the  supply of 
capital on  this market.  In 1967 it acquired a  net total of approximately  DM  l  300 
million  (some  10%  of the  market). 
This  extension of the  open-market  policy  was  suggested by  the  Federal Minister 
of Economic  Affairs  and  the  Federal Minister of Finance  because  the  tendency  for 
interest rates to  fall,  which  had  been  active  since  the  end  of 1966,  had  been 
arrested  and  even  reversed.  This  was  due  to  the  inflow of securities to  the  market, 
in association with  the  financing  of short-term investment  programmes,  and  the  sale 
of  fixed-interest  securities by  the  social security agencies. 
- 71  -The  Bundesbank  did not,  however,  confine its activities to  buying.  In  1968 it 
sold securities to  the· value  of DM  600 million because  of  the  brisk recovery in bank 
purchases.  Nor  did it continue  to intervene  on  a  regular basis,  against the  market 
trend,  but  rather to offset certain short-term  fluctuations. 
In February 1969,  because  the  factors  determining  monetary  policy had  changed, 
the  Bundesbank  dropped  the  open-market  policy it had  been pursuing,  with its own 
resources,  on  the  bond  market.  It was  forced  to  limit bank liquidity,  which  meant 
that it could  no  longer purchase  public securities for its own  account.  It did, 
however,  continue  to  intervene  on  the  public-sector loan  market,  using  the  resources 
of public issuers. 
(c)  It should also  be  noted  that  the  bond  market  received indirect support  on  two 
occasions in 1967:  first  when  the  Federal Government  financed its economic 
programmes  by  issuing short-term securities insteaq of bonds,  and  then  when  the 
Bundesbank  gave  special liquidity status to  medium-term notes  (Kassenobligationen) 
with  18  months  to  run,  thereby  facilitating their inclusion in  bank  portfolios. 
(a)  Intervention affecting domestic  capital supply was  relatively limited during  the 
period 1966-69;  the  sector chiefly affected was  the  institutional investors. 
The  rules  on  insurance  companies'  investments  were  relaxed by  a  decree  dated 
8  December  1966.  Insurance  companies  were  authorized  to  include  debentures  among 
their "first-category" assets,  up  to  5Cl%  of the  total of these  assets,  provided they 
did not increase their holdings by  more  than  10%  by  the  end  of 1970 at  an  annual rate 
of increase of 2.5%.  This relaxation had  a  favourable  impact  on  the  volume  of 
private-sector bonds  placed in 1967  and  1968. 
The  reform of placing techniques introduced in April 1968,  which prohibited the 
passing  on  of brokerage  to institutional investors,  had  the effect of making  these 
institutions step up  their subscriptions at  issue  whereas  previously their preference 
had  been  for  investing on  the  secondary  market.  Since  then,  the  signs are  that 
institutional investors have  been  subscribing  more  than  50%  of certain issues, 
compared  with  20%  before  the  reform. 
- 72  -It should  oe  noted  that neither the  Bank  of France  nor  the  Caisse  des  Depots et 
Consignations intervenes regularly on  the  secondary market.  The  Caisse  des  Depots 
acts like  a  private  investor and  has  no  role  as  a  stabilization fund. 
(b)  A number  of spontaneous  developments  had  an  appreciable  influence  on  the  supply 
of capital. 
~~e rapid  development  of the  SICAV  (open-ended investment  companies)  specializing 
in  the  placing of bonds  boosted capital supply  on  the  bond  market  from  the  end  of 
1966.  This  trend became  more  and  more  marked  because  of the  rise in interest rates, 
particularly since  even  non-specialized SICAV  are  required  to hold 30%  of their 
investments  in bonds  and  liquid assets. 
On  the  other hand,  market  strain was  aggravated  towards  the  end of 1967,  in June 
and  November  1968,  and  again in the  second  quarter of 1969  by  the  wait-and-see 
attitude  adopted  by institutional investors,  who  were  expecting interest rates to go 
up.  One  effect  of this was  that  the  psychology of the  market  transferred the 
increase  in interest rates on  the  international market  to France,  despite  the  absence 
of any  close  links hetween  foreign markets  and  the  French market. 
The  authorities noted that the  policy of raising issue  rates gradually was 
encouraging  investors to  mark  time  and  facilitating price  erosion,  and in July 1969 
they  fixed  the  yield of one  issue at  a  level considerably above  the  yields that had 
been  ruling up  to  that  time  in an  attempt  to  break  the  vicious circle. 
Another  reason  for  the  reduction in the  supply of capital  from  institutional 
investors in 1969  was  the  high yields offered by  short-dated investments  and  the  pull 
exercised by  investment  in shares  and in real estate. 
(c)  A number  of steps were  taken to  make  bonds  more  attractive  to households. 
In April 1968  placing  techniques  were  reformed  to  do  away  with  the'1ong circuit" 
(institutional investors buying  on  the  secondary market  rather than at  issue)  and  the 
"decote"  (the  tendency  for prices to deteriorate after issue).  Canvassers had  been 
encouraging households  to sell their old bonds  and  buy  new  ones  with higher  coupon 
rates.  This  practice  caused  disillusionment  among  individuals,  particularly since 
yields at  issue  were  often  lower  than  stock exchange  yields.  It was  expected that, 
- 73  -initially,  this reform  would  have  the  effect of reducing public  subscriptions while 
encouraging  increased buying at issue  by institutional investors.  In  the  long run, 
however,  the  improvement  in the  quality of investments  was  expected  to  lead to  an 
increase  in subscriptions  from  households  and  institutions. 
Because  of the  spectacular rise in French interest rates it proved  impossible 
to  reap all the  expected benefits of this reform.  Furthermore,  developments  in the 
monetary  and  political fields  combined  with  falling prices had  a  very  bad effect on 
bond  buying  by  households. 
In  1968  and  1969,  therefore,  households  continued  to  exchange  their old  bonds, 
not  for  new  ones  but rather  for  short-term  commitments  and  for  investment  in real 
estate  and  shares.  There  was  large-scale  selling of bonds  after each  increase  in 
coupon  rates  and  during  international monetary  crises and  periods of internal 
political tension. 
The  authorities also  introduced  a  number  of tax arrangements  to  encourage  bond 
buying  by  households.  From  January 1965  onwards  bond  income  up  to  FF  500  was  exempt 
from  tax.  The  tax-free  ceiling was  raised to  FF  l  000 as part  of the  measures 
associated with  the  August  1969  devaluation.  Furthermore,  since  November  1965 
individuals have  been  free  to opt  for  a  final  levy of 25%  on  bond  income. 
Netherlands 
Compared  with  the  authorities in other Community  countries,  the  Dutch  authorities 
seem  to  have  relatively little opportunity of influencing the  domestic  supply  of 
capital. 
(a)  Unlike  other EEC  countries,  the  Netherlands  does  not  encourage  direct  investment 
by  private  savers  on  the  capital market. 
However,  some  securities,  such  as  savings  certificates,  which  offer tax 
advantaces  (interest  can  oe  taxed in the  year  in  which  the  securities are  sold or 
redeemed,  and  the  tax  due  is reduced if they  have  been in  the  holder's  possession  for 
more  than  three  years  and if the  amount  taxable is higher  than Fl.  l  000),  meet  the 
needs  of individuals seeking  a  "deferred"  income. 
Moreover,  one  of  the  reasons  for  changing  the  way  in which  central government 
loans  are  floated  was  to step  up  sales  to  small  investors,  who  had  often  failed to 
secure  any  stock  when  subscriptions  were  accommodated  on  a  ~  rata basis. 
- 74  -Lastly,  issuers broke  down  their security issues into relatively small 
denominations  to  meet  the  needs  of the  small investor. 
On  the  whole,  however,  households  and  business  contribute little to  the  supply 
of capital  on  the  market,  preferring to let institutional investors manage ·their 
savings  for  them. 
(b)  The  rules  on  lending by institutional investors are  generally very liberal as 
regards  the  choice  of domestic  investments.  A number  of institutions,  such  as  the 
civil service  pension  fund,  certain accident  insurance  funds,  the  social insurance 
bank,  the  post office  savings  bank,  the  post  office giro,  are  covered  by  a  1920 
investment  law  and  are,  in  fact,  centrally administered  by  a  Central Investment 
Council.  The  chairman  and  four  of the  members  of this Council  are  appointed by  the 
Minister of Finance,  the  two  remaining  members  by  the  Central Bank.  Although  no 
civil servant sits on  this Council,  its existence  affords  the  authorities  some 
opportunity  for  intervention,  though  a  relatively limited one  in  view  of the  volume 
of  funds  to be  administered,  the  rules  limiting its freedom  of action and  the  fact 
that  funds  must  be  administered in the  interests of the parties entitled rather than 
in the light of considerations  Qf  general economic  policy.  In practice,  a  large 
proportion of these  funds  is invested in both privately and  publicly placed central 
government  loans. 
(c)  Finally,  the  credit policy of the  Central Bank  has  repercussions  on  the  trend 
of interest rates  for  bonds  despite  the  clear separation between  the  money  and  capital 
markets.  A restrictive credit policy affects the  liquidity position of the  banks 
and  is reflected in an  increase  in  the  cost of various  forms  of  bank  credit.  This, 
in turn,  has  repercussions  on  the  bond  market  because  institutional investors  are 
then inclined to  "wait  and  see".  As  in France,  this attitude  on  the  part  of 
institutional investors helped to send interest rates  up  rapidly in 1969  - a  trend 
which  was  reinforced  by  the  growing attraction of investment  in shares  and  fc·reign 
convertible bonds.  Furthermore,  the  regulation of long-term  operations,  under  which, 
since  1  January  1969,  the  banks  are  not  permitted to increase  their long-term assets 
more  than their long-term liabilities,  limits the  banks'  opportunities to invest  on 
the  capital market  and  tends  to  make  capital more  expensive. 
The  Central Bank  does  not  engage  in  open-market  operations  on  the  bond  market, 
nor  has  any  institution been  given  the  task of intervening  on  the  secondary  market 
to  keep  prices stable. 
- 75  -In Italy the Central Bank  intervenes  on  the  bond  market  to  a  considerable extent. 
It does  so  directly through its open-market  operations  and  indirectly by  influencing 
buying  and  selling by  credit institutions.  Its intervention was  the  main  instrument 
of interest rate stabilization policy. 
(a)  The  monetary authorities  made  it easy  for  credit institutions to  subscribe  to 
bond  issues by  authorizing  them  to include  certain categories of long-term security 
in their compulsory  reserves.  In September  1967  school-building securities were 
added  to  mortgage  bonds  (cartelle  fondiarie)  and  securities issued by  agricultural 
credit  ~nstitutions,  and early in 1968  bonds  issued by  the  CCOP  (Consorzio  di Credito 
per  le Opere  Pubbliche)  for  the  account  of the  Treasury  were  added  to  the list. 
Banks,  savings  banks  and  other credit institutions bought  net  amounts  of 
Lit.  1  311  000  million  (or  47%  of net  issues)  in 1966,  Lit.  1  002  000 million  (42%  of 
net  issues)  in 1967  and Lit.  1  544  000  million  (50%  of net  issues)  in 1968.  They 
made  good  use  of their right  to  ~nclude certain long-term securities in their 
compulsory  reserves  (Lit.  303  000 million in 1966,  Lit.  410  000  million in 1967  and 
Lit.  443  000 million in 1968),  since  these  have  a  higher yield than other eligible 
investments. 
Thus,  throughout  the  period 1966-68  the  Central Bank  encouraged  investment in 
securities,  though  the  Bank's  powers  on  compulsory  reserves are  normally  used both as 
an  instrument  of credit policy and  to regulate  the  market  in fixed-interest  securitie& 
In 1969,  however,  the Central Bank  curbed  investment  in  mortgage  bonds,  and  the 
banks  absorbed  a  notably smaller  volume  of securities in the  first quarter of 1969 
than  in  the  first quarter of 1968  (Lit.  239  000  million as  against Lit.  410  000 
million). 
It should  be  borne  in mind,  incidentally,  that  the  banks  also  finance  the  buying 
of securities through  the  credit lines accorded  them  by  the Central Bank  for  loans 
against the  deposit of securities,  though  they refrain  from  using  these  lines to  the 
full  so  as  to  maintain  adequate  liquidity.  Such  advances,  limited to  four  months  in 
principle,  are  almost  always  renewed.  Furthermore,  fixed-term  advances  which  have 
to  be  used within  two  to  three  weeks  were  introduced in 1967. 
- 76  -(b)  From  1966  onwards,  the  Bank  of Italy engaged in substantial buying  and  selling 
of bonds  as part of its open-market  policy.  It acquired Lit.  470  ooo' million 
(Lit.  420  000 million at issue)  in 1966,  Lit.  640  000  million  (Lit.  480  000 million 
at issue)  in 1967  and Lit.  870  000 million  (Lit.  690  000  million at  issue)  in 1968. 
It sold securities to  the  tune  of Lit.  270  000  million in 1966,  Lit.  480  000 million 
in 1967  and Lit.  650  000 million in 1968.  In other words,  it stepped up  its buying 
and selling each  year,  the net result being  a  steady increase  in the Central Bank's 
portfolio,  net purchases representing some  7%  of the market  each  year. 
These  interventions helped  both  to  support securities issued or guaranteed  by 
central government  (theonly securities which  the  Bank  of Italy can acquire)  and  to 
regulate  liquidity.  In  the  first place,  intervention by  the  Bank  of Italy was 
concentrated in the  second  quarter,  when  large issues were  floated  for  the  account  of 
the Treasury to  finance  medium-term  plans.  And  secondly,  budgetary rules require 
funds  to  be  raised during  the  financial  year concerned,  i.e. before  they are  used, 
so if the  ultimate  recipient of the  funds  raised  does  not  use  them  immediately,  the 
issue  has  the  effect of withdrawing liquidity  from  the  market.  The  acquisition of 
a  proportion of these. securities by  the  Bank  of Italy therefore  makes  it possible  to 
offset this reduction of liquidity.  It also  makes  it possible  to  maintain  market 
equilibrium over time  in that  the  Bank  of Italy absorbs  the  excessive  end-of-year 
influx of securities and  resells  them  through  the  credit institutions during the 
course  of the  following  year. 
(c)  The  Cassa Depotiti e  Prestiti,  which  also helped  to  maintain  market  equilibrium 
in 1964,  virtually had  to  stop buying  bonds  because  of increased  commitments  in the 
form  of loans  to local authorities. 
The  central savings bank institution  (ICCRI),  however,  played  a  role  somewhat 
similar to that  played by  the  Bank  of Italy by  underwriting entire issues or  a 
proportion of  them,  placing them  on  the  market  when  the  securities were  given  stock 
exchange  listing. 
{d)  The  policy of keeping prices stable  undoubtedly stimulated individuals' 
investment in bonds;  moreover,  the  tax privileges attached to bonds  mean  that these 
are  already quite  attractive. 
The  authorities also hoped  to  make  other  forms  of medium- and  long-term saving 
attractive.  A bill to  allow  the  creation of investment  trusts is being  debated in 
parliament. 
- 77  -Individual and  business  investors hold  a  relatively large  share  of the  market. 
Their  bond  purchases  represented  48%  of net  issues in 1966,  54%  in  1967  and  44%  in 
1968,  giving  a  virtually stable total of some  $2  000 million in each of these  years. 
This  amount  is especially remarkable  in view  of the  consideraole  contribution made  by 
the  banking  system to  bond  issues  and  the  size  of the  issues in Italy. 
Belgium 
Relatively little can  be  done  to  influence  the  supply of capital on  the  bond 
market. 
(a)  The  Fonds  des  Rentes  acts,  as it were,  as  a  jobber.  It helps  to  maintain 
equilibrium  on  the  bond  market  - and  on  the  money  market  - by  attempting  to 
regularize  the  movement  of prices  for  public  loans  on  the  secondary market,  though 
it does  not  try to  go  against  the  basic  trend. 
It uses  arbitrage  to ensure  that yields of securities with  analogous  features 
are  kept  in line,  supporting certain loans which  are  accidentally depressed.  It 
also  facilitates  the  placing of new  public  loans  by  intervening on  the  secondary 
market,  particularly when  new  issues are  being floated. 
Its intervention is reflected in changes  in its portfolio of public  stocks. 
This  fell  from  Bfrs.  6  400  million at  the  end  of 1966  to Bfrs.  5  900  million at the 
end  of 1967,  rising to Bfrs.  7  900  million at  the  end  of 1968.  In June  1969 it 
stood at Bfrs.  7  500  million. 
These  end-of-year  figures  do  not necessarily give  a  true  picture  of the  Fund's 
activities,  variations within  the  year being  wider.  In 1966  the  lowest  figure 
(Bfrs.  5  900  million)  was  recorded in January  and  the  highest  (Bfrs.  7  500 million) 
in May.  In  1967  the  portfolio  fell  from  Bfrs.  6  400  million in January to 
Bfrs.  5  100 million in August,  climbing back  to Bfrs.  5  900  million in December.  In 
1968  the  lowest  figure  was  recorded at  the  end  of January  (Bfrs.  5  700 million)  and 
the  highest in December  (Bfrs.  8  100 million). 
Lastly,  while  the  Fund  exercised control over  236  securities in  1968  (this 
figure  changing slightly from  year to  year)  it must  be  remembered  that it can 
concentrate  on  certain securities at certain times.  Selective  intervention therefore 
allows  the  Fund  to influence prices,  despite  the  limited resources  at its disposal. 
On  a  number  of occasions it even  managed  to  help establish certain  trends.  The  Fund 
did not  attempt,  however,  to  check  the  rapid rise in interest rates in 1969. 
- 78  -(b)  Since  the central government  has  a  hold  over certain investors, it sometimes 
uses moral  suasion to facilitate  the  placing of certain loans if it considers that 
this may  prove  difficult. 
(c)  In  May  1969  the  Banking  Commission  made  a  regulation  which  could  have  the  effect 
of increasing bank holdings  of  public  securities.  This regulation,  valid for  12 
months,  introduced a  reinvestment coefficient obliging the  banks  gradually to step 
up  the  ratio of easily realizable assets  (disposable  funds,  call money,  commercial 
bills and  bank acceptances,  public  securities)  to total assets  (where  these  easily 
realizable assets represent  less than  60%  or  their short-term liabilities).  It is 
possible,  however,  that  the  present  restrictions  on  bank  lending will prevent  the 
banks  from  complying  with  this reinvestment coefficient rule  unless  they  increase 
their investment  in bonds.  Therefore,·as long as  the  restrictions remain in force, 
the  flow  of bank capital to the  bond  market  is liable to  increase. 
Luxembourg 
In  Luxembourg  too  the  central  government  uses its hold  on  certain investors, 
such  as  the State Savings  Bank  and  certain pension  funds,  to facilitate  the  placing 
of  loans  by  specified public  issuers.  Apart  from  this,  nothing is done  to  influence 
the  supply  of capital.  So  far,  neither the  central government  nor  the  Savings  Bank 
has  taken  any  action to  support  prices.  The  absence  of any  regulatory  agency  and 
the  fact  that  the vast  bulk  of  public-sector securities are  placed  with institutional 
investors limits the  volume  of  stock-exchange  transactions.  This  situation does  not 
rule  out  relatively large  price fluctuations. 
- 79  -CHAPTER  IV.  POLICIES  ON  SUPPLY  OF  AND  DEMAND  FOR  CAPITAL  IN  RELATIONS  WITH 
COUNTRIES  ABROAD 
In all countries the authorities'  attitude to supply  of  and  demand  for capital 
between  the  home  country  and countries abroad is largely influenced by  balance  of 
payments considerations.  Concern  for  market  equilibrium  and  even  for  the  business 
situation are  only  of  secondary  importance. 
The  years  1966-69,  during  which  the  tendency  was  for  interest rates to come 
closer together,  began  with  a  period of growing liberalization which  continued until 
1968  and constituted an  extension of an earlier movement.  This  was  followed  by  a 
period in which restrictive policies were  adopted  by  a  number  of countries  because 
of  balance  of  payments  problems and/or strain on  the  capital market. 
Germany 
In  1964,  because  of  the  needto export  capital to  restore  balance  of  payments 
equilibrium and  curb  internal liquidity,  the German  authorities discouraged  inflows 
of  foreign capital in the  form  of  subscriptions to domestic  issues  by  introducing 
a  25%  coupon  tax.  For  the  same  reasons  they  adopted an  extremely liberal attitude 
to  the  issue  of foreign  and  international loans in Germany,  even  when  the  resulting 
outflows  of capital caused  tension  on  the  German  capital market.  At  the  beginning of 
the  period under  review,  this attitude merely  had  the  effect of ensuring that 
foreign capital entering Germany  was  re-exported  since  only  non-residents,  hit by 
the  coupon  tax,  had  an interest in subscribing to foreign  and  international loans. 
In  1967,  however,  when  international rates caught  up  wit~ yields for  domestic  loans 
and  then  overtook them,  German  subscriptions  to  foreign  and  international issues 
began  to  grow  and  gradually increased in volume,  resulting in considerable  net  exports 
of capital. 
(a)  In  1966,  despite  pressure  on  the  domestic  market  which  had  forced  the 
authorities to limit calls by  certain domestic  issuers,  the Federal Government  made 
no  use  of its powers  to restrict the  placing of  foreign  loans under Article 22  of 
the  1961  law  on  external  economic  relations.  There  was  no  reason for it to do  so, 
since  the  market  crisis was  caused  by  excessive  domestic  demand  and  foreign issuers 
were  making virtually no  calls on  the  German  market  because  rates in Germany  at  the 
time  were  higher than  those  prevailing abroad  and  on  the  international market. 
- 80  -Totals  dropped  from  the  equivalent  of $24?  million in  1965  to $96  million in 
1966.
1 
Euro-issues in DM  were  still not  very  common  at this time.  They  only 
amounted  to $50 million in 1966,  and  German  banks'  quotas in consortia floating 
Euro-issues  denominated in dollars were  for  the  most  part  placed  outside  ~ermany. 
(b)  During  1967,  because  of  the  drop  in German  domestic  rates and  the  increase  in 
rates for  international issues,  the  latter became  more  attractive to German 
residents.  Their acquisitions  of  foreign securities and  of German  fixed-interest 
securities circulating abroad  led to net capital exports of 1300  million in 196? 
(10%  of net  domestic  issues)  and to $1  100  million in 1968  (25%  of net  domestic 
issues).  These  totals are  partly due  to an  increase in traditional foreign  issues 
managed  by  German  banking consortia  ($156  million in 1967,  then  $231  million in 
1968)2  but  mainly  to an  increase in placements of Euro-issues  denominated  in dollars 
in 1967  and  in  DM  from  1968  (80%  of German  banks'  quotas  in  foreign  DM  issues  were 
placed with  German  residents in 1968). 
(c)  Since  then,  without  abandoning their liberal attitude to  foreign  issues,  the 
German  authorities  ~~d bankers  have  made  a  point  of being  informed about  the  volume 
of  these  issues and  their reper.cussions  on  the German  market  and  have  tried to ensure 
that  they are better staggered. 
With  effect  from  February  1968,  under  a  gentlemen's agreement  between  the 
Bundesbank and  the  German  credit institutions,  the  latter agreed  to  place  DM  loans 
in Germany  only if the  consortium included  a  German  bank  among  its leaders.  Since 
then all  DM  issues have  been  managed  by  a  consortium  which  includes at least  one 
German  credit institution. 
The  figures given for  foreign issues in Germany  only partly reflect the  placement 
capacity of  the  German  market  because  they  only  refer to  "conventional"  foreign 
issues floated  by  consortia  composed  exclusively  of German  banks  (see  footnote  to 
the  table  "Gross  public  issues of conventional  foreign  bonds").  If German  banks' 
quotas  in international issues denominated  in  DM  and  other currencies,  and  private 
placements,  are  taken into account,  the  figures,  particularly those  for  1968,  are 
considerably higher. 
2  The  figure  for  1968  would  be  $1  289  million instead  of $231  million if the 
additional  factors  referred to in note  1  above  were  taken  into account. 
- 81  -Moreover,  although  the  Central Capital Market  Committee  did  not  deal with 
foreign issues,  a  subcommittee  was  formed  in  1968  to deal  with  foreign  issues 
denominated  in  DM.  It groups  representatives of  the  Big  Three  banks  and  the  savings 
banks,  and  of other credit establishments  when  they are  leaders  of a  consortium. 
This  subcommittee  meets  regularly  to draft a  time-table  for  foreign  DM  issues in  the 
four  weeks  ahead  and  to ensure  that  a  number  of issues are not  floated at  the  same 
time.  This cooperation  between  the  banks participating in consortia was  found  to  be 
necessary  because  of  the  volume  of these  operations.  But  it in no  way  binds  the 
banks  taking  part and  has been  shown  in practice  to be  wanting in efficacy - since 
the  market  was  overloaded  on  several occasions  during  1969. 
Representatives of the  Federal Ministry  of Economic  Affairs and  the  Bundesbank 
were  present  at  a  meeting  of  the  subcommittee· for  the  first  time  in April  1969; 
they  again attended  in June.  They  were  asked  to supply  information  on  the  trend of 
economic  activity and  the  balance  of payments  situation.  They  stressed that it would 
be  well  to keep  up capital exports but  warned  against  the  dangers  of  overloading  the 
market  with  foreign  issues. 
It is worth  remembering  that total  foreign  issues in  DM  (irrespective  of  whether 
the  consortium  was  German  or multinational),  which  amounted  to $146  million in  1966 
and  $171  million in  1967,  suddenly  shot  up  to $931  million in 1968  and  stood at 
$1  278  million by  1969.  The  relative increase  in  DM  issues compared  with all 
international issues  was  even  more  spectacular in view  of the  considerable  drop  in 
Euro-issues denominated  in dollars beginning  with  the  second  quarter of  1969.  DM 
issues represented  a  little over half of all international issues in the  third 
quarter of  1969  and  about  a  third in the  full year. 
While  remaining  within relatively narrow limits,  the  supply  of and  demand  for 
long-term capital between the  home  country  and  countries abroad  were  dependent  on 
extremely varied conditions during  the  period  1966-69,  both  because  of changes  in 
official policy and  because  of  spontaneous changes  in the  market  situation.  It is 
possible to distinguish  two  phases: 
(i)  first,  a  period of liberalization which  lasted until May  1968, 
(ii)  then  a  period in which  there  was  a  return to restrictions on  operations  resulting 
in outflows  of capital and  a  voluntary  suspension  of  operations liable to 
produce  inflows  of capital. 
- 82  -(a)  The  decree  issued  on  27  January  1967,  implementing  the  law  of  28  December  1966 
on  financial relations with countries abroad,  laid  down  the  principle that  freedom 
constitutes the rule,  prohibition the  exception.  The  reverse  had  been the  case 
under  the  law  of  31  May  1916. 
The  first result  of  this reform  was  to  remove  all exchange  restrictions  on 
French  banks'  participation in consortia placing and  underwriting international loans, 
enabling  them  to  step up  their effective participation in operations of this kind. 
However,  the ~  !!£i2 change  was  even greater than  the ~  jure  one.  Although 
foreign  issues in France  and  French  issues abroad  remained  subject  to authorization 
by  the Minister of Finance,  the arrangements actually  enforced  were  rather liberal. 
(i)  Foreign issues: 
The  Minister  did  not  have  to turn  down  any  applications for  foreign  issues 
because  interest rates and  high brokerage  acted as natural barriers 
discouraging potential foreign issuers. 
(ii)  Placement  of  loans  issued outside ¥ranee: 
Although  advertising and  soliciting for  funds  for  foreign securities 
require authorization,  French  banks  were  in  fact  able  to  buy  quantities of 
international bonds  for their customers in France.  The  only condition imposed 
was  that  they  should  not  seek custom,  and  even  this rule  was  rather flexibly 
applied. 
(iii) French  issues abroad: 
Although  the  French authorities had  not  been very  keen  on  French  banks  and 
other businesses participating in the Euro•issue  market,  and  had  been  even  more 
doubtful about  French  savings  being invested  on  this market,  their attitude 
changed  in 1967.  Authorizations for French  issues abroad,  which  had  previously 
been granted in exceptional circumstances only,  were  now  freely available  to 
firms,  which  for  the  most  part had  income  in foreign  currencies  or had 
investment  abroad to finance.  Seven  loans totalling $157  million  were  floated 
in  1967. 
Even  calls by  French  firms  on  the  international market  were  looked  on 
favourably  where  they  made  it possible  to  ease  the  programme  of  domestic  issues. 
Moreover,  some  of  these  operations  were  in francs. 
(b)  The  expansion  of  international operations  was  interrupted by  a  series of 
political and  monetary  events. 
- 83  -(i)  French  issues abroad: 
Calls made  by  French issuers on  the  international market  had  begun  to 
increase  in  1967;  two  Euro-issues in francs  took  place  in  1967  and  early 1968. 
But  the  events  of May/June  1968,  combined  with  the  reintroduction of  exchange 
control,  had  the  effect of putting French  firms  at  a  disadvantage  on  the 
international market,  preventing  them  from  borrowing  francs  and  discouraging 
them  from  incurring debts in a  foreign currency.  Once  things returned to 
no~mal, however,  calls were  again  made  on  the  German  market  from  the third 
quarter  of 1968  until April  1969.  These  operations  were  all the  more 
favourably  viewed  by  the  authorities since resources  on  the  domestic  market 
seemed  too  limited to cover  planned issues  which  had  already been  postponed. 
The  subsequent  prospect  of  a  revaluation of the  DM  exchange  rate did not 
favour  resumption  of  these  operations,  which  were  in any  event  made  more 
difficult by  tension  on  the  German  market. 
(ii) Participation by  French  banks  in Euro-issues and  their placement: 
Since  the  reintroduction of  exchange  control  on  29  May  1968,  the  placing 
of  foreign  bonds  in France is strictly forbidden.  It was  only  allowed  for  a 
short  period  from  4  September  1968,  when  exchange  control  was  lifted, until 
24  November  1968,  when  it was  reintroduced  for  a  second  time. 
Although participation by  French  banks  in international loan consortia is 
not  subject to  exchange  control,  it is clear that their activities in this 
field are  considerably  limited since they  can  only· take  part if the securities 
are  placed  outside France. 
Netherlands 
The  traditional attitude  of  the  Dutch authorities to  foreign  issues in the 
Netherlands  and  Dutch  issues abroad  was  maintained during  the  period  1966-69.  The 
principle is that  the  two  kinds  of  operation must  balance  out  so that  they  are 
neutral in their effect  on  internal market  equilibrium,  the  balance  of  payments  and 
economic  activity. 
This  basic  approach is therefore  very  different  from  that of the authorities in 
Germany  and  France,  where  exports or  imports  of capital are  encouraged as adjuncts to 
monetary  or capital market  policy. 
- 84  -(a)  In  the  past,  because  Dutch interest rates  were  relatively  low,  there  were  more 
foreign  issuers wanting  to  borrow  in the  Netherlands  than  Dutch  issuers wishing  to 
borrow abroad.  Thus  the  main  effect of the  official desire  to balance  imports and 
exports of capital was  to prohibit capital exports. 
From  1966  onwards,  however,  when  Dutch  rates began  to move  towards international 
rates,  coming  level with  them  in  1969,  a  number  of  Dutch  issuers became  interested in 
borrowing abroad.  The  authorities are keeping  these  operations in check also,  though 
they  could have  the  effect of  easing pressure  on  the  domestic  market  and  domestic 
interest rates. 
(b)  In  1966  no  foreign issuer applied  for  permission  to float  a  loan in guilders. 
One  Dutch  firm,  however,  floated  an  issue  on  the  Swiss  market,  authorization being 
granted  by  the Central  Bank  on  condition that  the  funds  raised by  the  issue  would  be 
invested abroad. 
In  1967,  no  authorization was  given  for  a  foreign  bond  issue  denominated  in 
guilders,  with  the  exception of  one  issue  for  the  Netherlands Antilles.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  number  of international institutions were  given  to understand  that  they  might 
be  allowed to launch guilder loans in 1968. 
The  authorities maintained their restrictive attitude to loans  floated abroad, 
insisting that  the  funds  be  used  outside  the  country.  Two  of  the  four  bonded  loans 
floated in 1967  were  by  Dutch  financial establishments  on  behalf of  foreign  issuers 
who  immediately  transferred the  proceeds abroad.  One  of  the  remaining  two  had  been 
authorized prior to  1967.  It was  only  in 1968  that  the  requirement  that the  funds 
must  be  used  abroad  was  lifted - to be  reintroduced in 1969  because  of the  strained 
business situation. 
In  1968  the  European  Investment  Bank,  World  Bank  and  International Development 
Association were  authorized to float guilder loans. 
Moreover,  new  authorizations were  granted and  older authorizations renewed  for 
the  floating of loans by  Dutch  firma  in Switzerland.  By  June  1969,  however,  these 
authorizations had still not  been  used  because  of the  long  waiting-period to which 
foreign issues are  subject in Switzerland. 
- 85  -(c)  There  were  no  restrictions on  participation by  Dutch  banks  in groups 
underwriting or selling Euro-issues not  denominated  in guilders during  the  period 
under  review.  Nor  was  there  any  objection to  the  opening  of subscriptions  for  these 
loans  on  Dutch  territory. 
Since  the  Dutch  public  shows little interest  in this type  of  investment,  the 
vast  bulk of  the  Dutch  banks'  quotas  were  eventually  placed abroad.  Issues  of 
convertible  bonds  met  with  some  measure  of success,  however. 
(a)  Relatively  low  interest rates  on  the  Italian market  (about  6.5 to  7%)  would 
surely have  attracted foreign  issuers had  they  not  been  deterred  from  making calls 
on  the  Italian market  by  a  tax surcharge  which  would  bring  the  cost  of capital to 
almost  10%.  Foreign  issues,  like  domestic  private-sector issues,  are  subject  to  the 
38%  tax  on  "ricchezza mobile".  In  practice  only international issuers  (EIB,  ECSC, 
World  Bank,  IDA)  which  are  treated as  domestic  public  issuers and are therefore 
exempt  from  this tax  were  able  to use  the  Italian market.  They  were  responsible  for 
1%  of net  issues in  1967  and  1968. 
On  the  other hand,  Italian issues abroad  are  not  subject  to this tax.  Public 
issuers are  exempt  from  it in respect  of both their domestic  and  their foreign 
issues;  private issuers are  also  exempt,  provided  the  funds  raised are  used  abroad. 
Consequently  a  number  of  public  and  private issuers have  made  use  of  foreign  issues. 
Recourse  to foreign  markets  was  facilitated  in a  number  of cases by  the Cassa per 
il Mezzogiorno,  which  assumed  responsibility  for  the  exchange  risk involved if the 
project  to be  financed  was  located in regions  in receipt  of special aid. 
(b)  Nevertheless,  the  main  problem  to be  faced  by  the  Ital±an authorities during  the 
period  under  review  was  that  Italian purchases  ~f international bonds,  either through 
the  intermediary  of  the  Italian banks  or more  commonly  through unauthorized  channels, 
was  on  the  increase  while  foreign  investment  in Italian securities remained  negligibl~ 
The  figures  for  funds  offered  on  the Euro-issue  market  through  the  Italian banks 
are  as  follows  (inS million): 
- 86  -1966  1967  1968 
Total quotas  142  221  271 
of which:  Placed  with  Italian 
residents  130  176 
99 
Remaining  in  the  port-
folios of Italian banks  25  16 
Placed  with  non-residents  43  66  79 
The  figures  for  Italian capital reaching  the international market  through 
unauthorized  channels  were  much  higher.  They  can  be  roughly estimated,  from 
repatriations of bank notes,  at S560  million in 1966,  S8oo  million in 1967  and 
S1  100  million in 1968,  the  figure  for  the first ten months of 1969  being  $1  800 
million. 
Italian capital on  the Euro-issue  market  far  and  away  exceeds  that raised by 
Italian issuers  ($65  million in  1967  and  $75  million in 1968). 
The  flight of Italian capital  to  the Euro-market,  attributable ·to  tax and 
institutional reasons  and  to  differences in yield,  gives some  indication of  the 
burden borne  by  the Italian authorities  to  maintain stable and relatively low 
interest rates on  the  Italian market. 
(c)  Whether  this objective  could  be  achieved  by resorting to  a  policy of isolating 
domestic  rates  from  the  higher  rates applied abroad  depended  on  the  balance of 
payments  situation.  During  the  first eight  months of 1969,  the  current account 
closed with  a  surplus of $1  200  million but  the deficit on  capital  movements  was 
in  the  region of $2  000  million - twice  what it was  during  the  corresponding period 
of 1968.  Remittances of bank  notes  amounted  to  $1  350  million in  the first eight 
months of 1969  as against  $740  million during  the  corresponding period of  1968. 
In  March  and  April  1969,  therefore,  the authorities  took a  number  of steps  to 
curb  exports of long-term capital. 
(i) First of all,  they introduced a  system of prior  Bank of Italy authorization 
for  participation by  any  Italian bank in international  consortia placing or 
underwriting  foreign  loans.  Previously,  the  banks  had  been allowed  to 
participate in these  consortia within certain limits without  seeking prior 
approval;  now,  prior approval  must  be  sought in  each  individual  case.  The 
- 87  -authorities are well aware,  however,  that  capital outflows  through 
unauthorized  channels are  much  more  considerable  than  those  through  the 
official channels  now  regulated by this measure. 
(ii)  They introduced a  system of prior authorization  for  the  sale of shares  by 
investment  companies.  Authorization is only granted  to  trusts  whose 
portfolios include at least 50%  Italian securities. 
(iii) Steps  were  also  taken  to  deal  with  movements  of short-term capital.  The 
authorities allowed  the lira/dollar exchange  rate  to  reach its upper limit and 
in June  1969  asked  the  banks  to  maintain a  balanced  external position. 
But  the authorities'  main  preoccupation has  been  to  make  the  Italian capital 
market  more  attractive and  stop the  flight of long-term capital. 
(i)  They are placing great reliance on  the  creation of a  statute for  Italian 
investment  companies;  this  would  give  them  tax advantages  making  them 
competitive with their foreign  counterparts. 
(ii)  They also  hope  that better information on securities,  the  refor~ of tax 
arrangements  for  dividends  and  interest now  being studied,  and  the  widening of 
the  range of securities listed on  the stock exchange  will  reawaken  public 
interest in  the  Italian securities market. 
Belgium 
Official Belgian  policy on  supply of and  demand  for  capital  between  the  home 
country and  countries abroad  was  somewhat  similar  to  that  followed  by  Italy.  The 
Belgian authorities  were  faced  with  similar problems regarding outflows of capital 
because  of their policy of keeping interest rates relatively low. 
(a)  Their attitude  to  foreign  issues varies  depending  on  whether  the application 
is filed  by an  issuer resident in one of  the  EEC  countries or in a  non-member  country. 
Borrowers  resident in non-member  countries are  almost  always  turned  down  by  the 
Minister of Finance;  1EC  issuers  find it easier  to  get  permission.  Quotations of 
securities issued by  EEC  residents are always  allowed. 
In  1966  twelve  issues of shares or  bonds  by  foreign  companies  were  approved, 
as  was  one  issue  by an  international organization.  Four  applications  from  companies 
established in countries which  are  not  members  of the  Common  Market  were  turned  down. 
- 88  -In  1967  thirteen applications were  filed  by  foreign  companies  and  two  by 
international organizations.  All  were  approved  with  the-exception of one  bond  issue 
from  a  company  in a  non-EEC  country. 
In  1968  nine applications were  filed  for  issues of shares or bonds  by  foreign 
companies  and  two  for  a  bond  issue by an international organization.  All  were 
approved. 
As  far  as  bond  issues are concerned,  however,  it must  be  said that  the  amounts 
involved  were  relatively modest.  Foreign issues amounted  to  110 million in 1966, 
$21  million in 1967  and  $30  million in  1968 and  were  floated  exclusively by 
international organizations. 
(b)  Throughout  the  period under  consideration,  except in  1968,  Belgian issuers' 
calls on  foreign  markets  were  more  substantial  than  foreign issuers'  calls on  th• 
Belgian market. 
In  1966  a  public  credit institution and  a  parastatal enterprise raised 
Bfrs.  2  000  million abroad,  the  central government  Bfrs.  3  900 million. 
In  1967  two  cities,  two  public  credit institutions,  one  building society and  two 
parastatal enterprises raised Bfrs.  5  900 million in all. 
In  1968 only one  credit institution called on  the  foreign  market,  and  this was 
for  a  short-term loan of Bfrs.  50  million. 
On  the other hand,  during  the first quarter of  1969 alone,  three credit 
institutions contracted ~ loans  to  the  tune of Bfrs.  4  500 million. 
The  widely varying amounts  raised on  foreign markets  can be  explained  by  the 
fact  that  the authorities  channelled Belgian issuers towards  foreign  markets  whenever 
supply on  the  domestic  market  was  inadequate.  Moreover,  since Belgian interest rates 
were  low,  they had  no  reason  to  borrow abroad  unless it proved  impossible  to get 
capital  from  the public credit institutions or  from  the Belgian fixed-interest 
securities market.  Recourse  to  foreign markets  therefore  provided  a  sort of safety 
valve  when  domestic  demand  exceeded  supply. 
(c)  The  main  problem  facing  the  Belgian authorities,  like their Italian counterparts, 
was  the  growing attraction of international issues  for  Belgian savers. 
In  1968  purchases of foreign  securities totalled Bfrs.  13  000 million,  most of 
this representing subscriptions  to Euro-issues. 
In  1969  purchases of foreign securities increased  even  further,  and  foreign 
deposits  in Belgium were  withdrawn.  This  created a  sizable gap  between  the official 
and  free-market  rates  for  the  dollar,  the effect of which  was  to  lessen the 
differences in yield between  Belgian and  international bonds. 
- 89  -During  the  same  year  the Institut belgo-luxembourgeois  du  change  asked  the 
banks  to  reduce  their net  foreign  exchange  holdings on  the official market.  This 
had  increased  beyond  current requirements,  the  banks  being allowed  under  the  exchange 
regulations  to  hold  foreign  currency on  the official market  for  this purpose. 
Capital outflows  were  accompanied  by increased  recourse  by  the  banks  to 
rediscounting at  the  Central  Bank,  which  thus  financed  capital outflows.  This led 
the  Bank  to  place ceilings on  the rediscounting facilities open  to  the  banks as 
from  May  1969. 
The  creation of liquidity,  determined  by  the  balance of payments  situation and 
notably  the  trend of capital movements  across  the  exchanges,  can  influence  the  supply 
of capital on  the  bond  market.  This link was  not  always  evident,  however.  In  1967 
the  balance of payments  surplus  was  accompanied  by  a  sharp increase in bond 
investment,  but  in  1968  a  deficit on  the  trade  balance  did  not  prevent  a  further 
increase. 
The  law of  10  July 1969  and  the  Royal  Decree of  12  November  1969 laid down 
stricter rules  for  determining  the  public  character of canvassing of Belgian savers 
for  foreign securities.  This  may  have  the  effect of restricting the  placing of 
international bonds  in  Belgium.  Banks  and  brokers are  not  subject  to  these 
provisions,  however,  provided  they agree  to  supply  the authorities  with statistics 
on  their activities in  this sphere. 
Luxembourg 
All  foreign  public  issues  were  freely admitted,  subj~ct to  the  controls and 
formalities  in  force  that are  designed  to  protect  savings. 
The  volume  of foreign  public  issues is in  fact relatively limited.  They are 
generally loans  denominated  in units of account.  Most  Euro-issues,  however,  are 
placed  privately through  the  banks  participating in consortia:  more  often than not, 
- 90  -there is no  need  to  make  a  public offer since  there are  so  many  banks  underwriting 
the issue that  they each receive only a  rather small  quota  which  they place with 
their private  customers.  Making  the  operation public  would  involve additional 
controls,  formalities,  delays and  costs without  necessarily making  placement  any 
easier.  However,  most  issuers seek official listing on  the  Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange  and  by so  doing subject  themselves  to  these  same  controls and  formalities, 
required  by  the provisions on  banking control. 
- 91  -CONCLUSIONS 
The  following  points can be  made  from this systematic  comparison of the policies 
followed  by  the  Member  States with regard  to  their  bond  markets. 
The  divergences  between  the  procedures  and  instruments at  the  Member  States' 
disposal  for  maintaining supply and  demand  equilibrium on  the  bond  markets  were 
lessened  during  the  period  under  review as  a  result of reforms  introduced in a 
number  of Community  countries,  notably France  and  Germany. 
Further alignment of  these  procedures  and  instruments,  and  above all of  the 
manner  in  which  they are used,  is still needed,  however,  if a  conflict  between 
Member  States'  policies on  their markets  is to  be  avoided. 
Although  the  Member  States already make  unilateral allowance in their structural 
reforms  for  the  experience  gained  by  their Community  partners  under  their 
arrangements,  joint discussion of  the  instruments  necessary for  a  policy on  market 
equilibrium could  be  fruitful. 
The  problems  that  the  Member  States had  to  face  on  their bond  markets  became 
increasingly similar  during this period,  but  there  was  often a  time-lag.  The 
joint dependence of  the'Member States'  markets  on Euro-markets  increased  considerabl~ 
and  there  was  a  growing  degree of interdependence  too.  Even  if allowance is made 
for  exchange  control  and other obstacles  to  communication  between  the markets, 
particularly in recent  times,  it remains  true nevertheless  that,  because of a  shared 
psychology and  in particular  the  influence of expected rises or falls in interest 
rates,  markets are  tending  to  become  more  closely interlinked.  It follows  that  the 
Member  States'  policies with regard  to  their  own  markets are  now  more  dependent 
on  external considerations  than previously. 
(a)  There  is therefore a  fundamental  need  for  shared  information 
Although  capital market  policies still differ  considerably, it would  be  in  the 
interests of  those  reponsible  for  supervising the markets  to  compare  their analyses 
of  the  problems  and  the  effectiveness of their solutions.  It would  also  be  in their 
interests  to  keep  each other  informed of forecast  market  trends,  the  problems 
arising from  these  trends and  the  decisions  they intend  to  take. 
- 92  -(b)  There is also  a  need  for  concerted action by  the  supervisory authorities 
An  exchange of information and  ideas would  reduce  the risk of the  Member  States 
pursuing conflicting policies.  But it is clear that,  given  the  broad range  of 
problems  which  are shared,  the  coordination of national policies would  enormously 
strengthen their effectiveness. 
Whether  this  common  approach  is to  interest-rate policies or  to  developments 
on  the Euro-issue market,  it would  allow  the  Community  as  a  whole  to  wield greater 
influence  than  can  now  be  exerted  by  the States in isolation. 
- 93  -ANNEX  I 
STATISTICS  ON  THE  BOND  MARKETS 
OF  THE  EEC  COUNTRIES LIST  OF  TABLES l 
I.  S  Series:  comparative  t·ables 
SA:  Net  domestic  public  issues  (annual  figures) 
SA  1  by  type  of issuer ($  million) 
SA  2  by  type  of issuer  (%) 
SA  3  by  type  of issue  ($ million and %) 
SA  4  compared  with  GNP,  with gross  fixed asset 
formation,  and  with all securities issues 
SB:  Quarterly statistics 
SB  1  in national currencies 
SB  2  in $  million 
SC:  Private  placings  (national currencies and  $  million) 
II. P  Series:  tables by  country 
PA:  Gross  and net  domestic  public  issues 
PA  1  Germany 
PA  2  France 
PA  3  Italy 
PA  4 Netherlands 
PA  5  Belgium 
PA  6  Luxembourg 
PB:  Quarterly statistics 
PB  1  Germany 
PB  2  France 
PB  3  Italy 
PB  4 Netherlands 
PB  5  Belgium 
PB  6  Luxembourg 
PC:  Private placings 
PC  1  Germany 
PC  2  F.rance 
PC  4 Netherlands 
PC  5  Belgium 
PD:  Lists of issues 
PD  1  Germany 
PD  2  France 
PD  3  Italy 
PD  4 Netherlands 
PD  5  Belgium 
PD  6  Luxembourg 
1  The  tables have  been  drawn  up  by experts of the  Working  Party on  Securities Markets 
and  the  relevant Commission  departments.  The  sources are  indicated  for  each table. 
They are  mainly national statistics, which have  been selected and processed with 
reference  to the needs  of the present report.  Owing  to differences in the 
breakdown  and  the  definitions adopted  by  the  various  countries,  the  comparability of 
the  data is limited. 
- 97  -III.  R Series:  yields 
R 1  Germany 
R  2  France 
R 3  Italy 
R 4 Netherlands 
R 5  Belgium 
IV.  E Series:  public  issues of foreign  bonds 
E  1  Conventional  foreign issues  (gross totals in $  million) 
E  2  Euro-bond issues  (gross totals in $  million) 
- 98  -Table  SA  1  - Net  domestic  public  issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest securities  by  type  of issuer 
(S  million) 
~ 
Federal  Government  and  Lander 
Local authorities 
Financial  institutions 
Public  enterprises 
Private enterprises 
Total 
securiti.es1  Memorandum  item:  non-negotiable 
~ 
Central  government 
Local  authorities 
Financial  institutions 
Public  enterprises 
Private enterprises 
Total 
Memorandum  item:  non-negotiable securities 
1 
~ 
Central  government 
Local authorities 
Institutions issuing  for  account of the ']rea-
Other  financial  institutions  sury 
Public  enterprises 
Private enterprises 
Total 
Me110randum  item:  non.-negotiable  securities
1 
tiETHERLANDS 
Central  government 
Local  authorities 
Mortgage  banks 
Financial institutions,  private and  semi-
public  enterprises,  miscellaneous 
Total 
~ 
Central  government 
Local  authorities 
Independent  public  funds 
Financial institutions 




Central  government 
Local authorities 
Financial institutions 
Fublic  enterprises 
Private and  semi-public  enterprises 
Total 
EEC 
Central  government,  local authorities 
and  independent  public  funds 
Financial  institutions 
Public  and  private enterprises} 
Total 
Memorandum  item:  non-negotiable securities 
1
see Footnote  1  of Table  SA  3. 







































1  804 
992 
3  753 
173 
1961  1962  1963  1964 
291  159  407  477 
- 2  20  - 4  10 
1 446  1  600  2 040  2 406 
185  409  413  329 
25  148  86  84 
1  945  2  336  2  942  3 306 
- 152  - 174  423  111 
71  61  77  79 
282  330  383  569 
221  253  351  369 
354  280  267  162 
776  750  1  501  1  290 
452  877  950  930 
10  - 162  - 317  118 
18  - 1  - 1  - 1 
229  273  204  254 
821  1  159  1  240  1  153 
185  94  516  758 
202  330  74  45 
1  465  1  693  1  716  2  327 
71  64  52  38 
13  - 25  167  54 
49  56  110  79 
19  36  40  83 
15  84  - 5  38 
156  151  312  254 
120  270  102  158 
78  128  60  102 
42  38  32  86 
200  170  104  44 
28  20  34  - 10 
- 32  24  22 
468  658  356  402 
- 2  8  - 2  4 
X  X  X  6 
X  X  X  X 
10 
5  X  - 1 
- 2  13  - 2  19 
825  651  1  258  1  537 
2  768  3  295  3 807  4  255 
1  215  1  655  1  760  1  806 
4  808  I  5  601  6  825  7598 









1  913 
152 
91 



































2  209 
8  523 
1  261 
4
Rate of  exchange  f  h  f"  h  I  4  or  t  e  1rst tree quarters  1  =  ~  ,for  the  fourth  quarter  $1  =  ~ 3.755  (daily average  of parities). 
5Rate  of  exchange  for  the  year  11  =  FF  5.17884  (daily  avera~e of parities). 
~:  Tables  PA  1  to  PA  6. 
1966  1967  1968  1969 
237  1.038  611  - 364 
- 4  34  20  - a: 
1 048  2  237  3 336  3  3004  - 128  201  294  1174 
X  223  - 17  - 45 
1  153  3  733  4  244  3  3284 
69  386  564
4 
113  43  - 190  - 19~ 
140  113  81 
6~  893  786  725  85 
523  577  411  21 
89  140  128  324 
1  758  1  659  1  155  1  26~ 
1 017  1  365  1  412  9Tr 
1  157  715  1  329  844 
34  13  75  4 
1  332  887  746  1  636 
1  377  1  579  1  902  2 047 
502  705  880  887 
4  - 61  - 54  - 96 
4  406  3 838  4  878  5  322 
189  220  214  168 
- 4  90  72  257 
182  209  197  178 
25  23  30  32 
244  79  93  91 
447  401  392  558 
238  230  360  260 
236  242  318  328 
- 34  194  140  104 
156  326  444  394 
24  52  94  26 
14  10  32  10 
634  1 054  1  388  1  122 
- 2  27  - 3  9 
X  X  4  - 1 
X  X  X  X 
- 1  - 1  - 1  - 1 
- 3  26  X  7 
3 625  3 835  3  760  3 448 
3 499  4  951  6 437  6  625 
1  271  1  925  1  ooO  1  529 
8  395  10  711  12  057  11  602 
1  206  1  654  2 012  1  709 Table  SA  2  - Net  domestic public issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest  securities by  type of issuer  (~) 
1960  1961  1962 
.Q!!!!!!! 
Federal  Government  and Linder  14.4  15.- 6.8 
Local authorities  0.1  - 0.1  0.9 
Financial institutions  80.4  74-3  68.5 
Public enterprises  13.7  9.5  17.5 
Private enterprises  - 9-2  1.3  6.3 
Total  100  100  100 
Memorandum  i tem1  non-negotiable  securities 
1:!!!!2! 
Central  government  - 45·0  - 19.6  - 23.2 
Local authorities  7.2  9-2  8.2 
Financial institutions  34·7  36.3  44.0 
Public  enterprises  37.8  28.5  33.7 
Private enterprises  65.3  45.6  37.3 
Total  100  100  100 
MemorandUdl  item  1 non-negotiable  securities  22.5  58.2  116.9 
.!!!E!. 
Central  government  16.3  0.1  - 9.6 
Local authorities  1.2 
~nstitutions issuing for account  of the  4-7  15.6  16.1 
l~:~~nancial institutions  48.8  56.1  68.5 
Public enterprises  7.0  12.6  5·5 
Private enterprises  23.2  13.8  19.5 
Total  100  100  100 
Memorandum  item1  non-negotiable  securities  4·4  4.8  3.8 
NETHERLANDS 
Central government  38.8  46.8  - 16.5 
Local  authorities  44.5  31.4  37.1 
Mortgage  banks  1·5  12.2  23.8 
Financial institutions,  private and  semi-
9.2  9.6  55·6  public enterprises,  miscellaneous 
Total  100  100  100 
~ 
Central  government  58.0  25.6  41.0 
Local  authorities  16,3  16.7  19·5 
Independent  public  funds  - 1.6  9·0  s.s 
Financial institutions  30·4  42· 7  25.8 
Public enterprises  - 2.7  6.0  3.0 
Private enterprises  - 0.4  4·9 





Public  enterprises 




Central  government,  local authorities 
a nil  independent  public funds  25.5  17.1  11.6 
Financial institutions  48.1  57.6  58.8 
Public and private enterprises  26.4  25.3  29.6 
Total  100  100  100 
Memorandum  item  1  non-negotiable securities  4.6  10.9  16.8 
1  Because of the  small number  of issues,  percentages are not significant. 
~~  Table  SA  1. 
1963  1964 
1).8  14.4 
- 0.1  0.3 
69-4  72,8 
14.0  10.0 
2.9  2.5 
100  100 
28.2  8.6 
5·1  6.1 
25·5  44.1 
23.4  28.6 
17.8  12.6 
100  100 
63.3  72.1 
- 18.5  5.1 
11.9  10.9 
72.3  49-5 
30.0  32.6 
4·3  1.9 
100  100 
3.0  1.6 
53·5  21.3 
35.3  31.1 
12.8  32.7 
- 1.6  14·9 
100  100 
28.6  39.3 
16.9  25.4 
9·0  21.4 
29.2  10.9 
9.6  - 2.5 
6.7  5·5 
100  100 
18.4  20.2 
55·8  56.0 
25.8  23.8 
100  100 
14.7  12.7 
1965  1966  1%7  1968  1969 
21,5  20.5  27.8  14.4  - 1,1 
0,9  - 0.3  0,9  0.5  - 0,2 
68.8  90-9  59·9  78.6  99.2 
5·5  - 11.1  5.4  6.9  3.5 
3.3  X  6,0  - 0.4  - 1.4 
100  100  100  100  100 
1,8  9-1  16.9 
1,5  6.4  2.6  - 16.5  - 15.2 
6.4  8.0  6.8  1-0  5.2 
45.0  50.8  41·4  62.8  o7.3 
36.3  29.7  34.8  35.6  17.1 
10.8  Sol  8.4  11.1  25.6 
100  100  100  100  100 
78.6  57-8  82.3  122.2  11·2 
8.3  26.3  18.6  27.2  15.9 
0.1  0.3  1.5  -
25.6  30.2  23.1  15·3  30.7 
33.0  31.3  41.2  39.0  38.5 
33.7  11.4  18.4  18.1  16.7 
- 0.6  0.1  - 1.6  - 1.1  - 1.8 
100  100  100  100  100 
3·9  4.3  5.7  4·4  3.2 
- 2.2  - 0.9  22.5  18.4  46.1 
39.7  40·1  52.1  50·3  31.8 
1).1  s.6  5·1  7·6  s.s 
49·4  54.6  19.7  23.7  16.3 
100  100  100  100  100 
44·7  37·5  21.8  25·9  23.2 
24.1  37·2  23.0  22.9  29.2 
1.9  - 5-3  18.4  10.1  9·3 
23.6  24.6  30·9  32.0  35.1 
- 1.9  3.8  4·9  6.8  2.3 
7.6  2.2  1.0  2.3  0.9 
100  100  100  100  100 
29.2  43.2  35.8  )1.2  29.7 
44-9  41.7  46.2  53·4  57,1 
25-9  15.1  18.0  15.4  13.2 
100  100  100  100  100 
14.8  l4o4  15·4  16.7  14.7 Table  SA  - Net  domestic  public  issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest securities by type  of issue 
)i  million  % 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
~ 
"Block"  issues  274  673  926  1  204  1  185  1011  105  1  589  1077  228  28.1  34.6  39.6  40,~  35.8  36·4  9-1  42.6 
"Tap"  issues  701  1  272  1  410  1  738  2  121  l  770  1 048  2  144  3  167  3  100  71-9  65-4  60.4  59-1  64.2  63.6  90·9  57·4 
Total  975  1  945  2  336  2  942  3  306  2  781  1  153  3  733  4  244  3  328  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
llemQrtndUIII  1tem1  n~~:-~~f~!ifble  69  386  564  1.8 
~ 
"Block"  issues  464  741  712  1  463  1  248  1  418  1  722  1  627  1  143  1  222  92·4  95·5  94·9  97·5  96-7  97-8  98-0  98.1 
"Tap"  issues  38  35  38  38  42  32  36  32  12  43  7-6  4·5  5.1  2-5  3·3  2.2  2.0  1.9 
Total  502  776  750  1  501  1  290  1  450  1  758  1  659  1  155  1  265  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Memorandum  itemt  non-negotifble  113  452  877  950  930  1  140  1  017  1  365  1  412  977  22-5  58.2  116.9  63.3  72-1  78.6  57-8  82.3 
ITALY 
"Block"  issues  l  134  1098  1  247  1  228  1  941  2  716  3 832  3  252  4  141  4  572  83.9  74·9  73·7  71.6  83.4  86.8  87.0  84.7 
"Tap"  issues  218  367  446  488  386  414  574  586  737  750  16.1  25.1  26.3  28.4  16.6  13.2  13.0  15-3 
Total  1  352  1  465  1  693  1  716  2  327  3  130  4  406  3 838  4  878  5  322  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Memorandum  itemt  non-negotiable 
securitiesl  60  71  64  52  38  121  189  220  214  168  4-4  4.8  3.8  3.0  1.6  3.9  4·3  5·7 
nTHERLANDS 
"Block"  issues  372  137  115  272  171  350  400  372  360  517  92.5  87.8  76.2  87.2  67.3  85.2  89-5  92.8 
"Tap"  issue9  30  19  36  40  83  61  47  29  32  41  7·5  12.2  23.8  12.8  32-7  14.8  10.5  7.2 
Total  402  156  151  312  254  411  447  401  392  558  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
~ 
"Block"  is9ues  302  238  310  206  264  530  376  602  762  546  58.8  50·9  47.1  57·9  65.7  71.8  59·3  57-l 
"Tap"  issu8s  212  230  348  150  138  208  258  452  626  576  41.2  49·1  52·9  42.1  34-3  28.2  40·1  42·9 
Total  514  468  658  356  402  738  634  1  054  1  388  1  122  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
LUXEMB'JU'!!G 
"Block" issues 2  8  - 2  13  - 2  19  13  - 3  26  X  1 
DC 
"Block"  issues  2  554  2 885  3  323  4  3'71  4  828  6 038  6  432  7  468  7 483  7092  68.1  60.0  59·3  64.0  63-5  7Q.8  76.6  69.7 
"Tap"  issues  1  199  1  923  2  278  2 454  2  770  2 485  1  963  3  243  4  574  4  510  31.9  4Q.O  40·1  36.0  36·5  29.2  23.4  30.3 
Total  3  753  4  8o8  5  601  6  825  7598  8  523  8  395  10  711  12 057  11  602  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Memorandum  itemt  non-negotiable  173  523  941  1 002  968  1  261  1  206  1  654  2 012  1  709  4.6  10.9  16.8  14·7  12.7  14.8  14.4  15·4 
securitiesl 
1 
Not  negotiable but  redeemable by  t~e issuer'  these securities are not  treated as bonds  in the countries concerned.  The  Working  ~arty's decision 
to insert  the  memor&ndum  item is the  result of a  compromise  between  one  school  of thought  which  favours  the  inclusion of these securities under "tap  issues" 
and  another which  feels  they should be  left out  altogether, 
2  x  •  less than  ~511 111, 
~~  Tables  PA  1  to PA  6, 
1968  1969 
25·4  6.9 
74-6  93-1 
100  100 
9·1  16.9 
99·0  96-6 
1.0  3-4 
100  100 
122.2  77.2 
84.9  85.9 
15.1  14.1 
100  100 
4o4  3.2 
91.8  92-7 
8.2  1·3 
100  100 
54·9  48.7 
45.1  51.3 
100  100 
62.1  61.1 
37-9  38.9 
100  100 
16.7  14-7 Table  SA  4  - Net  domestic  public  issues of medium- and  long-term  fixed-interest  securities 
As  percentage  of 
Net  total 
(S  million)  Gross  Gross  fixed  All 
national  product  capital  formatioJ  securities 
Germany 
1966  1  153  0.9  3.6  63.0 
1967  3  733  3.0  13.1  88.7 
(1967)1  (3  802)  (3.1)  (13.3)  (88.9) 
1968  4244  3.2  13.6  84.4 
(1968) 1 
(4  630)  (3.4)  (14.8)  (85.5) 
1969  3 328  2.2  8.9  82.8 
(1969) 1 
(; 892)  (2.6)  (10.4)  (84.9) 
~ 
1966  1  758  1.6  6.5  71.8 
(1966)1  (2  775)  (2.6)  (10~3)  (80.1) 
1967  1  659  1.4  5·7  71.0 
(1967) 
1 
(3  024)  (2.6)  (10.4)  (81. 7) 
1968  1  155  0,9  3.6  51.5 
(1968) 
1 
(2  567)  (2.0)  (8.1)  (70.2) 
1969  1  265  0.9  3.6  46.5 
(1969) 1  (2  242)  (1.6)  (6. 3)  (60. 7) 
Italy 
1966  4  406  6.9  37.7  85.4 
(1966) 1 
(4  595)  (7.2)  (39.3)  (85.9) 
1967  1  3 838  5·5  28.9  85.8 
(1967)  (4 058)  (5.8)  (30.5)  (86.5) 
1968  4  878  6.5  33.2  86.6 
(1968) 1  (5  092)  (6.8)  (34.6)  (87.1) 
1969  5  322  6.5  31.5  83.0 
(1969) 1  (5  490)  (6.7)  (32. 5)  (83.4) 
Netherlands 
1966  447  2.1  8,4  96·5 
1967  401  1.8  6.8  96.8 
1968  392  1.6  5.9  99.6 
1969  558  98.3 
Belgium 
1966  634  3·5  15.5  68.2 
1967  1 054  5·4  24.4  79·0 
1968  1  388  6.7  31.7  75.1 
1969  1  122  4·9  22.0 
Luxembourg 
1966  - 3  - - -
1967  26  3.7  13.0  17.4 
1968  - - - -
1969  7 
~ 
1966  8  395  2,5  10.5  76.6 
(1966)1  (9 601)  (2.9)  (12.0)  {78.9) 
1967  10  711  3.0  13.1  82.9 
(1967)1  (12  365)  (3.5)  (15.2)  (84.8) 
1968  12  057  3.1  13.5  77.6 
(1968)1  (14  069)  (3. 7)  (15.8)  (80.2) 
1969  1  11  602 
(1969)  (13  311) 
1  Including  memorandum  item  (see  Footnote  1  of Table  SA  3). 
~:  Table  SA  1  for  fixed-interest  securities. 
Statistical Bulletin of the Statistical Office  of the  European Communities  for  GNP,  gross 
fixed  capital  formation  and  share  issues. Ta.ble  SB  1  - Domestic public issues of medium- a.nd  long-term fixed-interest  securities by quarter 
(in na.tiona.l  currencies) 
1967 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd 
1968 
3rd 
quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  Yea.r  quarter  quarter  quarter 
Gross  totals 
GERMANY  (in DM  million)  5  027  3  586  5  213  4  832  18  658  1 015  4  521  4  816 
FRANCE  (in FF  •ooo  million)  3.51  3.60  1.55  3.69  12.35  3.51  1.99  1.27 
ITALY  (in Lit.  •ooo  million)  926.3  342·4  895.6  1  028.4  3  192.7  1  394.7  1  001.2  937.9 
NM'HERLAl'lDS  (in Fl. million)  770  515  455  534  2  274  690  444  642 
BELGIUM  ~n Bfrs. •ooo  million)  19.6  18.4  9.9  18.6  66.5  17.3  12.5  25·9 
LUXEMBOURG (in Lfrs.  million)  700  - - 800  1500  - 200  -
Net  tota.la 
GERMANY  (in DM  million)  4296  2  943  4  259  3  432  14 930  5  621  3  583  3  870 
FRANCE  (in FF  •ooo  million)  8.19 
ITALY  (in Lit.  1000 million)  717.3  156.0  104·9  820.9  2  399.1  843.6  760.4  700.1 
NETHERLANDS  (in Fl. million)  523  323  268  338  1  452  457  216  451 
BELGIUM  (in Bfra. •ooo  million)  9·9  4.6  2.0  13.6  30.1  12.7  8,2  12.5 
LUXEMBOURG  (in Lfrs.  million)  648.5  -30.5  -59  753  1  313  -82  169  -74 
1  "Block"  issues  only, 
~~  Tables  PB  1  to  PB  6, 
1969 
4th  Yea.r  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Yea.r  quarter  aua.rter  auarter  auarter  quarter 
4  861  21  213  5  415  4  037  5  128  4  043  18  623 
3.47  10.24  3.51  1.32  2.94  3.68  11.45 
986.9  4  320.7  1  118.1  1  251.0  1  412.0  1  066.9  4  848.0 
517  2  293  760  400  489  1  146  2  795 
12.7  68.4  23-1  18.5  11.3  31.5  84·4 
- 200  600  - - - 600 
3  904  16  978  4294  2  909  4  241  1  755  13  199 
5,70  6.55 
744-5  3  048.6  812.8  719.2  1  062.9  731.1  3  326,0 
297  1  421  585  222  275  925  2  007 
4·7  38.1  6.4  6.1  4.5  10.3  27.3 
-37  -23  523.2  -47·3  -76·7  -49·3  349·9 Table  SB  2  - Domestic  public  issues of  medium- and  long-term  fixed-interest  securities by  quarter  (S  million) 
.1967  1968  19692 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Year  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
Year  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
quarter  quart..er  qua:r,ter  auarter  ouarter  auarter  ouarter  auarter  quarter  _quarter  quarter  _quarter  Year 
Gross  totals 
GERMANY  1 257  897  1 303  1 208  4 665  1754  1 130  1204  1  215  5 303  1  354  1 009  1 282  1 077  4  722 
FRANCE  711  729  314  747  2 501  711  403  257  703  2 074  678  255  568  710  2211 
ITALY  1 482  548  1 433  1  645  5108  2  231  1 602  1 501  1 579  6 913  1  789  2 002  2 259  1 707  7 757 
NETHERLANDS  213  142  126  147  628  191  123  177  143  633  211  111  136  318  776 
BELGIUM1  392  368  198  372  1 330  346  250  518  254  1 368  462  370  226  630  1 688 
LUXEMBOURG  14  - - 16  30  - 4  - - 4  12  - - - 12 
Net  totals 
GERMANY  1 074  736  1 065  858  3  733  1 405  896  968  976  4 245  1  074  727  1 060  467  3 328 
FRANCE  1 659  1 155  1 265 
ITALY  1 148  250  1 128  1  313  3  839  1 350  1 217  1 120  1 191  4 878  1 300  1 151  1  701  1 170  5 322 
NETHERLANDS  145  89  74  93  401  126  60  125  82  393  163  62  76  257  558 
BELGIUM1  198  92  40  272  602  254  164  250  94  762  128  122  90  206  546 
LUXEMBOURG  13  -1  -1  15  26  -1.7  3.4  -1.5  -0.7  -0.5  10.5  -1  -1.5  -1  7 
"Block"  issues only. 
2  For  the  conversion of  DM  and  FF  into dollars,  see  Footnotes  4  and  5  of Table  SA  1. 
Source:  Table  SB  1. Table  SC  - Private placings
1 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966 
(in national currencies) 
Gross  total3 
GERMANY  (DM  million)  246  255  256  351  405  1 675  1 666 
FRANCE  (FF  '000 million)  0.18  0.22  0.34  0.22  0.25  0.45  0.46 
YET3ERLANDS  (Fl.  million)  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
BELGIUM  (Bfrs.  1000  million)  8.9  5.8  15.6  10.4  15.6  16.0  16.3 
Net  totals 
GERMANY  (DM  million)  244  194  188  296  285  1 341  912 
Memorandum  item1  Scbuldscheindarlehen  1 375  1 415  1 562  1 472  1 519  1 711  2211 
FRANC!  (FF  1000  million)  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
NETHERLANDS  (Fl.  million)  1 969  3 025  3 168  3 477  4  738  4890  4 838 
BELGIUM  (Bfrs.  •ooo  million)  4·9  1.7  9-9  3.1  6.2  8.1  8.3 
(¢ million) 
Gross  totals 
GERMANY  59  64  64  88  101  41,  417 
FRANCE  36  45  69  45  51  91  93 
NETHERLANDS  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
:BELGIUM  178  116  312  208  312  320  326 
Net  totals 
G:!RMANY  58  49  47  74  71  335  228 
Memo~andum item•  Schuldscheindarlehen  327  354  391  368  380  428  553 
FRANCE  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
NETHERLANDS  544  845  892  981  1 316  1 358  1 344 
BEL:liUM  98  34  198  62  124  162  186 
The  comparability of the  figures  is not very satisfactory,  as  the  statistics used are  incomplete  in moat  cases.  Private placings 
according to the definition adopted by  the Vorking Party on  Securities Markets  do  not  exist  in Italy. 
So~~~  Tables  PC  1,  PC  2,  PC  4,  PC  5. 
1967  1968  1969 
1 187  1 381  1 190 
0.80  0.90  1.30 
.  .  . 
17·5  16.6  22.1 
389  820  654 
2 189  1 660  2644  .  .  . 
5 671  6 359  6 163 
7·2  5·7  14.8 
297  345  302 
162  182  251  .  .  . 
350  332  442 
97  205  166 
547  415  671  .  .  . 
1 572  1 756  1 712 
144  114  296 Table PA  1  - GERXAliiY 
Doaeatio  public iBBuea  of aedi,.- and  lonl!'-'tera  tixed-intereat aeouritiu 
Gross totals in DM  million  llet  totale in DM  million 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
"Block"  issues  ~  .uili=  !...22!.:..: ~  ~  i...li!:.1  UQhl U2!:! ~  !.ill::  .Lill..:j 1.m:..4 .l....m.:..2  ~  L1lhl ~  ~  U24:.: ~  .2.lli:: 
Federal 
Govel'lllllsnt 
and  Lllndsrl  682.3  1  226.2  962.5  2  203.5  2  218.7  2  579.2  1  421.8  4  886.9  2  829.- 1  522.- 586.7 1  163.7  635·- 1  629.8  1  908.6  2  394.2  949·5  4  153.2  2  444.  - 130. 
Local  2  authorities  40.- - 140.- 150.- 80.- 120.- - 150.- 100.- - 28.8  - 10.7  79·- - 16.7  40.6  105.8  - 16.2  134.6  81.  - )0. 
i!=~~~~ona3  486.1  1 030.2  1  104.  1  853·9  1  775.1  1  176.7  666.6  1  264.3  1  681.- 1  422.- 350.1  696.4  760-- 1  207.1  1  139·4  573·5  1.8  369.)  676.  787. 
~~!!;rieea4  610.3  765.- 1  678.4  2  223.- 1  64().- 890.- 182.- l  375· 7  2 012.- 1  190.- 563.3  741.5  l  637·3  l  651·5  1  316.6  609.3  -513.4  8fo4o9  1  176.  488.-
~~:::;isea5  27·5  319.6  1  076.  l  552.5  973.7  585.8  231.7  1  117.2  300·- 457·- -376.4  100.5  591.6  343.2  334-l  363.2  1.2  892.- - 69.  -164.-
"Tap"  issues  ~  ~  2...ill.:.:  8  089.6 ~  7 806.- ~  ~  14 291.- l!..Ql!:..: .~  .2...Q2k 2.M2:.l  ~  ~  7 080.1  .L.!..2hl  Ulli:: 12  669.  2  248. 
Financial 
institutions  1 
( i) "Communal" 
bonda6  966.9  2  331.3  2  224.:!  3  116.6  3  434.1  2  635.1  2  259.8  5  469.1  8  231.- 8  221.- 791-4  1  740.- l  682.4  2  349.3  2  715.8  2  285.- 1  870,2  5  192.7  7  822.  7  542. 
(11)  Mort~ge 
3  496·9  bonda7  2  266.4  3  581.5  4  002.:!  4  003.8  4  739-9  3  791.2  2  488.2  4  213.- 3  776-- 2  150-4 3  252.2  3  557·3  3  670.6  4  443-3  3  625.2  2  275·- 3  143.2  3  950·  3  458· 
(iii) other bonds 
animtes .m 
certi:f'ica.tes  3·- 100.- 401.  969.2  1  441·9  1  379.7  482.8  899.6  1  847-- 2 034-- 2.8  97.8  401.- 934.8  l  324.4  1  169.9  46.1  241.1  897.  1  248. 
'l'otal  5 082.5  9  353·8 11  588.5  6  072.5 16  503-4 13  157· 7  1 732-9 18  659·1  21  213.- 18  622.- 4  097-1  7  781.4 9  343.6  11  769.6 13  222.8 11  126.1  4  614.2 14 931.- 16  977·  3  199· 
Memorandum  item  ,10 
Federal 
Oovel'lllllent  8  (Schatzbriefe)  280.- 280. 
Credit 
(~;!!~~i!~:)9  275·- 1  543·  1  947· 
1  Issues by the Federal  Government,  the Equalization of Burdens  Fund  (Lastenausgleiohsfonds)  and  the  Linder,  The  only Equalization of Burdens 
Fund  issues included here  are  the Erftlllungeschuldvereohreibungen. 
2  Local  authority bonds  and  bonds issued by inter-municipal associations under public law, 
3  Deutsche Genossenechaftskasae,  Deutsche  Siedlunge- und  Landesrentenbank,  Laatenausgleichsbank,  Industriekredi  tbank  AO,  Irredi  tanstal  t  f'B.r 
Wiederaufbau,  Landwirtschaftliche Rentenbank, 
4  Federal  Post  Office  and Federal  Railways bonds  only. 
5  Includes bonds  issued by oertain public enterprises  (notably electricity enterprhes) which  can be  ranked with those  issued by private 
enterprises. 
6  Proceeds of issues of Kommunalobligationen are mainly used  to gt'ant  loans to legal persona under public  law, 
1  Proceeds of issues of mortgage  bonds  (Pfandbriefe ),  including those issued by the maritime mortgage  banks,  are used to  gt'ant loans to the 
private  sector. 
8  Issued  from  1969  onwards. 
1~ Issued  from  1967  onwards. 
The  memorandum  item includes securities which  are not negotiable but are mobilizable  through redemption by the issuer. 
~· 
Monthly reports of the Deutsche Bundesbank and figures  supplied to the Working Party on  Securities Markets by the  German  delegation, Table  PA  2  - FRANCE 
Domestic  public  issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest securities 





1960  1961  1962 
0.20  0.15 
Gross  totals in FF  1 000 million 
1963  1964 










1968  1969  1960 
~ 
- 1.12 












1965  1966 
1.:::... 
0,11 
1967  1968 
~  ~ 
0.21  1.-
0.34  0.12 
i!~~~~~~~ons 1  1.06  1.60  1.90  2.21  3.21  5.40  0.86  1.)9  1.63  1.89  2,81  3,22  4o41  3.88  3o58  4o41 




1.88  2.09  1.82  1.86  1.49  1.52  1.25  1.60  1.64  2.86  1.62  1.  75  1.38  1.32  0.80  o.  77  0.44  0.69  0.63  1.68 
11Tap 11  issues 
Local 
authorities  0.28  0.26  0.29  0.29  0.27  0.31  0.30  0.22  0.39  0.19  0.17  0.19  0.19  0.21  0.16  0.18  0,16  0,06  0.22 
Public  4 
enterprises 
Total 
Memorandum  item:8 
Treasury  bonds5 
CNCA  bonds6 
Bank  notes and 
0.03 
c:~!!f!~a~=~sse)  7  l 
0.05  0.04 
5·78  6.17 
0.12  0.05  0.01  0.02 
10.25  12.19  12.35 
0.01  0.02 





Land  bonds  and  communal  bonds  of the  Cr&dit  Foncier  de  France,  Caisse Nationale  de  Credit  Agricole  (CNCA),  Credit 
National and Caisse  Centrale  de  Credit Hotelier  loans. 
2 
Postea et T&lecommunications,  SNCF,  Electricite  de  France,  Gaz  de  France,  Charbonnages  de  France,  Caisse Nationale  des 
Autoroutes, 
3  These  figures  include net  tap issues of SNCF  kilometre  prize  bonds  which  could not be  isolated;  figures  for 
redemptions  are  only available globally  for all issues of public enterprises. 
4 
SNCF  kilometre  premium bonds,  No  figure  for net  issues could  be  given since  redemptions  cannot  be  isolated.  See 
3  above, 
5  Three- to  five-year Treasury bonds  "sur  formules"  (placed exclusively with  the  public), 
6 
Five-year or three- or five-year  bonds  issued by the  CNCA.  The  figure  given represents _only  the  portion subscribed 
~y the  p:ublic;  bonds  held_ by  regional  ofJj.ces  are  exc.J.IJJied. 
7  Bank  statistics do  not  make  it possible  to  make  a  distinction between  notes  and certificates  (bona  de  caisse)  and 
fixed  deposits,  with  which  they are  grouped. 
8 
The  sec  uri ties included in this memorandum  item are  not  negotiable  on  the  market  but  are  mobilizable  through  redemption 
by  the  issuer  i  in respect of duration  and  interest rates they are  also very  different  from  the  sec  uri  ties appearing 
in  the  first part of the  table, 














2.80 Table  PA  3  - ITALY 
Domestic  public  issues of mediu- and  long-term fixed-interest  securities 
Gross  totals  in  Lit.  •ooo  million  Net  totals in Lit.  •ooo  million 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
"Bleck"  issues  .9.62:1  ~ ~  I~  1  814.2 ~  Ulli&  D.12:.2 ~  ~  708.8  686,2  11.2.:.1  lli.:.1  1  213.2  l..§.2h2  L..l22.:.f  2  032.8 ~  L§&! 
Central  government  265.4  164.1  195-0  2.4  319.6  369.8  1  139·3  500.3  1  218.5  981-5  138.2  6.1  - 101.3  - 198.1  73·5  162.8  722.~  447.2  830.7  527.7 
Local  authorities  - 12.0  - - - - 22.5  10.0  51·7  7·5  - 0.3  11.4  - 0.4  - 0.5  - 0.5  - 0,4  21.1  8.0  46 ·9  2.2 
Institutions 
issuing for  account 
1):  tf:e  Treasuryl  5Q.O  158.0  184.0  167.0  197·2  568.4  933.0  649· 7  592.6  1  227.9  39-4  143·4  170.6  127.4  158.8  500.7  832.3  ~4-4  466.2  1 022.2 
InstitutiCilS specializ 
ing in credit agajns t 
movable  property  346.9  370.0  56LO  626.~  666.8  575.8  692-4  844.0  999·7  1  117-4  275· 7  283·9  445-9  469.8  479.6  387.9  50l.CJ  620,)  728.2  810.7 
Public enterprises"  86.0  140.0  105.0  385.0  562.6  757·0  405.0  557-5  687·5  732.0  59-4  115·4  59·0  322.7  473·7  658.6  313.9  440.9  549.8  554.1 
Private enterprises  214.~  147·2  236.  76.7  68.0  32.4  59-4  18.4  28.4  6.3  196.4  126.0  205·9  46·4  28.1  - 11.7  2.9  -38.0  - 33.6  - 59.8 
"TaE!"  issues 
Institutions  I  specisliz1ng in credit 
~t;~:\ real  187.1  293· 7  361.8  415.  370.3  428.9  573.6  612.8  742.3  775·4  136.4  229.6  278.6  304.9  241.1  258.5  358.8  366.3  460.4  468.9 
Total  1  149.8  ~  285.0  1  643.<;  1  673.  2  184.5  2  732.3  3  825.2  3  192.7 4  320.7  4  848.0  845-2  915.8  1  058.3  1  072.6  1  454·3  1  956.4  2  753.8  2  399.1  3  048.6  3  326.0 
Memorandum  itemt4 
Euoni fruttiferi  37·5  44-3  40.1  )2.6  23·5  75·5  118.0  137· 7  133.5  105.2 
1Issues  of  the  Consorzio  di  Credito per le  Opere  Pubbliche  (CCOP)  to finance  the  railways,  the  Green Plan  (f'or agricultural development), 
ANAS  (Azienda Naziona1e  Autonoma  della Strada,  or highway service),  etc. 
2IRI  ( Isti  tuto per la Ricostruzione  Industrials),  BNEL  (Ente per l'Bnergia Elettrioa),  ENI  (Ente Nazionale  Idrooarburi),  and Autostrada.  I 
1r:..sues  of mortgage  bonds  (Cartalla fondiarie). 
1This  memorandum  item covers buoni fruttiferi,  which are non-negotiable fund-raising instruments,  issued at  a  fixed rA.te  of interest  (5-5?') 
by  the  postal autho:-ities  and  credit institutions.  In the Italian financial context,  they can be  ranked  as fixed savings deposits.  They 
are  issues by public credit  institutions,  ordinary credit banks  and first-category pawnbrokers. 
~· 
Annual  reports  and Bulletin of the Eanoa d 1 It  alia.  I Table  PA  4  - NETHERLANDS 
Domestic  public  issues of  medium- and  long-term fixed-interest securities 
Gross  totals in Fl.  million  Net  totals in Fl.  million 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
"Block"  issues  U&l  m  ~  1...2.§2  .Lill  l...221  2  201  LQ.2.2  ~  ~  !...ill  .1.2.2  ill  .2!21  621  .!..£§1  L1fL  l...J!2  ~  U§.! 
Central government  937  643  298  996  652  435  448  791  728  1.320  595  266  - 91  605  198  - 33  - 15  324  262  925 
Local  authorities  738  25f\  297  527  421  731  834  950  925  820  679  176  202  400  287  589  659  758  714  639 
Financial  12  - 31  9  60  125  106  - 58  175  )  )  )  )  )  )  )  - 34  30  148 
institutions2  )  )  )  )  ) 
I 
)  ) 
)  )  )  )  )  )  ) 
Private  and  semi~  133  66  294  31  87  598  683  236  252  104 








Bo3  181  161  9  140  53 
p~blic  enterpriseS'  )  )  )  )  )  I )  ) 
)  )  )  )  J  )  ) 
Non-profit-making  23  25  44  26  59  68  130  122  146  149  )  )  )  )  )  )  )  116  137  140 
institutions  2  and miscellaneous 
"Tap"  issues  lli  .2l  160  182  ill  268  ill  m  ~  ill  .ill  1Q  .ill.  ill  ~  ~  ill  .!Q1  ill  ill. 
~~~!~~~~e~edit 
136  93  160  182  332  240  134  144  174  191  115  70  132  144  298  196  ~  84  110  117 
Commercial  banks  4  28  93  31  10  36  24  81  23  7  29 
Total  1  979  1 085  1  124  1  771  1  611  2  225  2  428  2  274  2  293  2  795  1  529  565  547  1  131  919  1  487  l  618  1  452  1  421  2 007 
- 1Provinces,  municipalities  and  the  Bank  for  Netherlands  Municipalities. 
2The  only available  breakdown  is for  gross issues.  Up  to  and  including  1966,  only global  figures  were  published  for  net  issues. 
3Mortgage  bonds  (Pandbrieven). 
4Includes  "Spaarobligaties"  (issued  from  1965  onwards)  and  other  bank  bonds. 
~:  Annual  reports of  the  Nederlandsche  Bank. Table  PA  5  - BELGIUM 
Domestic  public  issues of  medium- and  long-term fixed-interest  securities 
Gross  totals in Bfrs.  '000 million  Net  totals in Bfra.  '000 million 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
"Block"  issues  .ll.:..2  £L..§.  ~ ~  .l2.&  .42.:§.  il:i  §i:.i  ~ ~  .!2.:.!  lh.2  ll.:j,  !2.:..l  ll:.l  ~  !!k.§.  ~ 
~~~:~:!enta 
27-5  13.4  26.0  18.6  30.1  29.8  31.3  37.8  40-9  56.6  14.9  6.0  13-5  5-1  1·9  16,5  11.9  11.5 
~~~:~rities  1 ,a  1.3  o.8  2.8  2.9  1.5  6.4  9-1  5-3  9.0  9·3  -0.8  -0.8  0-5  0.4  0-7  4-8  6.0  3-1 
Independent 
1.6  funds2,a  0.9  3.6  3-4  3.0  5·4  5·5  0.4  12.3  8.3  9·5  -Q.4  2.1  1.9  4·3  0.7  -1.7  9·7 
=~~=!~rises5  • a  3.8  4·3  4.0  2. 7  1.4  2.0  4·5  6.8  7-3  6.0  -0.7  1.4  0.7  1.7  -o.5  -o.7  1.2  2.6 
Public  financial 
institutions3,a  2.4  5·4  - 0.4  - 2-5  1.1  2.9  0.5  2.0  2,2  3-2  -2-7  0.3  -o.3  2.4  0.7  2. 7 
Private  financia  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - institutions 
Private  b  - 0.1  1.8  1.1  1.4  3·4  1.0  1.4  2-4  1.0  -o.l  - 1.6  1.2  1.1  2.8  0.7  0-5  enterprises 
"TaE"  issues  .!£.:&  1!:.2  !.1:..4.  1.:.2.  ~  1&:.1.  1l.:..2  ~ 
Local  1  6  authorities  '  ,a  5.0  4·7  5·9  2.6  4·4  4-1  5.8  9-0 
=~~!!;rises5'  a  - - 0-3  - - - - -
i~:!i~  u ~~~::5  :g;!  3.8  4·4  6.9  4-1  1.3  4·7  4-0  6.8 
i~!~~~~ti~::~~~l  1.8  2·4  4·3  0.8  1.2  1.6  3.1  6.8 
Private 
enterprises 
Total  25.7  23·4  32-9  17.8  20.1  36-9  31.7  52· 7 
2
1  Pr->yinces,  commul}es  and Credit Com111unal  de  Belgique. 
SocJ.al  security  funds  and  Road  Fund. 
'  Societe  Nationals  de  Credit a 1'  Industria,  Caisse  nationals  de  Credit professional,  Institut national de  Credit agricola,  Office central du  Credit hypothecaire. 
1968  1969 
.l§.:.!  li.l 
18.0  13-0 
6.7  6.6 
7-0  5-2 
4·7  1.3 
0.1  0.7 
- -
1.6  0-5 
.ll:.l  ~ 
9-2  9·8 
- -
13-2  1·1 
8.9  11.3 
69·4  56.1 
Tap  issues of securities and  notes and  certifl.cat.es  (bons  de  caissel  of banks,  savings banks,  mortgage  companies and  hire-purchase  finance  companies. 
~ Societe  Nationale  des  Chemins  de  Fer  Belges,  .;ocJ.ete  Nationals  des  Chemins  de  Fer Vicinaux,  Societe Nationale  de  Distribution des  Eaux,  SABENA,  RTT  and  Yarious  inter-communal  compan:les 
No  breakdown  of short-term notes and  certificat.en  (bons  de  caissel  of the Credit Communal  de  Belgique  and  the  public  financial  institutions is aYailable up to and  including  1965;  they 
are  included in the  net  totals for  medium- and  long-term issues. 
~:  (a)  Bulletin d
1Information et de  Docum .. ntation of  the  Banqufl  Nationals  de  Belgique  (Statistical Table  XVI,  1,  Securities available to all inyestors). 
(b)  Gross  totals:  Annual  reports of  t:h"  Banking  Commission  (Table  headed  "Public  and  Private issues by  economic  sector"  from  "Iron and  steel" to "Department  stores" + 
"Miscellaneous"). 
Net  totals:  llanque  Nationals  de  Belgique calculations  (gross totals less estimated  redemptions based  on  yariations in the total nominal Yalue  of  company  securities 
listed on  tne  Stock Exchange l. 
(c)  Annual  report;s  of the  Banking  Commission:  tap issues of banks,  savings banks,  mortgage  companies,  hire-purchase  finance  companies,  insurance companies,  enterprises 
covered  by  t;ile  Law  of  16  June  1964  and  finance  companies. 
~: Occasionally  these  sources give  different figures  for  the  same  category  of issuer.  ·the  sources used  in this table  were  selected and  the  figures reconciled by  the  Belgian 
delegation. Table  PA  6  - LUXEMBOURG 
Domestic  public  issues of medium- and  long-term  fixed-interest securities 
Gross  totals in s million  Net  totals in s million 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
"Block"  issues  I  Central  1- 1.7  government  10  - 10  - 6  12  - 30  - 12  8.46  - 1-59  8.1  4-1  10  - 2.33  27.32  - 3.26  8. 79 
Local 
authorities  - - - - 6  - - - 4  - -0.26  - 0.26  -0.26  - 0.26  5·74  - 0.4  - 0.4  -0.4  3-6  -0.65 
Public 
enterprises  - - - - 10  - - - - - - - - - 10  - - - - -
Finan.cial 
institutions  - - - - - - - - - - -0.07  - 0.07  -0.07  - 0.07  -0.07  - 0,07  - 0-07  -0.07  - 0.07  -0.08 
Private  and 
semi-public 
enterprises  - - 5  0.4  - 4  - - - - - - 4.86  0.3  -0.43  3·47  - 0.56  -0,59  - 0.73  -1.06 
'rotal  10  - 15  0.4  22  16  - 30  4  12  8.13  - 1.92  12.63  - 1.73  19-34  13.- - 3-36  26.26  - 0.46  1.00 
~:  Figures supplied  to the  Working  Party  on  Sec uri  ties Harke ts by  the  Luxembourg  delegation. Table  PB  1  - GER¥~NY 
Domestic  public  issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest securities  (~ million) 
1967 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st 
quarter quarter  quarter  quarter  Year  quarter 
Gross  totals 
"Block"  issues  .Lm  UQ.2  ~  ~  !L1.2l 
Federal Government  and  Lander  1  309  911  1  729  938  4  887 
Local  authorities  100  50  - - 150 
Financial  institutions  234  213  214  542  1  263 
Public  enterprises  668  100  370  238  1  376 
Private enterprises  421  175  271  250  1  117 
"TaJ:!"  issues  £..125.  ~  ~  2  864  i...M2 
Financial institutions: 
( i)  "Communal" bonds  1  323  ll96  1  555  1394  5  468 
(ii)  Mortgage  bonds  781  775  873  1  068  3  497 
(iii) Other  bonds  and  notes and  certificate.E  191  106  201  402  900 
Total  5  027  3  586  5  213  4  832  18  658 
Net  totals 
"Block"  issues  ~ !...ill  .!....m  .!....Qll  §...ID 
Federal Government  and  Lander  1  115  871  1  607  560  4  153 
Local  authorities  95  44  - - 4  135 
Financial  institutions  5  117  -170  416  368 
Public  enterprises  599  21  298  - 113  805 
Private  enterprises  350  128  216  198  892 
"TaJ:!"  issues  ,g_ill  .!...ill  ~  ~  §..211 
Financial  institutions: 
(i)  "Communal' bonds  1  279  1  111  1  482  1  321  5  193 
(ii) Mortgage  bonds  774  747  827  794  3  142 
(iii) Other  bonds  and  notes  and  certificates  79  - 96  - 1  260  242 
Total  4296  2  943  4  259  3  432  14  930 
Memorandum  item:  Schatzbriefe  - - - - -
Sparbriefe  - - - 275  275 
Discrepancies  between  annual  totals and  figures  given in Table  PA  1  are  due  to .rounding. 
For  sources  and  notes  see  Table  PA  1. 
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1968  1969 
3rd  4th  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
quarter  quarter  Year  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  Year 
~ ~  §...ID.  ~  lli  1...222  .2!§.  ~ 
467  414  2  829  165  9  749  ~  1  523 
- - 100  - - - - -
205  600  1  682  449  274  380  3i8  1  421 
410  420  2  012  580  310  300  - 1  190 
- 115  300  - 321  136  - 457 
.l....U!  l..ill  ~  .Llli  .l..lll  l...22l  ..l....!l2  ~ 
2  056  1  762  8230  2  526  1  652  2  242  1  802  8  222 
1  079  838  4213  1  224  1  032  770  750  3  776 
599  712  1  847  471  439  551  573  2  034 
4  816  4  861  21  213  5  415  4  037  5  128  4  043  18  623 
2.2§.  1  025  ~ ~  .ill.  LQ.§l  ~  .2.2. 
370  373  2  444  - 101  - 361  542  - 210  - 130 
- 2  - 5  81  - 13  - 10  - 2  - 5  - 30 
- 30  535  676  228  50  306  203  787 
309  113  1  176  362  244  198  - 316  488 
- 91  9  - 69  - 138  213  18  - 257  - 164 
l...ll4  ~  12  670  ~ .uu  l..!12  ~  12  248 
1  881  1  651  7  822  2  487  1  502  2  102  1  451  7  542 
1  041  733  3  951  1  196  993  721  548  3  458 
392  495  897  273  278  356  341  1  248 
3870  3  904  16  978  4294  2  909  4  241  1  755  13  199 
- - - 86  21  89  84  280 
352  450  1  543  801  369  437  340  1  947 Table  PB  2  - FRANCE 
Domestic  public issues of medium- and  long-term  fixed-interest  securities  (FF  '000 million) 
1967  1968  1969 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd  }rd  4th  Year  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  Year  quarter quarter  quarter  quarter  Year  quarter  quarter quarter  quarter 
Gross  totals 
"Block"  issues  hlJ.  ~  !:.lQ.  .l:21  .....!l.:.Ql  l:Al  ~  1-22  ~ lQ.:.Q!  .l!..l!!  1.:11  2-82  l:..ll  11-04 
Central government  - 1.25  - - 1.25  - - - - - - - - - -
Local authorities  - - 0.40  0.15  0.55  - - ·- 0.51  0.51  - - 0.32  - 0.32 
Financial institutions  1.64  1.10  0.9Q  0.98  4-62  2-50  - 0.90  1.23  4·63  2.28  0.50  0-91  1.71  5·40 
Public  enterprises  1.53  0.95  - 1-53  4-01  o. 76  1.62  - 0-85  3.23  - 0.67  0-50  1-29  2.46 
Private enterprises  0.26  0.23  0.20  0.91  1.60  0.17  0-34  0-32  0.81  1.64  1.10  0.10  1-09  0.57  2.86 
"Tal!"  issues  Q..:.Q!!  Q:.Q1  2.!.Q2.  Qill  ~ ~  Q£1  Q:.Q2  Q:.Q1  Q!ll  2:.!.l  £:..Q.2  ~ ~  ~ 
Local authorities  0.08  0.07  0.05  0.10  0.)0  o.o8  0.03  0-05  0.06  0.22  0.12  0.05  0.11  o.11  0.39 
Public  enterprises  - - - 0-02  0.02  - - - o •  .o1  o.o1  o.o1  - O,.()l  - 0.02 
Total  3-51  3.60  1.55  3-69  12-35  3-51  1.99  1.27  3-47  10.24  3-51  1.32  2.94  3.68  11-45 
Memorandum  item  {net  totals) 
Treasury  bonds  0.68  0.56  0.78  0.76  2-78  1.06  0-42  0.58  0.65  2.71  1.07  0.61  0.48  0.10  2.26 
CNCA  bonds  0.99  0.78  1.06  1.13  3-96  1.64  0-97  0.83  0.82  4-26  1.21  0.91  0-79  - 0.11  2.80 
For sources and  notes  see Table  PA  2. Table  Pl3  3  - ITALY 
Domestic  issues of medium- and long-term fixed-interest  securities (Lit,  1000 millim) 
1967 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter 
Gross totals 
"Blook"  issues  ~ ~  l2hl  §l&1 
Central  government  1.3  - 204.8  294.2 
Local  authorities  - 10.0  - -
Institutions iSI!Uirlg  ftr accrunt  af 1ba  Trea.a.try  339.8  - 153.2  156.7 
Institutials speal.alizjng in 01'8di.t  against movable  121.2  178.5  271.6  272.7 
Public enterprises  property  325.0  - 127.0  105.5 
Private enterprises  1.4  10.3  3.1  3.6 
"Tal!"  issues 
Institutions specializing in credit 
against real estate 
13].6  143.6  135.9  195·7 
Total  926.3  342.4  895.6  1  028.4 
Net  totals1 
"Block"  issues  609.2  ~  603.1  ~ 
Central  government  - 11.9  - 2.2  175.0  286.3 
Local  authorities  - 1.1  9.5  - - 0.4 
Inst!.tutims issuing ftr aoocmrt  of the Treuury  281.6  - 1.2  124.8  149.2 
Institutiom specializing in credit against m~  65.0  uo.o  216,2  229,1 
Public enterprises  propert;y  287.7  - 13.7  95·3  n.6 
Private enterprises  - 12.1  - 4.8  - 8,2  - 12.9 
"Tal!"  issues 
Institutions specializing in credit  108.1  58.4  101,8  98.0  against real estate 
Total  717.3  156.0  704-9  820.9 
Memorandum  item  t  Buoni fruttiferi  53·7  25.4  24.6  34-0 
1  Issue prices and redemptions  were  taken into account in calculating net totals. 
For  sources and notes  see Table  PA  3. 
Year  1st 
quarter 
Li.I2:j  .Lm:l 
5()0.3  713.2 
10.0  -
649·7  -
844.0  281.8 
557·5  232.5 
18.4  8,2 
612.8  159.0 
3.192.7  1  394.7 
2 032.8  1!2:.I 
447.2  391.4 
8.0  - 1,7 
554·4  - 63,8 
620.3  207.9 
440·9  189.6 
- 38.0  - 6.1 
366.3  126.9 
2  399.1  843,6 






















1968  1969 
3rd  4th  Year  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  Year 
lli:.l  1i!hl  U1!!:i  ~  1  064.0 ~  872.8  ~ 
100.1  250.8  1  218.5  0.5  484.0  200.0  297.0  981.5 
40.0  11.7  51·7  - 7·5  - - 7·5 
- 257.8  592·6  394·3  117.9  443.3  272-4  1  227.9 
194.7  234·4  999·1  258.7  421.0  237.4  200.3  1  117·4 
425.0  - 687.5  245.0  33.0  352.0  102.0  732.0 
3.5  3.4  28.4  3·1  0.6  0.9  1.1  6.3 
174.6  228,8  742.3  215·9  187.0  178.4  194.1  775·4 
937.9  986.9  4  )20.7  1  118.1  1  251.0  1  412.0  1  066.9  4  848.0 
~  625.2  2  588.2  ~ ~  Wh§.  2.5!:.!  ~ 
54.8  242.7  830.7  - 12.9  194-5  117.9  228.2  527.7 
38.5  10.6  46.9  - 1.8  6.5  - 1.5  - 1.0  2.2 
- 26.0  240.3  466,2  297·3  108.7  375·5  240.7  1  OZ!. 2 
125.8  183.7  728.2  172.5  329.6  157·6  151.0  810.7 
382.5  - 37·4  549.8  196.9  12.8  291.1  53.3  554·1 
- 9·1  - 14.7  - 33.6  - 12.6  - 17-4  - 12-0  - 17.8  - 59.8 
134.2  119.3  460.4  173,4  84.5  134.3  ]6.7  468.9 
700.1  744·5  3 048.6  812,8  719.2  1 062.9  731.1  3  326.0 
21.3  34·7  133.5  44·4  18.3  16.0  26.5  105.2 Table  PB  4  - NETHERLANDS 
Issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest securities 
en.  million) 
1997 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Year  quarter  I  quarter  quarter  quarter 
Gross  totals 
"Block"  issues  m  2Q.l  m.  ill  ~ 
Central government  250  295  - 246  791 
Local authorities  446  150  204  150  950 
Financial institutions  - - - - -
Private  and  semi-public 
enterprises  - - 157  79  236 
Non-profit-making 
institutions and  11  58  31  22  122 
miscellaneous 
"Tap"  issues  2l  ll  2l  .ll  112 
Mortgage  credit 
institutions  45  11  53  35  144 
Commercial  banks  18  1  10  2  31 
Total  170  515  455  534  2.274 
Net  totals 
"Block"  issues  .m.  .ill  lli  ill.  !.:lA2 
Central government  82  187  - 99  154  324 
Local authorities  411  103  166  78  758 
Financial institutions  - 5  -12  - 15  - 2  - 34 
Private  and  semi-public 
enterprises  - 9  -15  141  64  181 
Non-profit-making 
institutions and  11  56  30  19  116 
miscellaneous 
"Tap"  issues  .ll  i  ~  ~  ill 
Mortgage  credit 
institutions  19  6  35  24  84 
Com•ercia1 banks  14  - 2  10  1  23 
Total  523  323  268  338  1  452 























1968  1969 
2nd  3rd  4th  Year  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  Year  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter 
.e.  21.5.  !22  2  109  ~  .ID.  ~  l...Q1Q  2  568 
- 247  232  728  513  - 250  497  1320 
307  265  200  925  101  150  112  457  820 
52  - 6  58  - 60  40  75  175 
19  2  12  252  - 100  4  - 104 
22  61  46  146  21  43  44  41  149 
~  §1.  n  ~  §2  .il.  J2  1§.  £gL. 
39  66  17  174  65  47  39  40  191 
5  1  4  10  - - - 36  36 
444  642  517  2  293  760  400  489  1  146  2  795 
182  ,4!g  ~  ~  lli  ill  ~  ~  !..M! 
-105  147  137  262  470  -97  144  408  925 
222  232  133  714  74  111  64  390  639 
40  -14  5  30  -1  ;I)  25  14  148 
6  -23  -31  161  -11  83  -20  -43  9 
19  60  43  137  19  40  43  38  140 
Ji  i2  .!Q  ill  .li  Jl  .!2  il!  .ill. 
32  48  6  110  34  38  19  26  117 
2  1  4  1  - -3  - 32  29 
216  451  297  1  421  585  222  275  925  2  007 Table  PB  5  - DIDIOJI 
Do•atic public iaauea ct ..  dium- and  long-tara th:ed-intereat aecuritiea  (B1're.  '000 aillicn) 
1967  1968  1969 
let  2nd  )rd  4th  Year  lat  2nd  )rd  4th  Year  let  2nd  )rd  4th  Year  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  auartar  auarter  auartar  auarter 
Oroea  totale 
"Block"  iaauea  !2.&  ~  'b!i..  18.6  .2W.  .!L.j  g:,2  ~  llir  ~  £l:.!  ~  .!!.:..l  ..ll.:..l  ~ 
f:i!:!~ f:b;raent  1).5  6.8  7.4  10.1  37.8  10.- 5·1  25.6  0.2  40·9  17.2  7.2  8.1  24.1  56.6 
~:ft  •g::~~!~•a and  2.1  - 0.8  2.4  5·3  6.- ).- - - 9·-
I 
5·- - 2.0  2.)  9-3 
Indepencl.ant  tunda  - 6.- 0.)  6.- 12.3  - - o. 3  8.- 8.3  - 9-3  0.2  - 9·5 
Public enterprises  1.6  4-3  0.9  - 6.8  0.4  2.4  - 4-5  7-3  0.9  1.5  - 3.6  6.0 
Public financial 
I 
inati  tuticna  2.4  - 0.5  - 2.9  0.5  - - - 0.5  - - 0.5  1.5  2.0 
Privata financial 
institutions  - - - - - - - - - -
I 
- - - - -
Private enterprises  - 1.3  - 0.1  1.4  0.4  2.- - - 2-4  - 0-5  0.5  - 1.0 
:...~.R.~  __  i_!!!~!!! 
1 
.!2.:1!  12.6  ~  ~  .!!:i  12.8  2l:l  li:.2  ll:.i  .ll:..§.  .!§.&  2l:.l  l!.:.i  !hl  ll:l 
~':!  t a~!!:!!~'a ancl.  7-- 6.6  6.6  7-7  27-9  7-8  6.8  7-3  7-5  29-4  8.7  7-8  7-9  9.8  34-2 
Public  financial 
inati  tutiona2  4-4  4-7  4-2  4·9  18.2  7.8  6.4  4-3  5.3  23.8  3.8  4-6  3·9  6.2  18.5 
Private financial 
institutions  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .  .  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .  .  .  .  ..  .. 
Nat  totals 
"Block"  issues  .2.:.2  .4:.2  .hQ.  .!.l:i  .l9..:l  lli1  !!:.£  11:.2  hl  $.d  ~  i:l  !:.2.  .lQ:l  ~ 
?:~~1f  ~~bt)•nt  4· 7  -2.- 2.- 6.8  11.5  6.6  2. 7  13.9  - 5-2  18,0  2. 7  ~-7  ).6  1·<.  1).0 
t~~t  •g~;~~!~aa and  1.8  -1.- 0.5  1.8  ).1  5· 7  2.8  ~-4  1.4  6. 7  4-5  ~.6  1.2  1.5  6.6 
Indepencl.ent  tunda  0.1  5-l  - 1.2  5· 7  9·7  - 0.2  ~.1  ~-2  7·5  7-0  ~-5  6.3  ~-3  ~-3  5-2 
Public enterprises  1.2  1.3  0.5  -0.4  2.6  - 1.6  ~-7  3.8  4-7  ~-2  1.0  ~.8  1. 3  1.3 
Public financial 
inati  tutions  2-1  0.2  0.5  -0.1  2. 7  0.4  ~-3  - - o.l  ~-1  ~.1  o.6  0-3  o. 7 
Privata financial 
inati  tut  ions  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Privata entarPriaea  - 1.0  - 0.3  - 0.2  0.5  0.2  1.5  ~-1  - 1.6  - 0.2  0.2  0.1  0-5 
::!!E:,_  issues  1 
hl  i&  hl  1.:i  ~  .!!.:.2  .1:.1  2..:.§.  .!i:.Q.  1hl  §.:;1  hl  hl  !h2  £ll 
---- 2 
2.6  2.6  4.2  12.2  Cr,dit Communal  2.8  2.2  2.3  3·3  10.6  3-1  2.1  2-5  10.3  2-9  2-5 
Public financial 
institutions 2  0.9  1.5  1.7  2.5  6.6  5.8  3.4  2.6  3·9  15.7  1.0  1.1  1.1  2.2  5·4 
i:!~~!!ti!~~cial  1.6  1.1  1.3  1.6  5.6  2.6  1.6  1.5  1.5  7.2  2.2  2-9  2.4  2.5  10.0 
1  The  totals tor tap  iaauaa are not  ooaparable vith thoae given in Table  PA  5,  notabl;r tor the raasona  indicated in Footnotea  2 
and  3. 
2  Includes  issues of one-yaar notes  and cartiticatea (bona de caiaae), 
3  Banks  and  private savinga banks  only. 
Other notes  and  sources  1  Table  PA  5. Table  PB  6  - LUXEMBOURG 
Issues of medium- and  long-term fixed-interest  securities  (I million) 
1967  1968  1969 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  1st  2nd  3rd  4th 
quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  Year  quarter  quarter  I quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  quarter  _quarter  Year 
Net  totals 
"Block"  issues  :!:...&21  ::...Q&  ~  + 15.06  +  26.24  =...h2.2  ±....hl!!.  =....!&  ::.£:.1!  10.46  ~  =...hll  ::....2..:..22  l.:.Q.Q. 
Central  government  +  13.3  - 0.4  - 1.0  +  15.4  +  27.3  - 1.2  - 0.4  - 1.3  - 0-4  11.17  - 0-55  - 1.34  - 0.49  8.79 
Local authorities  - 0.1  - - - o. 3  - 0.4  - 0.1  + 4.0  - - 0.3  -o.o8  - 0.16  - - 0,41  -o.65 
Public  enterprises  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Financial  institutions  - 0,03  - - - 0.04  - 0.07  - 0.03  - - - 0.04  -o.03  - - 0,02  - 0,03  -o.o8 
tprlvate  and  semi-public 
0.2  - 0.18  -o.6o  - 0.17  - 0,06  -1.06  enterprises  - - 0,21  - - 0.59  - 0.32  - 0.22  - 0.19  - - 0.23 
~:  Figures supplied  to  the  Working Party on Securities Markets  by  the  Luxembourg  delegation, Table  FC  1  - GER~~NY 
Private  placingsM  (Nominal  value  in  ~ million) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
Gross  totals 
Mortgage  bonds  77  60  94  67  66  540  347  285  326  467 
"Communal"  bonds  153  174  144  281  338  1 056  921  781  1 034  693 
Bonds  issued  by  specialized 
credit institutes!  15  21  18  4  - 66  )05  94  19  30 
Other  bank  bonds  - - - - - 13  93  27  2  -
Total2  246  255  256  351  405  1 675  1 666  1 187  1 381  1 190 
Net  totals 
Mortgage  bonds  77  50  82  51  35  468  235  176  224  300 
"Communal"  bonds  152  124  88  242  252  798  436  190  606  353 
Bonds  issued  by  specialized  15  21  17  3  - 2  63  158  58  - 5  3 
credit institutes1  - - - - - 13  81  - 34  - 4  - 2 
Other  bank  bonds 
Total2  244  194  188  296  285  1.341  912  389  820  654 
Memorandum  item:  Net  increase  in 
indebtedness  represented  by  debt 
certificates and  insurance 
company  loans3  1 375  1 415  1 562  1 472  1 519  1711  2211  2 189  1 660  2 644 
1Deutscbe  Genossenschaftskasse,  Deutsche  Siedlungs- und  Landesrentenbank,  Lastenausgleichsbank,  Industriekreditbank AG, 
Kreditanstalt  fUr  Wiederaufbau,  Landwirtschaftliche  Rentenbank. 
2Discrepancies  in  totals are  due  to  rounding. 
3Mainly Schuldscheindarlehen  though  not all of  these are  included  in the  figures. 
KRegistered  bonds. 
~:  Monthly reports of the  Deutsche'Bundesbank  (Table  VI-7)  and  series  2  of the statistical annexes  to  them 
(Tables  9  and  10). Table  PC  2  - FRANCE 
Private placings• 















1961  1962 
- 0.04 
0.19  0.23 
- -
0.03  0.07 
0.22  0.34 
institutions. 
Source:  Figures supplied to the  Working  Party  on Securities 
1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969 
0.03  - - 0.09  0.08  0.08  o.oa 
0.11  0.23  0.30  0.13  0.43  0.54  0.62 
o.oa  - 0.10  - - - 0.22 
- 0.02  0.05  0.24  0.29  0.28  0.38 
0.22  0.25  0.45  0.46  o.8o  0.90  1.30 
Markets by  the  French delegation. Table  PC  4  - NETHERLANDS 
Private  placings  (Fl.  million) 
1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965"  1966  1967  1968  1969 
Net  totals 
I. Onderhandse  leninsen 
Central government  30  416  524  299  603  802  1 o80  1 294  999  1 253 
Local authorities  635  794  269  748  1 410  1 357  413  877  889  502 
Private  sector  717  1 000  1 301  1 130  1 143  1 415  2 149  2 324  2 735  2.490 
Total  1 ')82  2 210  2 094  2 177  3156  3 574  3642  4 495  4 623  4 245 
II. Mortsases 
Private sector  587  815  1 074  1300  1 582  1 316  1 196  1 176  1 736  1 918 
Total  I  + II  1 969  3 025  3 168  3 477  4 738  4.890  4838  5 671  6  359  6 163 
Source:  Figures supplied  to the  Working Party  on  Securities Markets  by  the  Netherlands delegation. Table  PC  5  - BELGIUM 
Gross  totals 
PriYate  placings• 
(Bfrs.  •ooo  million) 
Central government  (direct  debt) 
Local authorities and  Cr&dit 
Communall 
Independent  funds1 
Public enterprises1 
Public  financial 
institutional 










Central  government  (direct debt)J  0.9 
Local authorities and Cr&dit 
Communall  -
Independent  funds1  2,3 
Public  enterprises1  0.4 
Public  financial 










































PriYate  financial 






































~  2.0 
Private enterprises  4  - 0.2  - - 0.2  1.- - 0.3  1.4 
~----4-----~------4-----~------~----~------+------+------+-----~  14.8  Total  4.9  3.1  6.2  8.1 
•  Domestic  issues by  private  agreement  of medium- and  long-term  fixed-interest securities. 
1  Source:  Bulletin d'Information et  de  Documentation  of the  Banque  Nationa1e  de  Belgique  (Statistical Table  XVI,  1, 
Securities not  accessible  to all investors). 
2 ~:  Annual  articles published in the Bulletin mensuel  de  Statistiques of the  Institut National  de  Statistiques 
on  issues by  joint stock companies,  Table  headed  "Issues of  bonds  and  notes  and  certificates  (bona  de 
caisse)  of  joint stock companies",  items  banks  +  insurance  companies  +  financial  and  real estate 
transactions  ("block"  issues less any  public  issues,  figures  for  the  latter being supplied by  the  Banking 
Commission). 
3 ~:  INS  Table  referred to in 2  above,  Public  issues  (Banking  Commission  figures)  haYe  been  deducted  from  the 
figures  in  the  INS  Table. 
4 ~:  Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique  calculations (total net issues less estimated net  public issues). Table  PD  1  - GERMANY 
List of issues• 
Open  for  Amount  Early  Issued  Redeem- Coupon  Actual  subscription  Issuer  (DM  Duration  redempt:lal  at  able at  interest yield on  on  million)  of~fon  (%)  (%)  rate  issue 
ta) 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
ill1 
10.1  Siemens  AG  120  2/15  97  7  7-43 
20.1  Miinchen  100  5/15  97  7  7.71 
21.1  Farbwerke  Hoechst  301.2  10  100  6 l/2 
30.1  Saarland  50  5/15  96  7  7.71 
10.2  Bundespost  110  10  96  1/2  7  7.50 
24.2  Rheinland-Pfalz  100  5/15  97  7  7.56 
6.3  Hessen  150  5/15  97  1/2  7  7.35 
28.3  Bundesbahn  170  11  97  1/2  7  7-34 
5·4  Isar Amper-Werke  11  5/10  100  7 
18.4  Schleswig-Holstein  80  10/15  97  6 1/2  6.96 
25.4  Bund  250  12  97  1/4  6 1/2  6.96 
8.5  Niedersachsen  100  10/15  97  1/4  6 1/2  6.93 
18.5  DUsseldorf  50  5/15  97  1/4  6 1/2  7 
23.5  Industriekreditbank  60  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.82 
7.6  BP  (A  series)  60  5/15  99  6 1/2  6.63 
7.6  BP  (B  series)  40  5/15  99  6 
12.6  Bremen  50  10/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.78 
19.6  Rhein-Main Rohrleitungs- 75  5/15  98  3/4  6 1/2  6.67 
Transportgesellschaft 
4/20  98  1/2  6 1/2  3·7  Bay  ern  200  6.78 
11.7  Kommunales  Elektrizitatswerk Mark  30  5/15  98  6 1/2  6.88 
13.7  Bund  300  10  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.82 
28.7  Nordrhein-Westfalen  250  10  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.82 
7.8  Berlin  100  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.82 
28.8  Rheinland Pfalz  100  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.92 
7-9  Deutsche  Lufthansa  150  5/15  100  6 
12.9  Bundesbahn  170  10  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.82 
20.9  Thyssenhiitte  80  7/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.80 
27.9  Hamburg  100  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.81 
12.10  KfW.FfM  200  3/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.83 
28.10  Industriekreditbank  60  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/2 
24.10  VEW.  Westfa1en  100  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/2 
6.11  Baden-Wiirttemberg  200  6/15  98  1/2  6 1/2 
21.11  Deutsche Siedlungs- und  125  5/20  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.87 
Landesrentenbank 
27.11  Adam  Opel  AG  ~  150  10  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.71 
20.12  Landwirtschaftliche  Rentenbank  8o  5/15  98  1/2  6 1/''- 6.88 
B.  Foreiean  issuers  1 
12.21 
-.2  Du  Pont  Europa  100  5/15  99  1/4  6 3/4  6.85 
-.2  Oster.  Elektrizitatswirtsch.  AG  55  5/20  96  3/4  7  7-54 
osterr.  Donaukraftwerke Osterr. 
-.3  City of Oslo  40  12  97  1/2  7  7.40 
-.3  BASF  (Luxembourg)  120  10  99  1/2  6 3/4  6.82 
-.3  National  Read  Overseas Capital Corp.  60  12  99  1/2  6 1/2  6,58 
-.9  Eurofima  60  4/16  98  3/4  6 1/2  6.68 
-.10  Australia  100  15  99  6 1/2  6~63 
-.10  City of Oslo  40  15  99  6 1/2  6.79 
-.11  ArgentinR  100  12  95  7  7.90 
January  International Standard Electric  43,1 
~  6 
II 
Deutsche Texaco  Ltd.  Corp.  45,4  5 
•  See  notes  on  lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  1•(contd.) 









































































I  s  s  u  e  r 
Amount  Early. 
(:rxq million. Duratioll  rede~ption 
optJ.on 
(a)  (b) 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
Bundespost 
Stadt  Ka1n 
Hessen 




Bundesbahn  (1st  issue) 
Schleswig-Holstein 




Esso  AG  Hamburg 
Bundespost  (2nd  issue) 
Deutsche  Siedlungs- und  Landesrente~ 
bank 
Bundesbahn  (2nd  issue) 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd issue) 
Bundespost  (3rd issue) 
Bay ern 
Industriekreditbank AG,  DUsseldorf 
Hessen 
Deutsche  Siedlungs- und  Landesren-
tenbank 
Landwirtschaftliche  Rentenbank 
Rationa1isierungsverband  Steinkohle~ 
bergbau 





















































I  2.  1.  74 
I  1.  2. 79 
I  1.  2. 79 
I  1.  2.  79 
I  2.  5· 79 
I  2.  5.74 
I  1.  6.  79 
I  1.  6. 78 
I  2.10.74 
I  1.10.  78 
I  2.  1.80 
B. Foreign  issuers 1 
New  Zealand  38.5 
Tauernkraftwerke  AG  45 
Japan  100 
Sira Kvina  Kraftschskap  (Norway)  34-7 
IBRD  120 
South  Africa  60 
City  of  Copenhagen  75 
Republic  of Austria  100 
City  of Vienna  60 
General-Instrument  (Cverseas  USA)  75 
Mexico  100 
EIB  100 
City  of  Kobe,  Japan  100 
Finland  75 
IDA  100 
Sears  International Finance  Curaqao  75 
Brenner  Autobahn  60 
City  of Helsinki  50 
New  Zealand  (II)  80 
Nacional  Financiera SA,  Mexico  60 
Australia  100 
IBRD  400 
City  of Yokohama  100 
Outokumpu  Oy  AG  (Finland)  40 
Transocean Gulf  Oil Co.  (USA)  200 
Tauernkraftwerke  60 
Argentina  100 
Charter Consolidated Overseas N.~ Curac:;ao  120 
SNCF  J  120 
Occidental Overseas Capital Corporatio  150 
Electricity Supply  Commission  100 
Industrie-Hypothekenbank in Finl.and JlGI  60 
Venezuela  100 
Caisse  nationale  des  telecommunications, 200 
Paris 
City of Trondheim,  Norway  25 
Iran  80 
Industrial Bank  of Japan  60 
Finland  75 
Mexico  100 














I  5·  2.73 
I  1.  2.78 
I  1. 3.72 
I  1.  3.79 
I  2.  5.79 
I  1. 4.78 
I  1.  6.78 
I  1.  6.71 
I  1.  6.77 
3/15  I  1. 
3/15  I  1. 
3/15  I 
4/15  I 
5/15  I  1. 
3/15  I  1. 











5/15  I 
12 
3/15  I 
3/10 
6/15  II 
5/15  I 
2/10  II 
3/15  I 
3/15  'I 
3/15  I 
5/15  I 
4/12  I 
5/15  I 
5/15  II 
3/15 li 
2/10  I 
3/15  .r 
3/15  I 
3/15  I 
7/15 
1.  8.74 
1.  9-75 
1.  9-78 
1.10.71 
1.10.72 










2.  1.  76. 
Issued 
at 
Redeemable Cioutpon  ,._Actual yield 
n  eres~.  . 
~t  t  on  J.ssue 
(%)  (%)  ra  e 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
98  1/2 
100 
98  1/2 






































98  1/2  100 
98  3/4  100 
98  100 
98  100 
98  1/2  100 
99  1/2  100 
98  3/4  100 
99  1/2  100 
99  1/2  100 
99  1/2  100 
97  1/2  100 
99  100 
99  1/2  100 
99  100 
99  100 
99  3/8  100 
98  100 
98  1/4  100 
99  3/4  100 
98  1/8  100 
98  1/2  100 
100  100 
99  100 
99  1/2  100 
99  1/2  100 
99  1/4  100 
97  1/4 100  1/2-lOL 
99  3/4  100 
99  1/2  100 
98  1/2  100 
97  3/4  100 
98  1/2  100 
97  3/4  100 
99  100 
98  100 
97  100 
99  3/4  100 
98  1/2  100 
97  1/2  100 









































6  3/4 
7 











6  1/2 
6 1/2 
6  1/2 
6 1/2 






6  3/4 
7 































































7  .. 11 
7-54 
7.00 
















Republic  of Austria 
City  of Oslo 
JUtland  Telephon Co.  Ltd. 
Government  of Canada 
Republic  of Austria 
Republic  of Austria 
USA  - Treasury  Notes 
Province  of Ontario 
IBM 
Kingdom  of  Denmark 
Commonwealth  of Australia 

















•  See  notes  on  lists of  issues  (following Table  PD  6). 














I 98  I 
99  1/2 
99  1/4 
99  1/2 





































6.50 Table  PD  1~  (contd.) 
')pened  for  Amount  Duratiol'l  Early  Issued Redeemable  Coupon  Actual 
subscription  Issuer  (DM  redemption  at  at  interest  yield 
on  million)  option  (%)  (%)  rate  on 
(a)  (b)  issue 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
~ 
15.1  Niedersachsen  150  5/15  I  2.  1.75  98  100  6  6.38 
20.1  Bundespost  310  12  98  100  6  6.24 
26.2  Bundesbahn  270  10  98  100  6  6.28 
20.5  Industrie-Kreditbank DUsseldorf  60  5/15  I  1.  6.75  98  1/2  100  6 1/2  6.83 
16.6  Bundespost  210  10  98  1/2  100  6 1/2  6  •  .82 
18.11  Bund  400  10  99  1/4  100  7  7.24 
B. Foreign issuers1 
12.§.2 
21.1  Quebec  Hydro  Electric  Comm.,  Canada  150  5/15  I  1.  2.75  99  100  6 3/4  7.16 
22.1  New  Zealand  100  5/15  I  1.  2.75  99  100  6 3/4  7.01 
11.2  Commonwealth  of Australia  200  5/15  I  1.  2.75  99  1/2  100  6 1/2  6.67 
21.2  0ntario,  Canada  150  5/15  99  100  6 1/2  6.74 
3·3  Caisse nationale  des  autoroutes  200  5/15  I  1.  3-75  99  100  6 1/2  6~64 
4.3  EIB  120  5/15  98  100  6  6.38 
4.3  Kansai El.  Corp.,  Japan  100  5/15  I  1.  9-75  99  1/4  100  6 3/4  6~98 
17.3  Mortgage,  Finl.  60  5/15  98  1/2  100  6 3/4  7.10 
18.3  District de  Paris  50  5/15  I  1. 4-79  99  100  6 1/2  6.76 
26.3  Austria  120  5/14  98  1/2  100  6 1/2  6.82 
26.3  Montreal,  Canada  100  20  I  1.  4.71  99  1/2  1CO  7  7."07 
1.4  Republic  of South  Africa  100  3/15  I  1. 4-73  99  1/2  100  6 3/4  6.94 
2.4  British Gas  Council  200  5/15  I  1.  4-75  99  100  6 3/4  1  ~01 
14.4  Republic  of  Iceland  25  3/15  98  3/4  100  7 1/4  7-.58 
17.4  Courtaulds,London  150  5/15  I  1. 4-75  99  100  9 3/4  7"'00 
14.5  Republic  of Finland  75  3/15  I  2.  5-73  99  100  1  7~29 
22.5  City of Kobe,  Japan  100  3/15  I  1.  5-73  98  1/2  100  6 3/4  7~11 
23.5  World  Bank  250  5/15  I  1.  6.75  98  1/2  100  6 1/2  6.81 
13.6  Nacional  Financiera,  Mexico  80  2/10  I  1.  6.72  98  1/2  100  1 1/4  7.69 
20.6  City of  ~openhagen  100  5/15  I  1.  6.75  99  100  6 3/4  7.00 
27.6  Redland.  engl./franz.  Finanzholding  8o  5/15  I  1.  6.75  97  100  7 1/2  8.13 
Netherlands  Antilles 
1.7  Autopista,  Spain  100  3/15  I  1.  7-73  91  100  1 1/4  7.82 
10.7  Chrysler 1verseas,USA  150  5/15  I  1.  7-75  99  100  7  7.26 
17-7  IDB  100  5/15  I  1.  8.75  99  100  7  7.26 
21.7  Denmark  150  5/15  I  1.  8.75  98  100  7  7-43 
31.7  Pro-vince  of Newfoundland  Bo  5/15  I  1.  8.75  97  1/2  100  7 1/4  7-75 
6.8  Studebaker,  New  York  100  10  I  1.  8.79  97  1/4  100  1 1/4  7.80 
11.8  Hydro  ~lectric, 1ntario  150  5/15  I  1.  8.75  97  100  7  7-59 
22.8  Quebec  Hydro,  Montreal  100  5/15  I  1.  9-75  97  3/4  100  7 1/4  7.73 
1.9  ~lectricity Council,  London  150  5/15  I  1.  9.75  99  1/4  100  7 1/2  7.76 
1.9  International Standard Electric,  100  5/15  I  1.  9-75  99  100  7  7.26 
New  York 
15.9  Ireland  100  5/15  I  1.  9-75  98  1/4  100  7 1/4  7  ~64 
17.9  Asian  Development  Bank  60  5/15  I  1.  9-75  97  1/2  100  7  7~48 
19.9  Jysk Telefon,  Denoark  30  5/15  I  15.  9-75  98  1/4  100  7 1/4  7  •. 64 
26.9  Yokohama  100  3/15  I  30.  9.73  96  1/2  100  7  7.66 
10.10  Republic  of Finland  75  3/15  I  1.10.73  91  3/4  100  7 1/2  8._00 
15.10  TRW,  Wilmington,  USA  80  5/15  I  1.10.75  97  3/4  100  1 1/2  7-97 
27.10  Kingdom  of  Denma~k  8o  5/15  I  1.11.75  98  1/4  100  7 1/2  7.90 
31.10  Australia  150  5/15  I  1.11.75  98  100  1 1/4  7.68 
10.11  Tenneco,  Willemstad,  Cura.!fao  100  7/15  I  1.11.77  97  1/2  100  1 1/2  1-19 
12.11  EIB  100  5/15  I  1.11.75  98  1/2  100  1  7-35 
18.11  City of '1slo  80  5/15  I  1.11.75  98  1/2  100  7 1/2  7.86 
20.11  Tokyo  ~lectric  150  5/15  I  1.12.75  96  1/2  100  7 1/4  7.90 
28.11  Borg-Warner Wilmington  100  5/15  I  1.11.75  97  1/2  100  1 1/2  8.01 
2.12  Finland  60  2/12  I  1.12.72  97  100  1 1/2  8.24 
18.12  Argentina  100  2/10  I  1.12.72  96  100  8  9.08 
c. Private ;elacings  of  loans  b~ forei~ issuers 
.!2§2 
?/12  99  1/4  6 1/2  ?.1  Austria  100  6.71 
?.1  World  Bank  125  ?/15  100  6 1/2  6.50 
?.2  Caisse  nationale  de  1 ';margie  200  ?/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.70 
?.2  Austria  25  ?/12  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.81 
?.2  Occidental Overseas Capital Corp.  100  ?/7  99  6 1/2  6~79 
?.2  Malaysia  40  ?/5  99  7  7.26 
?.2  Province  of Quebec  80  ?/1  99  6 3/4  7.05 
?.2  Province  of Ontario  90  ?/6  99  1/4  6 1/4  6.51 
?.2  Aeroport  de  Paris  65  ?/15  98  1/2  6 1/2  6.70 
?  .. 2  Australia  100  ?/6  99  1/2  6 1/4  6.45 
?.3  Goodyear  Intern.  Finance  Corp.  150  ?/1  99  6 1/4  6.53 
?.4  Worli  Bank  125  ?/15  96  6  6.50 
?.4  The  Gas  Council  100  ?/10  99  1/4  6 3/4  6.99 
?.9  The  ~lectricity Council  50  ?/15  99  1/4  7 1/2  7.75 





















































l:rssued at  Redeemable  at 
Issuer  Duration  (%)  (%) 
(a)  (b) 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
Societe de  developpement 
regional  du  sud-ouest 
"EXPANSO"  (state-
guaranteed) 
15.59  1/15  I  - after  99.75  108.75 
Charbonnages  de  France 
(state-guaranteed) 
Credit  foncier de  France 







B  _after 6 
and  11 yeers 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
Societe de  developpement  19.6  1/15  I  - after 
regional  Bretagne 
(state-guaranteed) 
6 years 
Electricite de  France  650 
(state-guaranteed) 
1/5/10/15/2C B  - after 
5,10,15 
CNCA  (state-guaranteed) 
Compagnie  maritime  des 
chargeurs reunis 
Societe lyonnaise des 
eaux et de  1 1eclairage 
Groupement  des  grands 
magasins et magasins 
populaires 
Societe de  developpement 
regional Nord  - Pas-de-
Calais  (state-guaranteed 




P,  et T.  (state-
guaranteed) 
Societe des  caves et 
producteurs de 
Roquefort 
Societe de  developpement 
regional  de  l'ouest 
"SODERO"  (state-
guaranteed) 
Entreprise Jean  LEFEBVRE 
Groupement  des  industr~ 
du materiel d'equipement 
"SIMAT" 
Caisse  centrale de  credit 
h8telier,  commercial  et 
industrial  (state-
guaranteed) 
Societe  POCLAIN 
Emprunt  national 
d'equipement 
MATRA2 
AUNE  - MESTRE2 
Gaz  de  Franoe  (state-
guaranteed) 
PERRIER2 
Ville de  Paris 
Soeiete de  develor~ement 
regional  NORMANDIE 
(state-guaranteed) 
Societe de  developpement 
regional  Centre-Est 
'  (state-guaranteed) 
SAVIEN 
Imprimerie  CHAIX-






























250  4/8/12/16 
12  4y.  7 m/ 
14y.  7 m 
2.6  3/7Y•  1 m/ 
14  Y•  1 m. 
525  4/9/14/19 
65.84  4/8/12/15 y. 
4  m. 
400  l/19Y·  9  m. 
18.3  1/15 
26.97  1/15 
40  1/5/10/15 
25  1/5/10/15 
Societe alsacienne de  24.5  1/15 
developpement  et d'ex-
pansion  SADE  (state-
guaranteed) 
Soci8te generals  d 'sngrais  30  1/5/10/15 




d'expansion  "CHAMPEX" 
{state-guaranteed) 
Societe pour le develop-
pement  economique  du 
Centre et du  Centre-
Ouest  "SODECCO"  (state-
guaranteed) 
Groupement  de  1 1industt1e 
siderurgique 
Societe lorraine de  de-
veloppement et d1expan-
sion "L0RDEX"  (state-
guaranteed) 
CNCA  (state-guaranteed) 




Societe de  developpemen 
regional  du  sud-est 
(state-guaranteed) 
Electricite de  France 
(state-guaranteed) 
Caisse  d 1aide A l'equi-
pement  des  collectivites 
locales 
Groupement  des indus-
tries de  la construction 
electrique "GICEL" 
SNCF  (state-guaranteed) 
Caisse d'aide  ~ l'equi-
pement  des  collectivites 
locales 
Societe de  developpement 
regional  de  1 10uest 
"SODERO"  (state-
guaranteed) 
Compagnie  des  compteurs 
900  1/20 
15.5  1/15 
21.5  1/15 
350  3/20 
21.16  1/15 
986.9  7y.  4 m/ 
lOy,  4  m/ 
16y,  4  m/ 
19y.  4 m 
120  1/5/10/15 
100  1/5/10/15 
105  1/15 
17-54  1/15 
600.9  5/10/15/20 
87  3/6/9/12/15 
59  2/4/7/10/13/ 
15 
932  5/10/15/20 
60  3/6/9/12/15 
26.85  1/15 
30  1/5/10/15 
Groupement  des indus- 35 
tries mecaniques "CIMECA" 




B  -after 11 
ani  17year~ 
I  -after 
3 years 
I  -after 
3 years 
I  -after 
4 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
3 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
3 years 
I  -after 
3 years 
I  -after 
9 years 
B  -after 6 
ani 12  yea.rE 
I  -after 
4 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  - after 
3 years 
I  - after 
5  years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  _after 
10  years 
I  -after 
5 yoe.ra 
:B  - after 10 y, 
4 m.  and 
16y.  4  m, 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
B  -after 7 
ani  15 years 
I  -after 
6 years 
B  - after 7 
and  15 ySRrs 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
5 years 
I  -after 
4  years 
100  103o75/107o50/115 
100  100  or prize 
drawings 
99.85  103/106/109 
99·75  108.75 
100  102.50/106.25/ 
115/125 
100  105/107.90/111.25/ 
117.50/128.75 
99.80  109 
99.80  106/110 
99.85  103/105/108 
99.75  108.75 
100  102.50/105/110/ 
117.50/127.50 
100  100  or prize 
drawings 
100  104/108/112/116 
99·90  107~50 
99.75  109 
99.70  106/110 
99.65  103/106/112 
100  101/103/106/110/ 
115 
99.70  103/106/109 
100  101,25/106,25/ 
111. 25/116.15 
100  108.33/116.66 
100  100/121 
100  100/106.25/115/ 
126.25 
100  166.40/176/185.60 
100  100  or prize 
drawings 
99· 75  109 
99·75  109 
99.60  104/107/111 
99.65  103/106/112 
99·75  109 
99·10  103/106/112 
100  100  or prize 
drawings 
99·75  109 
99·75  109 
100  109 
99·75  109 
100  105/107.50/ 
111.25/117.50/ 
128-75 
99.90  103/106/112 
99.90  103/106/112 
99.90  110 
99.75  109 
100  102.50/106.25/ 
115/125 
99  100/102.50/106/ 
110/115 
99.95  102/104/106/108/ 
114 
100  101,25/106,25/ 
116.25/130 
99.50  100/102.50/106/ 
ll0/115 
99.75  109 
99·90  103/106/112 
99.80  108 
99.90  103/106/112 














































5·50/6.50  3-59 
5/6.50  6-34 
6.25  6.25 
5·75/6.30  6.01 
6.25  6.20 
6.25  6.21 


















































































6.82 Table  PD  t!  (cont.) 





































Credit  fancier de France 
Generale  alimentaire2 
2  Cie  de  Kaysesberg 
Charbonnages de  France 
(atate-~uaranteed) 
Cie  g!merale  de  1'ad:io1ogie 
Wanner  I so fi  2 
Credit  national 
Societe  pour le deve1opp!ment 
economique  de  la Picardie 
(state-guaranteed) 
Societe  pour  le  develop-
pement  regional du  Sud-
Ouest  "EXPANSO'' 
(state-guaranteed) 
Societe  du  pipe-line 
Medit~anee - Rh~ne 
Caisse  nationale  des 
autoroutes 
(state-guaranteed) 
CECA  (state-guaranteed) 
PETROFIGAZ 
Gaz  de  France 
(state-guaranteed) 
P.  et  T.  (state-
guaranteed) 
Emprunt  Pyrenees  -
Languedoc  (state-
guaranteed) 
Cie  fran~aise de 
raffinage 
Emprunt  Bretagne  Oc~nie 
(state-guaranteed) 
Electricite  de  France 
(state-guaranteed) 
Societe  de  developpement 
region  ale  du Nord  e t  du 
Pas-de-Calais  (state-
guaranteed) 
Cie  fonciere  du  ch~teau 
d'eau  de  Faris2 
Cpt.  des  industries  de 
ma t~riaux de  construction 
Societe  fran~aise des 
nouvelles galeries  reunies 
Societe de  developPement 
regional  de  1'0uest 
(state - guaranteed)(  SODt.RO) 
Credit  foncier  de  France 
Societe  de  deve lopJ:ement 
regional  du  Centre-Est 
(mtate-guaranteed) 
Cpt.  des  industries  du 
l:Q.timent  et des  trav. pub, 
Caisse  cent.  de  cred. 
ha-telier commerc. et  ind. 
(~tate-guaranteed) 
Groupement  de  l~ndustrie 
siderurgique 
Societe  pour  le develop-
pement economique  du 
Centre  et  du  Centre-Quest 
(state-guaranteed) 
(SODECCO) 
Groupement  de l'equipe-
ment  automobile 
~NCA (state-guaranteed) 
Ville  de  Paris 
Cie  bancaire 
Electricite  de  France 
(state-guaranteed) 
Caisse  d'aide a 1'equi-
pement  des  collectivites 
locales 
SNCF  (state-guaranteed) 
FELIX  FOTIN 
Lignes  telegraphiques 
et  telephoniques 
Societe  francraise  des 
telephones  ERICSSON 
Cie  francraise  de 
l'AZOTE 
Guichard  - Perrachon  et 
cie  (Eta.economiques 
du  CASINO) 
Amount 
(nominal  . 
1  .  DuratJ.on  va  ue  l.n 






Issued  Redeemable  at 
at 
(%) 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
Coupon  Actual  yield 
interest  on  issue4 
rate 
Net  Gross 
(before  (after 
tax  credit  p ersom;al 
tu credit) 
900  1/19 y. 1l  m~  I  - after  100  100  or prize draw:ing=;  6.25  6.18  6.80 
5 years 
27.3  3/7/12/15  I  - after  100  104/110/116  5-75-6.5<  6. 36 
15.2  3/15 
315  1/6/12/18 
24.48 4 y .n m/ 
lly~ 11  m 
Boo  1j2o 
15  1/15 





800.4  3/7/11/15/19 
115  1/5/10/15 
500 
468.7  1/5/10/15/20 
19.8  1/15 
150  1/6/12/18 
23.9  1/15 
650  15 
17-9  1/15 
14.25 1/3/13 
45·5  1/5/10/15 
100  1/7/13/18 
26 •. 25  1/15 
900  1y  .j19 y. 
11 m. 1 
35.2  1/15 
120  2/7/12/15 
300  1/5/10/15 
450  1/20 
16.3  1/15 
20.2  2/7/12/15 
930  7/11/15/19 
360  1/20 
180  1/6/11/15 
400  15 
148.5  3/6/9/12/ 
15/18 
450  5/10/15/20 
25  3/15 
15  3/15 
15  2/7/12/15 
50  3/7/11/15 
so  2/15 
5 years 
I  - after  100 
4 years 
B  _  after  7 and  100 
14  year~ 
I  - after  99.9 
4 years 





5· 50-6.  5<  4.10 
6.25  6.20 
6.50  6.48 




I_  after 
100  100  or prize dra~ 6. 25  6 .18 
5 years 




99.75  109 
99.75  109 
99-75  103/106/112 
100  103/110-5/123.75 
B - a ft8' 11 and  100  102/107.5/113.75/ 
128-75  15years 
I- after 
5  years 
99-25  103/108/112 
B- after 6 and  100 





I_  after 
9  years 
I- after 
5  years 
B- after 6 and 
9 Y'::!&rs 
I_  after 
5 years 
I_  after 
3  years 
I_  after 
7  years 
I- after 
10  years 
I- after 





99·50  105/110/116 
100  110 
99· 70  112 
100  110 
100  104/108 
98.60  104/108/112 
99-05  106/112/118 























6.- -6.75  4·74 
6.75  6.84 
I- after  100  100  or p:-jze  draw~'S  6 •75  6.74 
6.58 
5  years 
I- after 
5  years 
I- after 
7  years 
I- after 
10  years 
I- after 
5  years 
I- after 
8 years 
B- after  11 and 
15 years 
I- after 
5  years 
I- after 
1  years 
B- after 1 and 
11 years 
B- after 7 and 




7  years 
I- after 
7  years 
I- after 
11  years 
I- after 
6  years 
99.85  108 
99.65  100/103/110 
100  102/107/113 
99.30  105 
99.85  108 
99,50  100/105/110 
100  102/107/113/ 
128.7? 
100  103.75  or prize 
drawings 
99-40  100/104/108 
99-30  110 
98.65  101/103/105/108/ 
113/120 
99.30  103/109/116/124 
98.10  109 
98.10  109 
98.40  104/108/112 
98.15  105/107/112 







































































Credit foncier  de  France  900 
Societe  Lorraine  de  develop- 22.44 
pement  et d'expansion 
(state-guaranteed) 
Societe de  developpement 
r&gional  de  Normandie 
(state-guaranteed) 
Gr6upement  des  industries  de 
materiaux  de  construction 
La  Rochette-Cenpa 
Societe de  developpement  de 
la region mediterraneenne 
(state-guaranteed) 
Societe  de  developpement 
regional du  Sud-Est  (s~ate­
guaranteed) 
Societe de  developpement 
regional du  Nord  et du  Pas-
de-Calais  (state-guaranteed) 





Caisse nationale  de  credit 
agricole  (state-guaranteed) 
Groupement  des  industries  de 
la,construction electrique 
La  Cellulose  du  Pin 
Cie  royale  asturienne  des 
'mines 
Groupement  des  industries 
agricoles alimentaires et 
de  grande  consommation 
Laboratoires  Labaz 
Ste de  developpernent 
regional de  l'Ouest et des 
Antilles - Guyane  (state-
guaranteed) 
Caisse nationale  des  auto-
routes  (state-guaranteed) 
P.  et T.  (state-guaranteed) 
St' de  developpement  regio-
nal  du  Sud-Ouest  (~tate­
guaranteed) 
Caisse centrale de  credit 
h~telier,  commercial  et 
industrial 























Duration  Early 
redemption 
option 
(a)  (b) 
A.Domestic  issuers 
1120 ;reare  I  - after 
11  monthe  5 years 














6  years 
I  - after 
5  years 
I  - after 
12 years 
I  - a.fter 
t5  years 
I  - after 
6  years 
I  - after 
6  years 
I  - after 
6  years 
I  - after 
12 years 
I  - ,a.fter  ·r  years 
I  - after 10  years 
I  - after 5 
years 
I  - after 12 
and  16  years 
I  - after 
8  years 
115110115  I  - after 6 
I I  I 
L  years 










6  years 
I  - after 
10  years 
I  - after 9 
years 
I  - after 
5  years 
I  - after 
5 years 





































96.95  105lllllll7 









































on  issue 
Net  Gross 
before (after 








































8.17 Table  PD  3  - ITALY 
List of issues• 
Opened  for 
Amount  Earl7  Actual 
(in Lit.  redemp- Redeem- Coupon  ;rield 
subscription  Issuer  Dura- Issued  able  interest 
on  •ooo  tion  tion  .  on  8  million)  option  at.  at  rate 
<•>  <•> 
18&Ue 
(a)  (b)9 
.&..  Do~~estic issuers 
.!221 
-. 1  EHEL  (state-guaranteed)  125  20  7  94-15  100,0  6  6.67 
-. 1  EHEL1  (state-guaranteed)  100  3/20  7  97-75  "  6  6.)66 
-. 1  Autostrade2  (IRI-guaranteed)  100  3/20  10  91·- "  6  6.45 
-. 1  Crediop  (FF.SS.)  70  20  2  94.-7  .  6  6.68 
-.  2  II  (LaT.  agr.)  21.1  20  94--7  "  6  6.66 
-.  2 
II  (18.11.66 No.  676)  122.7  20  94.-7  .  6  6.66 
-. 3 
II  (dot.  laT.  agr.)  125.6  20  96.50  "  6  6.54 
-. 4  Autostrade TO-AL-PC  10  5/25  65.-7  .  5·50  7·35 
-.  6  Cor.une  di Ro ..  10  20  10  96-- "  6  6.61 
-.  7  IMI  26° aeries  140  20  at an7  96.- "  6  6.61 
time 
-. 7  EHEL  (state-guaranteed)  125  20  5  94.157  .  6  6.66 
-. 7  FF.SS.  (Az.  Aut.)  100  20  10  96.- .  6  6.61 
-. 9  Crediop  (P.  Terde)  153  20  3  96·- .  6  6.61 
-.  9  FF.SS.  (Az.  Aut.)  50  20  10  96-- .  6  6.61 
-. 9  Certificati FAP  54-1  10  at any  96.50  .  5.50  5-90 
tille 
-.  10  Autostrade2  (IRI-guaranteed)  ~  67  2/20  10  97-50  .  6  6.41 
33  6 
-.  10  Edilizia Scolastica3  231  15  99·- "  5·50  5.72 
-.  11  Crediop  (inter....  stat 30)  156-7  20  96·- "  6  6.61 
-.  11  Certificati AIMA4  61  1/11  99.- "  5.50  5·77 
-.  10  Mediocredito Centrale  77  2/10  at an7  95·50  .  6  6.97 
time 
B.  Foreie issuers 
.!221 
197.- I  - •  11  European Investment Bank  15  3/20  9  "  6  6.45 
•  See  notes  on  lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6), Table  PD  3•  (c;ontd.) 
Opened  for 
Amount  Early  Redeea- Actual 
subscription  Issuer 
(in Lit.  Dura- redemp- Issued  able  -coupon  yield 
on 
1000  tion  tion  at  at  flntereet  On  8 
million)  option  (~)  (~)  rate  issue 
(a)  (b)9 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
~ 
-.  1  Certificati Az.  Petrolif.  50  2  99·- .  5  5.75 
-.  1  EifEL  (state-guaranteed)  125  20  1  94-15 7  "  6  6.86 
-. 1  EifEL 1  lstate-guaranteed)  100  3/20  7  97-75  "  6  6.36 6 
-.  1  BTP  ( contanti)  5  213  9  100  "  5  5-57 
-.  2  Certificati  AIMA  40  1/11  99·- "  5·50  5·77 
-. 2  Mediocredito Centrale  15  2/10 
lat  any 
95.50 7  "  6  6.97  time 
-. 3  FF.SS. (Az.  Aut.)  100  20  10  93·50 
7  "  6  6.95 
-. 3  Crediop  (interY. stat. 30)  126  20  93·50 
7  "  6  6.95 
-. 3  Mediocredi  • ..,  Centrale  5  2/10 
at any 
95-50 
7  "  6  6.97  u .. 
-. 4  EifEL  30  3/20  1  97-75  "  6  6.36 
-. 5  Crediop  (Green Plan)  206  20  3  96.- .  6  6.61 
-.  5  FF.SS.  (Az.  Aut.)  100  20  10  93·50 
7 
"  6  6.95 
-.  5  BTP  10  9  100  "  5  5-57 
6  CIS  30  15 
at any 
96.- .  6  6.73  -.  time 
-.  6  Certificati Az.  Petrolif.  45  2  99·- "  5  5-75 
-.  6  Pirelli (connrtible)  24  (10/5)  100  .  5  -
-.  1  Comune  di Napoli  (state-guaranteed)  30  20  10  96-- "  6  6.61 
-. 7  ENEL  (state-guaranteed)  125  20  5  94.15 7  "  6  6.86 
-.  7  EifEL  (state-guaranteed)  150  3/20  1  97·75  "  6  6.36 
-.  7  FF.SS.  (Az.  Aut.l  100  20  10  93·50 7  "  6  6.95 
-.  9  Bancoper (MEPI l  25  2/20  3  96-- "  6  6.58 
-.  9  Autostrade2  (IRI-guaranteeaJ  150  2/18  9  97-75  "  6  6.38 
-.  9  Comune  di  Rolla  (state-guaranteed)  10  20  10  96.50  "  6  6.54 
- •  10  Crediop  (interY.  stat.  40)  120.5  20  93-50 
7 
"  6  6.95 
- •  11  Citta di VENEZIA  11.7  20 
at any 
94·-
7  "  6  6.54  time 
- •  12  Crediop  (FF.SS,)  60  20  94.10 7  "  6  6.87 
- •  12  Crediop  (interY.  stat.  40)  77-3  20  93-80 7  .  6  6.91 
- •  12  ISVEIMER  30  2/13  93·50 7  "  6  7.06 
- •  12  Edilizia Scolaatica 20  249  15  93-60 7  "  5-50  5·97 
B.  Forei15!!  issuers 
!i@_ 
-.  2  ECSC  15  5/20  6  97·50  "  6  6.38 
- •  10  ECSC  15  5/20  6  97-50  "  6  6.38 
- •  12  European  InYeatment  Bank  15  3/20  9  96.50  "  6  6.51 
•  See  notes  on  lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  3•  (contd.) 
Opened  Amount  Dura- Warly  Iasued  Redeee- Coupon  Actual 
for  (in Id.t.  tion  redemp- at  able at !interest  yield 
eubscription  I  s  s  u  e  r  '000  tion  (")  (")  rate  on 
on  •illion)  option  issueS 
(a)  (b) 
9 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
1222 
-. 1  Bancoper  (MIPI)  50  2/18  96.25  n  6  6.54 
-.  1  l!:N'BL  120  3/17  97.25  "  6  6.42 
-.  1  EN'BL  125  20  93.607  "  6  6.94 
-. 1  Crediop  ( interv.  stat.  40)  191.2  20  93.807  n  6  6.91 
-.  3  Crediop  (Green Plan)  203.1  20  96.- "  6  6.61 
-. 4  EN'BL  30.0  3/17  7  94.757  "  6  6.75 
-. 4-6  B'I'P  482.0  9  - 100.- n  5  5·57 
-.  5-6  CIS  50.0  5/10  - 96.- "  6  6.64 
-.  5  IS~IMER  60.0  3/12  - 96.- "  6. 
(  6.71 
-. 6  Comune  di Rom"  7.5  20  93·507  "  6  6.95 
-.  6  IMI  27a  145.0  1/19  - 96.- "  6  6.59 
-. 6  Crediop  ( interv.  stat.  Sa)  118.0  20  - 94.157  "  6  6.86 
-. 1  ENl!:L  120.0  3/17  7  97.25  n  6  6.42 
-. 1  ENHL  125.0  20  4  93.907 
"  6  6.89 
-.  1  FS  (Az.  Aut.)  200.0  20  10  93.807 
"  6  6.91 
-.  7  Crediop (FS)  5().0  20  - 94.107  "  6  6.87 
-. 1  Bancoper  (MRPI)  25.0  2/10  - 96.00  "  6  6.55 
-. 7  EN!  100.0  20  - 93·50  "  6  6.95 
-. 7  IRFB  30.0  5/10  - 96.00  "  6  6.62 
-. 9  Crediop ( interv. stat.  6°)  393.3  20  - 91.80  n  6  7.19 
- •  11  Autos  trade  ( IRI-guaranteed)  100.0  2/18  10  93.00  n  6  7.02 
- •  11  Crediop ( interv.  stat.  6°1  2nd  tranche)  159-2  20  - 89.00  "  6  7.60 
- •  12  Crediop (FS)  5().0  20  - 89.00  "  6  7.60 
- •  12  Edilizia Scolastica 3°  297.0  15  - 93.50 
n  5.50  7.16 
- .•  12  Crediop (interv. stat.  6°1  3rd tranche)  63.2  20  - 89.00  "  6  7.60 
Bo  Forei~m issuers 
~  I  ..... I  -. 2  IDB  15  5/15  "  6  6.55 
* 
See  notes  on  lists ot ieaues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  4  - NETHERLANDS 








31.  1 
11· 3 




4·  1 
(16.  8 to 
29.  9) 
17. 8 




Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities 
povernment  of the Netherlands 
Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities 
·Bank  for  Netherl~nds Municipalities 
Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities 
Government  of the  Netherlands 
Blauwhoed  N.V.,  Amsterdam 
Stichting Het  Dorp 
Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities 
Rotterdam-Rijn Pijpleiding Mij 
Rentespaarbrieven - Bank  for Netherlands 
Municipalities  (196?  series I  to VI) 
Nederlandse  Staatsmijnen 
Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities 
Government  of the  Netherlands 

































A.  Domestic  issuers 
11-25  10 
11-25  10 
11-25  10 
11-25  10 
11-25  10 
11-25  10 
11-20  11 
11-25  10 
11-25  10 




11-20  11 
11-25  10 















B.  Foreign issuers 

















































6.50 Table  PD  4•  (contd.) 
Opened  Amount  Earl;r  Issued  Redeem- Coupon  for  Issuer  (Fl.  Duration redemp-
at~)  able  interest  Actual 
subscription  million)  tion 
at<:')  rate  yield  1 
on  option  on  issue 
(a)  (b)  5 
J..  Domestic  issuers 
~ 
15.12.67  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  100  11-25  10  98·75  100  6.50  6.62 
12. 1  Nederlandse  Gasunie  100  11-20  10  99.25  100  6.50  6.58 
s.  2  Government  of the  Netherlands  250  11-25  10  99-50  100  6.50  6.55 
13. 3  Koninklijke Luchtvaart  Mij  100  11-20  10  100  100  7  7 
(12.  3 to  Rentespaarbrieven - Bank  for  Netherlands  65  fran6i  100  150/  6.50 
29. 4)  Municipalities  (1968  series I  and  II)  to9;ream.  175 
28.  2  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  150  11-25  10  98-75  100  6.50  6.62 
28.  3  Algemene  Bank  Nederland  43-5  11-15  11-t  B~J:Stiae  100  100  6.50  (3) 
6. 5  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  150  11-25  10  99  100  6.50  6.60 
6. 6  Verenigde  Maohinefabrieken  15  6-15  at an;rtill 100  100  6.50  (3) 
14. 6  Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities  250  11-25  10  99  100  6.50  6.60 
3. 7  Pakhoed-Holding  35  11-20  11  99-50  100  7  7.06 
(29. 7 to  Rentespaarbrieven - Bank  for  Netherlands  65  8l  (4)  100  175 4  6.60 
14. 8)  Municipalities  (1968  series III)  4 
21. 8  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  100  11-25  10  99-75  100  6.75  6.78 
3. 9  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  100  11-25  10  99-75  100  6.75  6.78 
8.10  Government  of the Netherlands  233.3  11-25  10  99-50  100  6.50  6.55 
13.11  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  140  11-25  10  98-25  100  6.50  6.67 
(10.12 to  Rentespaarbrieven - Bank  for Netherlands  6).1  from~to  100  150/  6.50 
31. 1.69)  Municipalities  (1968  series IV  and  V)  11  Va:l- 200 
7  a  s 
12.12.68  Government  of the  Netherlands  225  11-25  10  99  100  6.50  6.60 
B.  Forei15n  issuers 
~ 
17. 5  European  Investaent  Bank  40  11-20  11  98-25  100  6.75  6.94 
17. 5  IBRD  40  11-20  11  98.25  100  6.75  6.94 
3.7  IDA  30  11-20  11  99  100  7  7-11 
•  See  notes on lists of issues (following Table  PD  6). •  Table  PD  4  (contd.) 
Opened  Amount  Early  Redeem- Coupon  Actual 
for  Issuer  (Fl.  Duration !redemp- Iss•ed  able  interest  Jield 
subscription  million)  tion  at  at  rate  on  issue1 
on  {a)  (t~ti~n  (%}  (%) 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
!22.2 
31.1  Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities  100  fal6 ito  10  100  100  1  1·00 
11  1/4 
;rears 
20.2  Government  of  the  Netherlands  350  11-25  10  100  100  1  7-00 
21.3  Nationale  Investeringsbank  60  11-20  11  99-50  100  7-25  7.31 
(Herstelbank) 
25.4  Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities  150  11-25  10  100  100  7-50  7-50 
14.5  Nederlandse  Gasunie  100  11-20  10  100  100  7.50  7·50 
(13.6  to  Rentespaarbrieven - Bank  for  Nether~  14.6  8  3/4  100  185  7-25  7-25 
31.7)  Municipalities  (1969  series  IV) 
19.6  Government  of  the Netherlands  250  11-25  10  100  100  1·50  7-50 
18.7  Bank  for Netherlands Municipalities  100  11-25  10  98  100  7-50  7-71 
19.8  Amsterdam-Rotterdam  Bank  40  1  - 99i  100  8  8.10 
9·9  Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities  250  11-25  10  100  100  8  8 
29.9  Amsterdam-Rotterdam  Bank  50  7  - 100  100  8  8 
21.10  Government  of the  Netherl&uds  300  6-7  - 100  100  8  8 
21.10  Government  of the  Netherlands  200  11-25  10  98i  100  8  8.17 
7.11  Bank  for  Netherlands Municipalities  200  6-7  - 100  100  8  8 
21.11  Samenwerkende  Electriciteits 
Productiebedrijven  50  11-25  10  991/4  100  8  8.08 
26.11  Bank  Mees  & Hope  25  6  - 100  100  8  8 
9.12  Nederlandsche  Middenstandsbank  25  1  - 100  100  8  8 
10.12  Bank  for  NetherlaAds Municipalities  100  11-25  10  98  3/4  100  8  8.14 
19.12  Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank  50  5  - 100  100  8.25  8.25 
•  See  notes on lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  5 - BELGIUM 
Liat ot iaauea• 
Early  Redeem- Actual 
Opened  for  Amount  Dura-
redemp- Issued  able  Coupon  yield 
subscription  Issuer  (Bfrs.  tion  at  at  interest  tion  on 
on  million)  option 
(~)  (") 
rate  issue 
(a)  (b)4 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
!2.§1 
9·  1  Ville de  Bruxelles 1967-1977  2  500  10  99  100  7  7-17 
30.  1  Etat belge 1967-72-78  5  Boo  11  5  100  100-101  6.75-7  6.B6  (6.76) 
7y. 1/2m.  7y.  1/2m. 
30.  1  Etat belge 1967-1982  1 710  15  99.50  100  1  7.08 
20.  2  SNCI  1967-17-87  2 000  20  10  99.50  100-104  1  (7.07) 
22.  3  RTT  1967-13-79  4  000  12  6  99.50  100-101  6.75-7  6.92  (6.85) 
-.  3  EBES  1  250  15  99.25  7-15 
17·  4  Fonds  des routes 1967-1982  6 000  15  99.50  100  1  7.08 
4  Esmalux  1  200  20  97.50  7-50  - . 
10.  5  SNCB  1967-73-82  3500  15  6  99.50  100-101  6.75-7  6.92  (6,B5 
15·  6  Etat belge 1967-72-78  B 960  llJ'  5 Y'.  100  100-101  6.75-7  6.88  (6.74 
3  m.  3m. 
15·  6  Etat belge 1967-1982  5 330  14  99.50  100  1  7.o8 
7y. 1/2 m. 
2B.  8  Ville de  Li~ge 1967-72-77  Boo  10  5  99  100-101.'  6.75-7  (6.99 
18.  9  CNCP  1967-73-79  5CO  12  6  99.50  1~101  6.75-7  - (6.85 
2.10  Etat belge 1967-74-82  10  000  14  y.  6 y.  100  100-10(  6.75-7  6.B2  (6.75 
4m.  4  m. 
-· 10  ACEC1  125  20  97.50  7.50 
6.11  Ville d'Anvers 1967-1979  2 000  12  99.50  101  1 
-· 11  Distrigaz  1  500  20  97-50  7.50 
4ol2  Fonds  des  routes 1967-1979  6 000  12  99.50  100  6.75  6.83 
B.  ForeiQ! issuers 
!2.§1 
24.10  European Investment Bank  750  15  6  99.50  100  1  7.o8 
30.11  IDB  300  15  6  99.50  100  1  7.o8 
•  See  notes on  lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  5•  (contd.) 
Early  Redeem- Actual 
Opened  for  Amount  redemp- Issued  able  Coupon  yield 
subscription  Issuer  (:B:frs.  Dura- at  at 
tion  ticn  interest  on 
on  million)  option  (%)  (%)  rate  issue 
(a)  (b)4 
A.  Domestic issuers 
1968 
8.  1  Ville de  Gand  1968-1980  1 000  12  98.25  100  6.75  7.04 
11.  1  C:NCP  1968-1980  500  12  99  101  6.75  -
1·  2  Etat belge 1968-1978  10  000  10  99-50  100  6.75  6.84 
20.  3  Interc.  Autor.  E 3 1968-1980  5 000  12  99  100  6.75  6.89 
3  Soc.  M~t. Hainaut-Sambre  2  400  20  7.95  -· 
16.  4  SliCB  1968-1983  2  500  15  99.75  100  6.75  6.79 
13.  5  Ville d'Anvers 1968-1983  2 000  15  99-75  100  6.  7-5  .. 
13.  5  Ville de  Li~ge 1968-1983  1 000  15  99.75  100  6.75  .. 
-·  5  Cie  Lambert  pour l'industrie et la finance1  150  20  7-50 
17.  6  Etat beige 1968-75-83  10 000  15  7  99-50  100-101  6.50-6.75  ~-65(6.59) 
-·  6  Petrotina3  2 000  12  6.50 
9·  7  Etat beige 1968-74-80  8  665  12  6  99.50  100  6.50-6.75 6.68(6.60) 
9·  7  Etat belge 1968-1980  12  185  12  99.25  100  6.75  6.86 
24.10  RTT  1968-198  2  4500  14  99  100  6.75  6.91 
-· 10  Interbrabant1  400  20  100  7.50 
2.12  Fonds  des routes 1968-1983  8000  15  99  100  6.75  6.90 
B.  ForeiS!! issuers 
1968 
6.  3  ECSC  750  15  99  100  6.75  6.858 
14.11  European Investment Bank  750  14  6  99  100  6.75  6.91 
•  See  notes on  lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  5•  (oontd.) 
Early  Redeem- Actual 
Opened  for  Amount  Dura- redemp- Issuec  able  Coupon  yield 
subscription  Issuer  (Bfrs.  tion  tion  at  at  interest  on 
on  million)  option  rate  issue 
(a}  (b)4 
(~)  (~) 
A.  Domestic  issuers 
~ 
9·  1  Intercom.  Autor.  E  3  1969-1981  5 000  12  98.50  100-101  6.75  7.00 
17.  2  Etat belge  196 9-197 5-198 2  5  650  13  6  99  100-103  6.50-6.7~  6.78 
17.  2  Etat belge 1969-1980  11  600  11y.  6 m.  98.50  100  6.75  6.97 
22 d. 
20.  3  SNCB  1969-1977-1984  3500  15  8  99.25  100-106  6.75  6.99 
28.  4  Fonds  des routes 1969-1981  9  200  12  98.50  100  7.00  7.25 
14.  4  Societe de  traction et d'electricite SA 
a Brm:elles5 
1 000  12  100  100  6.50  6.50 
5·  5  La  Societe generale de  Banque7  1  500  12  100  100  6.50  6.50 
19.  5  Kredietbank6  792  11  100  100  5.50  5.50 
16.  6  Etat belge  1969-1975-1981  9 450  12  6  99  100-102  7.00-7 .2t  7.28 
16.  6  Etat belge 1969-1987  5 550  18  99.50  100  7.50  7.57 
8  7.61  1.  9  Interc.  Autor.  E  3 1969-1984  2  000  15  100  5 
9·  9  CNCP  1969-1975  500  6  99  101  7.10  7.45 
13.10  Etat belge 1969-1975-1981  24  345  11 ~ 6m.  5Y·  6m.  99.50  100-106  8.00-8.2  8.39 
24.11  RTT  1969-1981  3  500  12  99  100-101  8.25  8.44 
10.12  Ville de  Liege 1969-1983  1  00('  14  98.50  100-105  8.25  8.64 
10.12  Ville d'Anvers 1969-1983  2  000  14  98.50  100-105  8.25  8.64 
15.12  SNCI  196 9-1980  1  500  11  99  100-1('1  8.25  8.45 
•  See  notes  on  lists of issues  (following Table  PD  6). Table  PD  6  - LUXEMBOURG 
List of issues• 
Opened  for 
subscription  Issuer 
on 
~ 
20.  2  Government  loan 1967  (1st tranche) 
11.12  Government  loan  1967  (2nd  tranche) 
,!968 
22.  4  City of Luxembourg  1968 
lli.2 
17.  3  Government 















20  after 5 
and  12 
years 
20  after 5 
and  12 
years 
15  after 7 
years 
15  after 8 
years 
Issued  Redeem- Coupon  Actual 
at  able at interest  yield 
(~)  (~)  rate  on  issue 
Domestic  issuers 
99  5.75/6/  (5.99/6.01/ 
6.25  6.03) 
99  6/6.25/  ( 6.18/6.21/ 
6.5  6.23) 
99  6.5  6.66 
99.60.  100  6.5  6.566 Notes  on  lists of  issues 
•  These  are generally "block"  issues.  Many  of the  lists are  incomplete because  some 
countries record major  issues  only. 
(a)  First and final  redemption dates  are  taken  into account. 
(b)  Where  there is an  early redemption option,  the  lists show  whether it is the issuer's 
(I)  or the bearer's  (B)  option.  They  also give  the  number  of years after which,  or 
the date from  which,  advance  redemption is possible. 
GERMANY 
1.  These  are  loans by foreign  issuers floated  in DM,  or with  a  DM  option,  and  placed 
either by  international oonsortia led by a  German  member  or by wholly German  consortiL 
1.  Redemption  by drawings,  either at par or by prize drawings. 
2.  Convertible bonds. 
3.  The  loan,  which  is divided  into five  equal series, will be  repaid by  drawings  (one 
each in 197 3,  197 8  and  198 31  two  in 1988). 
4.  Brokerage charges  and  stock-exchange  taxes  were  taken  into account  in calculating 
the yield. 
5.  Contracts for loans floated  in France  often contain special clauses which  could not 
be  mentioned  in the  lists.  In calculating actual yields,  allowance  was  made  for the 
tax credit  on  interest and  on  redemption premiums  so that the figures  would  be 
comparable  with  those for other countries. 
1.  Cash  prizes during the first three years. 
2.  Motor  oar prizes during the first  two  years. 
3.  Banca d'Italia subscriptions•  Lit.  100  000  million in October,  Lit.  100  000  million 
in November  and  Lit.  31  aoo  million in December  (in January  Lit.  100  000  million 
offered to the  public,  the  remainder to the banks for compulsory  reserves). 
4•  Lit.  30  000  million subscribed in October,  Lit.  10  000  million  in November  and 
Lit.  21  000  million in December. 
5·  Cash  prizes totalling Lit.  50  million for a  series of  Lit.  10  000  milljon. 
- !77-6.  Excluding prizes. 
7.  When  securities are  offered to the public,  the prices  irLdioated are  augmented  by 
placing and  guarantee  commissions. 
8.  Calculated on  the basis of final  redemption date. 
9·  Always  the  issuer's option. 
NETHERLANDS 
1.  Before tax.  Based  on  the  average life before final redemption date.  Subscription 
or purchasing charges are  ignored. 
2.  A further Fl.  20  million offered for private subscription. 
3.  Issues of convertible bonds  with  subscription rightJ  yield therefore depends  on 
the price of the  subscription right. 
4•  Holders  may  opt for early redemption  on  1 December  1974  at  15~, but  the Bank for 
Netherlands  Municipalities is not permitted to redeem  in advance. 
5·  Issuer's option  except  where  otherwise  indicated  (see note 4). 
BElGIUM 
1.  Private issues. 
2.  Loan  convertible into preferred shares in 1978  without  indication of value. 
3.  Loan  convertible into partnership shares from  1 January 1969. 
4•  Always  the bearer's option. 
5.  Loan  convertible into shares from  1 January 1971  ~o 20  December  1978. 
6.  Convertible  and  subordinate  loan  (1  January 1970  to  20  April 1979). 
1·  Convertible and  subordinate  loan  (1  April  1971  to  20  March  1978). 
8.  Loan  featuring prize bonds. 
- 178-Table  R 1  - GERMANY 
Selected yields of fixed-interest securities 
Industrial bonds  Public bonds  Mortgage  bonds 
On  issue  On  secondary  On  issue  On  secoadary  Oa  issue  On  secondary 
market  market  market 
1960  - 6.2  - 6.4  6.6  6.3 
1961  - 5.9  - 5o9  5·9  6.-
1962  - 6.- - 5o9  6.- 6.-
1963  - 6.- - 6,- 6.1  6.1 
1.964  - 6.2  - 6.2  6.1  6.2 
1965  - 1·- - 7.1  1·- 6.7 
1966  - 1·9  - 8.1  1·9  7.6 
1967  - 7.2  1.- 1·- 1·- 1·-
1968  - - - 6.5  6.7  6.8 
w 
January  1·5  7.6  1·1  1·5  1·5  1·3 
February  - 1·5  7.6  1·4  7·4  7.2 
March  - 1·4  1·3  7.2  1·3  7·1 
April  - 7.1  1·- 6.9  6.9  6.8 
May  - 7.1  1·- 6.9  6.8  6.8 
June  6.7  7.1  6.8  6.9  6.7  6.8 
July  6.9  7.1  6.8  6.9  6.7  6.9 
AUg1lst  - 7.1  6.9  6.8  6.8  1·-
September  6.8  1·- 6.8  6.7  6.8  1·-
October  6.8  7.1  6.8  6.7  6.8  1·-
lfoyember  6.7  7.1  6.9  6.8  6.8  7.1 
December  - 7·1  6.8  6.8  6.9  7.1 
~ 
Jaauary  6.9  1·- 6.8  6.7  6.9  7·1 
February  - 1·- 6.8  6.7  6.9  7·1 
March  - 6.9  6.8  6.7  6.9  7.1 
April  - 6.9  6.8  6.6  6.9  1·-
May  6.9  6.1  6.7  6.4  6.7  6.9 
Juae  - 6.7  6.6  6.4  6.7  6.8 
July  - 6.6  6.6  6.4  6.6  6.8 
August  - 6.5  - 6.3  6.5  6.7 
September  - 6.5  6.3  6.3  6.5  6.6 
October  - 6.5  6.3  6.3  6.5  6.6 
November  - 6.6  - 6.3  6.5  6.1 
December  6.4  6.5  6.3  6.3  6.5  6.1 
~ 
Jaauary  - 6.5  6.3  6.3  6.5  6.6 
February  - 6.5  6.3  6.3  6.4  6.6 
March  - 6.7  - 6.4  6.5  6.1 
Apri1.  - 6.8  - 6.5  6.6  6.8 
May  - 6.7  - 6.5  6.7  6.9 
Juae  - 7.0  6.8  6.7  6.8  7.0 
July  - 7.2  - 6.9  6.9  7.2 
August  - 7.1  - 6.9  1·1  7.2 
September  - 7.3  6.9  7.2  7.0  1·3 
October  - 7·4  - 7·4  7.1  1·3 
Jfoyember  - 7.4  7.2  1·4  7-1  7.3 
December  - 7.8  - 7.6  1.0  7.3 
~:  Series 2  of the statistical annexes  to the  monthly  reports of the  Deutsche  Buadesbank  (Taole  ?) • Table  R  2  - FRANCE 
Bond  yields  1 
---
1st class  bonds2  2nd  class  bonds3 
End  of month  Net'+,b  Grosa5t?  Grosa5,? 
1966 
July  6.291  - 7.56 
August  6.336  - 7.53 
September  6.355  - 7.40 
October  6.413  - 7.60 
November  6.422  - 7.56 
December  6.419  - 7.62 
.!2.§.1 
January  6.428  - 1·45 
February  6.368  - 1·44 
March  6.368  - 7.36 
April  6.372  - 7.44 
May  6.39  - 7.41 
June  6.373  - 7.35 
July  6.362  - 7.26 
August  6.345  - 7.30 
September  6,34  - 7.29 
October  6,381  - 7.23 
November  6.364  - 7.35 
December  6.371  - 7.39 
~ 
January  6.433  - 7.37 
February  6.428  - 7.34 
March  6,370  - 1·34 
April  6.384  - 7,31 
May  (10)  6.38  - 7.29 
June  6.754  - 7o55 
July  6.619  7.24  7o34 
August  6.533  7.15  7·43 
September  6,558  7.24  7.40 
October  6.578  7.24  7o41 
November  6.788  7.45  1.10 
December  6.937  7.61  7.83 
1222 
January  7.232  7.85  8.16 
February  7,184  7.87  8.20 
March  7.411  8,10  8.48 
April  7.415  8.08  8.51 
May  7.449  8.12  8.56 
June  7.524  8.18  8.45 
July  7.569  8.16  8.46 
August  7-583  8,21  8.48 
September  7.601  8.27  8.47 
October  7.117  8.44  8.71 
November  7.795  8.51  8.87 
December  7.896  8.63  8.91 
-
1Stock  exchange  yields, i.e.  with  allowance  made  for  brokerage  charges  and  stock exchange  taxes. 
2Bonds  issued or guaranteed  by  the  Government  and  bonds  ranking  with  them. 
3Mainly  bonds  by  private issuers. 
4Index  calculated  by  a  private  company. 
5Index  calculated  by  the  Caisse  des  Dep~ts et Consignations  (average rate on  the last day of  the 
week,  weighted  by  the  average of stock-exchange  transactions  during  the  week). 
6After  ~  deduction of  the  1v~ withholding  tax;  in France,  a  large  number  of institutional 
investors cannot  recover  this  tax. 
7Account  being  taken of restitution of  the  withholding  tax in  the  form of a  tax  credit  (which  maJ 
be  claimed,  in particular,  by  private  individuals subject  to  personal· income  tax and  by  compani.eE 
subject  to  corporation  tax). 
~:  See  Footnotes  4  and  5. Table  ~ 3  - ITALY 
Selected yields of fixed-interest  securities 
Central  Bonds  of institutions  Bonds  All  l  government  specializing in oredi  t  of  bonds 
securities  against  movable  enterprises 
property 
A.  Annual  ave rye 
1965  5.42  6.86  7.20  6.67  1966  5.48  6.55  6.61  6.37 
1967  5.59  6,66  6.75  6.46 
1968  5.63  6.78  6.91  6.54 
1969  5-81  7.06  7.23  6. 73 
B.  Monthl;z  average 
1221 
January  5·56  6.60 
February  5.52  6.56 
March  5.56  6.66 
April  5.60  6.86 
May  5.62  6.78 
June  5.62  6.76 
July  5.61  6.75 
August  5-60  6.70 
September  5.6o  6.76 
October  5.6o  6.13 
November  5.61  6.84 
December  5.61  6.95 
1968 
January  5.62  6.82 
February  5.60  6.74  6.81  6.51 
March  5.59  6.76  6.89  6.52 
April  5.60  6.74  6.92  6.54 
May  5.65  6.79  6.98  6.56 
June  5.66  6.83  6.99  6.58 
July  5.65  6.81  6.92  6.56 
August  5.65  6.79  6.89  6.54 
September  5.64  6.79  6.91  6.55 
'1ctober  5.64  6.77  6.88  6-54  November  5.65  6.78  6.95  6.55 
December  5.62  6.78  6.98  6.55 
1:.2.22 
January  5.61  6.70  6.81  6.50 
February  5.60  6.68  6.75  6.49 
March  5.62  6.72  6.87  6.52 
April  5.63  6.72  6.91  6.52 
May  5.64  6.76  6.87  6.53 
June  5.65  6.83  6.94  6.58 
July  5.66  6.93  7.07  6.63 
A•.1gust  5.68  7.08  7.27  6.73 
September  5.90  7.26  7.55  6.88 
October  6.15  7.46  7.72  7.02 
November  6.28  7.62  7.80  7.12 
December  6.33  7.90  8.14  7.28 
1 Excludi~g central government  securities. 
Sources  Supplement  and  Bulletin of the Banca d'Italia. Table  R 4  - NETHERLANDS 
Selected yields of fixed-interest  securities  (monthly  average) 
Two  5%  and  5  1/4%  4.5%  Bank  for  Three  4.5% 
central government  Netherlands  and  4.75% 
loans  Municipalities  private 
loan  1958/59  sector bonds 
1966 
July  6.68  6.93  ?.oB 
August  6.82  7-07  7.38 
September  6.61  6.77  7.21 
October  6.66  6.77  7-14 
November  6.69  6.74  7.15 
December  6.54  6.74  7-12 
.!2§..7. 
January  6.22  6.35  6.57 
February  6.o8  6.22  6.54 
March  5·98  6.04  6.36 
April  5.88  6.06  6.33 
May  6.06  6.13  6.26 
June  6.29  6.41  6.50 
July  6.30  6.31  6,66 
August  6.18  6.28  6.61 
September  6.12  6.24  6.66 
October  6.26  6.37  6.65 
November  6.37  6.41  6.68 
December  6.37  6.52  6.71 
1968 
January  6.43  6.59  6.81 
February  6.43  6-54  6.83 
March  6.45  6.55  6.84 
April  6.47  6.56  6.83 
May  6.45  6.59  6.71 
June  6.49  6.63  6.84 
July  6.61  6.79  6.81 
August  6.55  6.67  6.93 
September  6.46  6.56  6.85 
October  6.49  6.58  6.88 
November  6.49  6.61  6.91 
December  6.58  6.79  6.98 
1222 
January  6.74  6.89  7.00 
February  6.93  6.95  7.19 
March  7.03  7.oB  7.37 
April  7-29  7.49  7.88 
May  7.31  1·41  7.53 
June  7.53  1·11  8.15 
July  7.69  7-87  8.47 
August  1-19  7-95  8.39 
September  7-98  8.06  8.60 
October  8.12  8.31  8.74 
November  7.81  8.03  8.43 
December  7.86  8.10  8.54 
Source:  Figures supplied to the  Working  Party  on  Securities Markets  by  the  Netherland• 
delegation. Table  R 5  - BELGIUM 
Selected yields of fixed-interest  securities 
I( 
Average  yield on  issue of central  Average  stock-ex~  Average  stock-exchange 
government  and  Road  Fund  loans1  yield  of  central  yield of industrial 
~overnment loans2  debentures3 
With  Without  Vvith  a  currency of  With  a  currency of 
.... i~;~n~  .. 
interim 
m~r~  ..  !~!n  m~r;e!~:n  maturities 
~ 
May  6.59  - 6.59  7.00 
June  - - 6.64  7.35-
July  - - 6,68  7.46 
August  - - 6.69  7.34 
September  6.85  - 6.73  7.31 
October  - - 6,76  7.83 
November  - - 6.67  7.67 
December  - - 6.73  7-74 
122.1 
January  6,86  7.o8  6.76  1·50 
February  - - 6.75  7.83 
March  - - 6,76  7.96 
April  - 7.o8  6.76  7.63 
May  - - 6.77  7.78 
June  6.88  7.o8  6.77  1·13 
July  - - 6.77  7.64 
August  - - 6.64  7.49 
September  - - 6.64  7.40 
October  6.82  - 6,66  7o41 
November  - - 6.57  7.61 
December  - 6.83  6.54  7.57 
~ 
January  - - 6.58  7.62  - 6.84  6.60  7.44 
February  - - 6.51  1·50  March 
April  - - 6.51  7-67 
May  - - 6.47  7.60 
June  6,65  - 6.44  7.62 
July  - - 6.52  7.48 
August  - - 6.45  7.32 
September  6.68  6.86  6.59  7.12 
October  - - 6.58  7.32 
November  - 6,86  6.59  7.49 
December  - 6,90  6.63  7·39 
~ 
January  - - 6.65  7.69 
February  6.78  6,97  6.71  6.61 
March  - - 6.76  7.66 
April  - 7.25  6.84  7.91 
May  - - 7.o6  8.o8 
June  7.28  7.57  7o19  8.44 
July  - - 7.16  8.52 
August  - - 7.22  8.53 
September  - - 1·31  8.94 
October  8.39  - 7.86  9·34 
November  - - 7.82  9.38 
December  - - 1·13  9.21 
1Bulletin d'Information et  de  Documentation of  the  Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique  (Statistical Table  XVI-2). 
2Ibid.,  Table  XIX-6,  rates at  the  beginning of  the  month. 
3unpublished  Banque  Nationale  de  Belgique  figures,  rates at  the  beginning of the  month. 
•Loans  issued after  1  December  1962. Table  E  1  - Gross  public  issues of conventional  foreign  bonds* 
($  million) 
1961  1962  1963 
GERHANY3  6.6  25.0  40.0 
FRANCE  - - -
ITALY  24.0  48.0  24.0 
NETHERLANDS  148.4  63.4  -
BELGIUM  - - -
LUXEMBOURG  - 6.0  -
Total  EEC  179.0  142.4  64.0 
UNITED  KINGDOM  154.6  111.4  165.6 
SWITZERLAND  230.4  161.2  142.0 
S'NEDEN  - 2.0  29.0 
AUSTRIA  - 5.0  -
Total  Europe  564.0  422.0  400.6 
UNITED  STATES  202.8  511.0  287.8 
CANADA  - - -
KUWAIT  - - -
Grand  total  766.8  933.0  688.4 
1964  1965  1966  1967 
132.5  247-5  96.32  156.32 
30.4  25.3  40.5  40.5 
- 24.0  120.0  24.0 
15.2  29.0  - 13.8 
- 10.0  10.0  21.0 
- 0.6  - -
178.1  336.4  266.8  255.6 
196-7  45.9  126.0  102.2 
83.1  77.5  94.1  136.5 
2.9  - - 19.3 
- - - -
460.8  459.8  486.9  513.6 
268.0  290.0  417.0  1 259.1 
- 23.1  18.4  18.4 
- - - -
728.8  772-9  922.3  1 791.1 
•  Generally bonds  issued by  non-residents  or international organizations,  denominated  in  the  currency of the  country 
of issue  and  placed  by  an  issuing  consortium consisting entirely of institutions  from  that country. 
1  Provisional  figures. 
2 
Excluding convertible  bonds  issued by  two  foreign  companies  in exchange  for shares in  two  German  companies. 
3  The  figures  do  not give  a  true  picture of the  volume  of foreign  issues placed on  the  ·3erman  fixed-interest-
securities market.  In addition to  the  foreign  loans  floated  through wholly German  placing consortia,  whicn are 
shown  in the  table,  German  credit institutions arranged  for  the  private  placing of major  foreign  loans  and 
participated in the  payment  of a  large proportion of international loans denominated  in DM.  If private  placings 
and  th~ proportion of international loans of all kinds  placed through German  consortia are also  taken into account, 
foreign  loans  floated on  the  German  market  in 1968  totalled 11  289  million,  the  vast bulk of this being subscribed 
by German  residents. 
~:  Banking Federation of the  EEC  and  figures supplied to the  Working  Party on Securities Markets  by  the 
various delegations. 
1968  19691 
231-2  194 
- -




363.6  218.0 
79·2  -
290.2  222.8 
9.6  -
6.0  4.0 
748.6  444.8 
1 267·7  425 
13.8  -
42-0  -
2 072.1  869.8 Table  E  2  - Public  issues on  the Euro-bond  market• 
(S  million) 
Currency  1961  1962 
Dollars  - -
Units  of account  5·0  5-0 
Currency option  - -
German  marks  - -
Swiss  francs  - -
Guilders  - -
French  francs  - -










1964  1965  1966 
449.2  563.0  842.5 
10.0  - 74-1 
14.0  64-4  19.6 
91.2  67-5  50.0 
- - -
- 48-3  -
- - -
564.4  743.2  986.2 
•  Generally  bonds  placed  by  an  issuing consortium consisting of institutions  from  at least  two  countries. 
1  Provisional  figures. 
~:  Banking  Federation  of the  EEC. 
1967  1968  19691 
1 589.3  2 260.0  1 560.5 
19.0  57-0  60,0 
20.2  28.8  116.4 
15.0  700.0  1 o83.5 
- - -
- - -
12.2  20.2  -
1 655·7  3 066.0  2 820.4 ANNEX  II 
List of members  of the Working Party Chairman&  Mr F.  De  Vogb.el,  Deputy Governor  of the Banque  nationale de  Belgique 
Oermanya  Dr  K.  Andreas, 
Belgium a 
Leiter der Hauptabteilung Kredit,  Deutsche Bundesbank 
(from  23  April 1969) 
Dr  W.  Haak, 
Regierungsdirektor,  Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
(from  5 February 1970) 
Mr H.  Ruppert, 
Leiter der Hauptabteilung Kredit,  Deutsohe  Bundesbank 
(until  23  April 1969) 
Dr B.  Sohr8der, 
Ministerialrat,  Bundesministerium fUr  Wirtschaft 
(until  23  April  1970) 
Dr M.  Stahl  berg, 
Ministerialrat,  Bundesministerium der Finanzen 
(until 5 February 1970) 
Mr H.  Theisunger 
Regierungsd1rektor,  Bundesministerium fUr  Wirtsohaft 
(alternate,  then member  from  23  April 1970) 
Mr  M.  D'Haeze, 
Direoteur general  de  l'administration de  la Tresorerie 
et de  la Dette publique 
Mr  F.  Junius, 
Banque  nationale de  Belgique 
Mr  E.  Kastens, 
Inspeoteur general  au Ministere des  finances 
Mrs  Beauvais, 
Banque  de  France 
(alternate) 
Mr Y.  Berger, 
Conseiller aupres  du  gouverneur de  la Banque  de  France 
Mr  Ph.  Cosserat, 
Direction du Tresor,  Ministere  de  l'economie et des  finances 
(from 1  July 1968) 
Mr  P.  de  Larosiere, 
Sous-Directeur des affaires internationales l  la 
direction du Tresor,  Ministere de  1 1eoonomie  et des  finances 
Mr J. du Pre  de  Saint-Maur, 
Sous-direction "Epargne  et Credit",  direction  du Tresor, 
Ministere de  l'eoonomie et des finances 
(until 1  July 1968) 
- 195  -Luxembourg a 
Netherlands a 
Dr  P.  Battaglia, 
Condirettore centrale,  Banoa  d'Italia 
(from  19 November  1968) 
Dr  G.  Monterastelli, 
Direttore presso Uftioio Studi,  Banoa d'Italia 
Dr  M.  Napolitano, 
Ispettore generale presso Direzione generale del Tesoro, 
Xinistero del Tesoro 
Dr  L.  G.  Romano, 
Direttore presso Vigilanza,  Banoa  d1Italia 
(until 19 November  1968) 
Mr  P.  Bastian, 
Commissaire  du  gouvernement 
(until 5 June 1969) 
Mr  G.  Crauser, 
Attaoh6 de  direction A la Caisse d'6pargne de l'ltat 
Mr E.  Israel, 
Attaoh6 de  direction A la Banque  international& A Luxembourg 
Mr J.H.o.  Graaf van den Bosch, 
Directeur der Nederlandaohe Bank,  NV 
Jhr.  Mr D.J.  de  Geer, 
Direotie van het Binnenlanda Geldvezen,  Ministerie van 
Financiln 
(until  30  May  1969) 
Mr V.  ICeyzer, 
Nederlandsohe Bank,  NV 
(from  30  May  1969) 
Xr E.A.  Liefrinck, 
Direoteur van het Binnenlands Geldvezen,  Ministerie van 
P'inanciln 
Commission  of the European  Communities• 
Xr  F.  Boyer  de  la Giroday, 
Director for Monetary Matters 
Directorate-General  for Economic  and Financial Affairs 
Mr  M.  Sarmet, 
Head  ot Division for Financial Institutions and  CapitaJ 
Markets 
Directorate-General  for loonomio  and Financial Affairs 
Mr H.  Stoller 
(from  24  July 1969  ) 
Xr  L.  Tanter 
(alternate) 
- 196  -Secretariat  a  Mr  R.  de  ICergorlay, 
Secretary of the  Monetary  Committee 
(until 1 July 1969) 
Mr  G.  Morelli, 
Secretary of the Monetary  Committee,  previously member  of 
the Working Party on  the  Commission  Delegation 
(from  24  July 1969) 
Mr  L.  Gouw 
MrG.Lermen 
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